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Abstract
Understanding why some organizations are more effective in their service
delivery than others is a central discourse in both public administration and political
organization. Scholars and practitioners all agree that the defining factor is institutional
(state) capacity.

Since the mid-1980s, deforestation in Zambia has been on the rise, especially in
Protected Forest Areas, suggesting poor management by the Forestry Department, an
institution mandated to manage these public lands. Ironically, despite the strategic
position that forests hold in sustaining both the daily subsistence needs of over 90% of
the Zambian population as well as the as the numerous industries that depend on this
resource,

the

Forestry

Department

has

not

developed

any

specific

strategies/interventions to combat forest degradation arguing that this problem is beyond
its control; the department is underfunded and has inadequate forestry personnel to
oversee its estates. Yet, the data shows that prior to 1980s Forestry Department
operated very effectively on a relatively small budget and a lean structure.

Utilizing longitudinal and cross-sectional data, and based on a multi-method
analysis, this study explores the nexus between public administration and program
implementation on one hand and, the role of politics in policy implementation on the
other. Contrary to the Forestry Department’s mantra that inadequate financial outlays
and field personnel have been the major factors contributing to forest degradation, this
study has found that the problem is managerial incompetence, manifested in lack of
visionary leadership, the practice of cronyism and clientelism, the breakdown in social
capital support, including support by local Chiefs, and the poor quality of political
connection between department managers and the larger political system. Clearly,
resource allocation is a necessary but insufficient condition for improving institutional
capacity, which is intimately connected to larger processes of governance. And this
include, but not limited to, the rules, relationships and partnerships created among
different actors, as well as the resultant environment that links these actors to the larger
social capital outside ones’ locale.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The economic importance of indigenous forests2 to the Zambian
economy and Forestry Department‟s role in ensuring that these
resources are sustainably available to support both the industrial and
daily subsistence needs of the Zambian people is well documented.3
These forests support not only the subsistence needs of over 90% of the
Zambian population (in terms of food, medicines, building materials,
ecological stability, etc.) but are also intricately connected to numerous
industries

such

as

copper

mining,

manufacturing,

construction,

transport (railways), energy, agriculture, tourism, and wood processing
and allied companies.
Unfortunately, for some time now, at least since the late 1980s,
forest degradation4 (arising mainly from deforestation) has been chipping
away at this natural gem, a situation that is not only creating far
2

These are also called natural or native forests to differentiate them from man-made industrial plantations,
where typically exotic fast growing tree species are the norm. In the case of Zambia these include
Eucalyptus and Pine species.
3
Forest Department, National Forestry Policy of 1965; National Forestry Policy of 2000; FD, Annual
Reports, from 1965 to 2005; Oscar S. Kalumiana, Study of the Demand and Supply of Firewood and
Charcoal in Central Province. 1996; GRZ, Zambia Forest Action Plan (PFAP), 1998; Esa Puustjarvi; Guni
Mickels-Kokwe and Moses Chakanga, The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National Economy and
Poverty Reduction in Zambia, September 2005; MENR, Zambia Forest Action Plan, 1996, Volumes I, II
and III.
4
Forest degradation is defined here as the loss of forest cover arising from various activities such as overexploitation for timber and charcoal production, illegal human settlements or simply claiming parts of such
lands for agricultural purposes – the result of which if exposed to severe weather conditions makes such
areas vulnerable. Under these conditions degraded forests lose their ability to provide various products and
services and this could lead to severe consequences that may affect the people miles away from where that
forest is. For simplicity, deforestation and forest degradation are used interchangeably in this study.
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reaching environmental problems such as floods or droughts5 that are
exacerbating food insecurity, but is also raising concerns that the loss of
natural forests could soon affect the industries that have close
connections to this resource. Ultimately, this may cause further
unintended consequences on job security, incomes and in the national
economy. Yet despite this strategic position that natural forests occupy
in the national economy (at least in the minds of those who appreciate
this importance), and given the potential ripple effects that could arise
from the mismanagement of these forests, forest degradation is not being
addressed with the speed and urgency it deserves. The Forestry
Department (FD), an institution mandated to manage Zambia‟s forests,
has not developed any clear strategies to combat this problem.
In fact, forest degradation is particularly pronounced in the
protected forest areas (PFAs), the estates directly administered by the
Forestry Department, a central government bureau, than in the open
forests which fall under the local Chiefs‟ jurisdiction. For instance, in
1986 it was estimated that Zambia was losing between 250,000 to
300,000 hectares (ha.) of forests per year,6 an outdated figure that
Forestry Department continues to use to date. Since that time the
department has not undertaken any forest inventory to establish the rate

5

Felix Ndlovu, et al., Key Threats and Opportunities to Biological Diversity Conservation in the
Copperbelt Province, 2004.
6
De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, et. al., Wood Consumption Resource Survey, Technical Findings
and Conclusion. Field Document No. 2, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Zambia. 1986.
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of forest loss. Yet, considering the intricate connections that indigenous
forests have in people‟s daily lives and the national economy at large, one
would expect FD to have taken this as a priority issue because left
unresolved forest degradation could have far reaching ripple effects
across the nation.
For over two decades (since mid 1980s) when forest degradation
touched down and became recognized as a national problem, FD
managers have continued to complain about inadequate funding and
field personnel as two major constraints working against their efforts to
manage the forest estates effectively. This argument is so entrenched it
has become FD‟s

mantra, and prominently features in all the

department‟s official statements and reports both as an introduction as
well as a conclusion. But since the department knows what is (or has
been) causing forest degradation all these years, why has it continued to
baby sit the problem for so long? How long should we buy into this
argument that inadequate funding and labor shortage are really the
[only] constraints not anything else? Why is it taking forever for the
department to deal with a problem it has known for decades? Also
considering that indigenous forests were in better shape at a time the
department had fewer and a less qualified (skilled) labor force, doesn‟t
this point towards managerial [in]competence rather than the other two
capacities the department has championed every year? Obviously, this
complaint raises an interesting hypothesis worth investigation.
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It is important to note upfront that although FD is only directly
responsible for the management of protected forest areas (PFAs), the
focus of this study, the department also has indirect jurisdictional
control over all natural (indigenous) forests in the country in that all
forms of resource extractions (except those for home consumption) are
licensed by the Forestry Department. It is therefore not an exaggeration
to conceive FD‟s role as a guardian of all natural forests including open
forests too, a public good and communally owned resource that changes
hands through generational inheritance.7
Taking FD‟s official statements as an entry point, this study
investigates why deforestation and, as a consequence, forest degradation
have remained unresolved for so long. Why has FD failed to stop forest
degradation? How do we explain the long staying power of this problem?
In other words, what factors account for the decline in the extent and
quality of protected forest estates, including the seemingly community
indifference towards forest conservation? Is this due to lack of
institutional capacity (IC)? Is IC the only capacity needed? Are there no
other factors at play? And what is institutional capacity? I address these
questions in the discussion that follow throughout this dissertation.

7

Land ownership in Chiefs‟ areas is based on one‟s lineage to a particular ethnic group. In the spirit of
“One Zambia One Nation,” Chiefs use their discretion to embrace people from other ethnic groups who
choose to settle in other areas away from their ethnic groups. This topic is discussed later in Chapter 5
under the land tenure and ownership arrangements.
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Institutional capacity means different things to different people.8
Some focus on tangible resources (as in factors of production);9 others on
the technical knowledge and skills;10 while others emphasize the
functional aspects that highlight the centrality of the human factor,11 the
glue that binds other resources to produce desirable outcome(s). In this
study I conceptualize IC as comprising all the above: an organization has
capacity when it has adequate and appropriate resources required to
undertake a given task and to attain its goals.
From a functional perspective I define IC as an organization‟s
ability to create and sustain an environment and relationships that
facilitate and support purposeful, collective action geared towards
achieving its objectives.12 This definition is certainly more appropriate
because it operationalizes IC and goes beyond the traditional conception
that portrays IC in terms of quantity of the factors of production and
overlooks the functional and relational interactions of the human factor
with other factors both within and outside an organization. In this

8

This topic is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Paul C. Nutt, Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision-Making, 1989;
Victor A. Thompson, Decision Theory, Pure and Applied, 1971; Herbert A. Simon, et. al., Public
Administration, 1950; Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, (Dorsey Press), 1987.
10
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems (Earthscan
Publications), 2002.
11
Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
(Westview Press), 1997; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and
Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political Science Review, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3;
Richard W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (Sage), 1989:21.
12
This definition draws on different scholars‟ conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley,
“Capacity and Planning for Growth,” in: Goran Cars, et. al. (eds.), Urban Governance, Institutional
Capacity and Social Milieux, 2002.
9
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respect, IC is conceived both in terms of tangible inputs as well as the
functional aspects.
Although the focus of this study is strictly institutional capacity
and how this has influenced FD‟s performance outcomes on natural
forests management, it is also important to note that other intervening
factors such as climate, population growth, political economy dynamics,
international treaties on forestry and the environment, and government
policy reforms and interventions (e.g. the [in]famous World Bank/IMF
sponsored structural adjustment program and its conditionalities) which
have the potential to tilt the scale are also acknowledged as part of the
larger discussion.
However, initially these external factors are kept constant so we
can first analyze the institutional capacity dimension and its impacts.
This is done on the assumption that these conditions applied equally to
all sectors and agencies not just to forestry and the forest agency. The
only difference is how the managers in respective bureaus responded to
such conditions, which speaks to the idea of managerial capacity, the
focus of this dissertation. For this reason, external factors re-appear as
part of the larger discussion. As we will see later this helps to put FD‟s
achievements and shortcomings into context that managerial capacity
has been a defining characteristic on what was and was not achieved,
and now continues to be a major weakness. And why should anyone care
about this? One reason is that this kind of inquiry gives us the
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opportunity to launch into a larger question of why forestry in Zambia
contributes so little to the national gross domestic product (GDP),
ranging from 0.02 to 0.09%.13 Secondly, and better still, since state
capacity is a sum of its parts (i.e. its agencies), understanding the factors
affecting the performance of individual bureaus is a good starting point
to get to know how weak states, a common phenomenon on the African
continent, come about. And Zambia is no exception. For instance,
despite its natural wealth both below and above ground, Zambia has
been successfully managed into oblivion. The country has fallen from
being a medium high income nation to becoming a highly indebted poor
country (HIPC). So the larger question worth investigating, which this
study partially contributes to, is how did the Zambian government lose
the ability to manage its economic affairs effectively? And what can be
done to rectify the situation? Before addressing these institutional / state
capacity issues a brief history about the case study and forestry work in
Zambia will be appropriate.

The Case Study
Zambia covers a total area of 752,612 square kilometers (km2), just
slightly bigger than the state of Texas, and shares borders with eight
neighbors: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Administratively, the

13

CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, from 1970 to 2005.
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country is divided into nine provinces,14 and currently has a total
population of 11.7 million15 people of which 35% live in urban areas and
the remaining 65% are in the rural areas.16 This has been an interesting
shift considering that for a long time Zambia has been the most
urbanized country in Southern Africa, a phenomenon the Kaunda
administration tried to change through its “go back to the land” policy
but which never worked. Better living conditions in the urban areas (paid
employment, good wages and availability of social services) acted as
strong magnets that accelerated the rural-urban drift. But following
some policy reforms in the 1990s and beyond that necessitated
downsizing of the public service and closure of previously state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) people have been forced to seek other means of
livelihoods, and going back to the land became a natural, if not, the only
choice. As a former colony British, and particularly for purposes of
unifying the different ethnic groupings, English has been retained as the
official language. Traditionally, Zambia boasts of 73 local languages
(compressed to 7 for administrative convenience),17 which translate into
an enormous cultural and linguistic diversity the Zambian social
landscape is famous for (Figure 1.1).18

14

CSO, Living Conditions 2004c:1, 13.
CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html. Accessed
May 28, 2008.
16
CSO, Living Conditions, Monitoring Survey Report, 2002-2003, (CSO: Lusaka), 2004c:13
17
Hywel D. Davies, Zambia in Maps, (University of London Press), 1971:35; George Kay, A Social
Geography of Zambia, 1967:44-45.
18
Scott. D. Taylor, Cultures and Customs of Zambia, (Greenwood Press: West Port, Connecticut), 2006.
15
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Figure 1.1: Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Zambia.

Source: Hywel D. Davies, Zambia in Maps (1967).
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Politically, this cultural and ethnic diversity is a huge challenge in
that these social groupings have different demands on the state. Not only
do bureaucrats have to deal with various Chiefs in one Province, but they
also have to know and respect the cultural aspects of these ethnolinguistic groupings. Therefore, to ensure program success, creating
rapport with the indigenous people in their tribal areas is a must.
In terms of forestry resources, Zambia is one of the most forested
countries in Southern Africa. Out of its total land mass (752,612 km2)
about 60% (446,000 Km2) of it is covered by indigenous forests, of which
roughly 9.8% (73,783 km2) are protected forest areas (directly managed
by Forestry Department) while 8.4% are National Parks and Game
Reserves (Figure 1.2), exclusively set aside as wildlife habitats and are
managed by the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Together this brings
the total protected forest area to 18.2%.19 The remaining forest cover
constitutes unprotected forests, commonly called open forests, which fall
under the Chiefs‟ jurisdiction. A word of caution is appropriate here: the
figures just quoted above should be taken with a pinch of salt in that the
last forest survey was done in 1986 and since then a lot has changed.20

19

Most likely these figures may have changed due to proposed degazettement of portions of some PFAs for
human settlements and agricultural purposes. Also note that FD does not exclude forests that are already
illegally settled. Thus, even without degazettement, the actual area on the ground is lower than what the
official reports say. For some specific examples, see Felix Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and Opportunities to
Biological Diversity Conservation in the Copperbelt Province, 2004.
20
Each year Forestry Department Annual Reports acknowledge that illegal encroachment is the biggest
problem the department faces, including right now, so much so that some forests have since been
degazetted. But FD still uses the outdated deforestation rates generated over 20 years during the 1986 forest
survey where it was estimated that Zambia lost 250,000 to 300,000 ha. of indigenous forests each year.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Protected Forest Areas in Zambia

Zambia: Protected Forests and National Parks

Protected Forests
National Parks
Provincial boundaries

Map created by: Rose Makano
Based on data from Forestry Department, Provincial Forest Action Programme, 200521
Insert accessed from: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1997/ofr-97-470/OF97-470A/

21

This map is based on data that has not been adjusted to incorporate forest loss due to illegal settlements.
Because such areas have not been officially been degazetted, the Forestry Department counts them as if
they still exist. Except for National Parks which are likely to be intact, the situation on the ground is quite
different with respect to Protected Forests.
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For instance, the consumption of forest products has gone up due
to due population growth and also the high unemployment rate that has
forced more people to depend on forests. Second, following the free
market policy espoused under the structural adjustment program (SAP),
a policy initiative dictated by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been an increase in the number of
timber processing companies from 4 commercial sawmills in 1984 to 264
in 2000. When these companies are grouped according to the type of
species they processed, 61.74% of these sawmills extract indigenous
timber and only 38.26% dealt with plantation timber (Table 1.1).22
Therefore, with this increase in sawmills timber extracted will certainly
be higher than what was extracted when sawmills were few, meaning
that the deforestation rate should be higher now than then.

Table 1.1: Number of Timber Processing Companies, 1984-2000.
SIZE AND TYPE OF SAWMILL
CATEGORY
Indigenous-based
Plantation-based
TOTAL
% OF TOTAL

TOTAL

% of
TOTAL

Commercial

Medium

Small

Pit-saws

59
8

10

83

104*
-

163
101

61.74
38.26

67
25.38

10
3.79

83
31.44

104
39.39

264

100

* This figure covers only the period from 1994-2000.
22

The summary in Table 1.1 is based on information accessed from Export Board of Zambia, 2000;
Forestry Department Annual Reports, 1984 to 2000. See also Rosemary Makano, The Effect of the
Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia, (University of Missouri-St. Louis),
MPPA Thesis, 2002 [unpublished].
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Yet, forest managers continue to use old figures from 1986 wood
consumption survey23 as though no changes have taken place since
then. What is the logic behind using outdated information that does not
reflect the situation on the ground? Why doesn‟t FD update its data? I
address these questions in Chapter 4 where the research findings are
discussed. For now let us briefly look at how forestry has evolved as an
enterprise and what FD has done over the years.

Forestry Development in Zambia: An Overview.
Forestry work in Zambia began in 1931 as a section under the
Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development. The primary purpose of the section was to deal with
forestry issues faced by farmers. Later in 1947 the forestry section was
transformed into a fully-fledged department: one that could deal with all
forestry issues, including those related to commercial exploitation (e.g.
timber for the mining industry, transportation, construction, etc.
sectors), rather than for subsistence use only as the primary mandate
seems to suggest. Thus, following this upgrade in 1947 the forestry
section was moved from the Department of Agriculture to become a fullyfledged department, headed by the Chief Conservator of Forests,24 in the
23

De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, et. al., Wood Consumption Resource Survey, 1986.
A name change to Director was proposed in the Forestry Act of 2000, which has not yet become law.
There has been strong speculation that because this Act has proposed phasing out the Forestry Department
to create the Forestry Commission (FC), the Director and probably others in the upper r echelon are fearful
of draining their own pond. The phasing out of the department means that all FD employees have to reapply to join the FC.
24
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Ministry of Lands and Water Affairs. And its mandate was substantially
expanded. Although the forestry section was created in 1931, generally
1947 is taken as the beginning of scientific forest management in Zambia
since that is the year when FD became a full-fledged department and
embarked on a new course of systematic forest management, an area
where the department performed exceptionally beyond expectations until
the mid 1980s when the situation seemingly fell apart. The department
was no longer able to increase the size of its estates let alone maintain
the existing ones. Thus, both the size and quality of its estates started to
deteriorate as evidence currently shows in the number of forests taken
over by illegal settlers, which have further accelerated forest degradation.
The question I ask and answer in this dissertation is how and why did
this happen?
In the discussion that follows, I lay out in very broad strokes some
of the issues or areas that may have led to the current problem, all of
which have connections to management choices that the department
took over the years. Either the department did something about the
issue(s) and failed, done a little and abandoned it, completely ignored the
issue(s), or was simply unaware of the issue(s) and therefore did not
attend to them at all. Whatever the situation, we can only point a finger
at forest managers and demand that keeping the status quo is certainly
not working well, and therefore a new approach is needed.
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Forestry Department’s Mandate
Prior to 1965, the Forestry Department‟s mandate can be
summarized as covering the following areas:25
a)

To supply timber to the copper mines;

b)

To carry out enumeration surveys and to prepare
management plans;

c)

To supply timber to industry;

d)

To carry out forest research and extension;

e)

To carry out reservation of forest estates in cooperation with
the Chiefs and local government authorities; and

f)

To train junior staff in forestry.26

But after 1965 the policy changed substantially to FD to do more
than just forest conservation but also to develop forestry into an
economic sector capable of creating job opportunities, a task partially
achieved.
In terms of policy implementation, notice that that the law
specifically mandated the department to work cooperatively with the
Local Chiefs and local government authorities. This is particularly not
inconsequential because Chiefs own much of the land in Zambia. Out of
the nation‟s total landmass, Chiefs have 93.9% (70.5 million ha.) broken
down into two categories: 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust land, and

25

GRZ, Forest Ordinance of 1947.
The training at this time was limited to non-degree level, mainly aimed at training Forest Rangers (1
year training) and Forest Guards (6 months training program).
26
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36.2% (27.2 million ha) as Reserve land27, while only 6% (4.5 million ha.)
of the land, mainly found along the line of rail and commonly referred to
as State land, belongs to central government. This land ownership
arrangement dates back to the colonial era and the new republic chose to
maintain it mainly because the modern contemporary or Weberian state
could not dismantle the traditional state structures (kingdoms and
chiefdoms) to create a unified state. Instead, the modern state
superimposed itself over these traditional structures, choosing to work
through them rather than destroy them as that could have created more
problems. Thus, with respect to land tenure these two types of authority
operate side by side, each with a different degree and sphere of control. I
will discuss how this complicates land use in Zambia at a later stage. For
now let us just note that this land ownership pattern has always put the
Chiefs in a stronger position as to what can or cannot be done with their
land. Central government cannot do anything in Chiefs‟ areas until each
respective Chief approves it. In other words, when it comes to land,
central government only has paper power: it has to get permission to use
any portion of land that belongs to the Chiefs. At times central
government has to exchange land with the Chiefs to implement certain
projects of in Chiefs‟ areas. The Lake Kariba project in Southern
Province, which feeds the Kariba Hydro-Power Station, the nation‟s

27

M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in
Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third
Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45
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largest power source, is a good example in this regard. Central
government had to give up part of its land to accommodate the people
who were misplaced by the Lake Kariba project.
Also since the land given to central government for forest
conservation is not sold but Chiefs only get into an agreement with
central government that ascribes legal powers to FD to act as a manager
over such lands, strictly speaking these forests still remain the Chiefs‟
property and can revert to the Chiefs whenever the Chiefs communicate
to central government that they want their land back. This means that
the FD operates at the Chiefs‟ pleasure. The department is obliged to
abide by what the Chiefs want in their areas, which in this case may
explain why local communities have the liberty to taken over the forests
whenever they want.
Therefore, if FD has to be successful in getting more land from the
Chiefs for protection, it needs both the blessings of the Chiefs (to operate
in their Chiefdoms), and the cooperation of the larger community in
those respective areas. This is the kind of support FD had always
received and relied upon and gave FD the unmatched strength it
exhibited. And because the Forest Act allowed the local communities free
access to the forest resources provided the resource in question was for
subsistence consumption, declaring any land a protected forest area did
not alter, threaten or curtail people‟s access rights in any way. People
paid fees only if one was extracting a resource for commercial use – i.e.
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for resale. In a way this legal provision humanized government‟s
intentions and dispelled fears for government take-over of communal
lands. Free access for subsistence use assured the local communities
that their government cared for their needs and gave them further hope
that government would live by its word of managing these forests in a
way that would create more job opportunities for them. As a result, there
was a strong sense of government and local community partnership. And
for the most part this arrangement worked quite well: there was mutual
respect and trust between the FD and the local communities.
But as the FD exerted more power over the management of the
PFAs and started to see the local communities as a problem and not part
of the management team, this compromised local people‟s trust and
sowed seeds of mistrust. For instance, government promulgated the laws
on PFAs with no input from the Chiefs and their subjects, acting as
though such lands no longer belonged to the Chiefs. This shift in
relations created a sense of alienation among the local communities who
saw the government as the new owners and managers of what previously
belonged to them and felt cheated as having given up their property.
Their alienation and eventual withdrawal of their involvement in forest
conservation weakened the very source of the department‟s strength.
Some people might wonder: is this information necessary in a
study looking at institutional capacity and not land ownership? The
response is: certainly, yes! Part of the reason why there has been an
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upswing in forest encroachments (which is contributing to forest
degradation) is because people feel cheated and are now trying to reclaim
their property. Whether their reaction is legal or illegal is a different
matter all together. The key issue here is that these state-society
relations need to be revisited if a lasting solution to forest degradation is
to be found.
Sadly, the FD hardly views this problem from this angle. Instead, it
sees these local communities as simply non-law abiding citizens who
need to be dealt with legally. If anything, the best the department has
done is pay lip service to the issue. Forest managers agree that they need
to adopt joint forest management (JFM), an approach which incorporates
local communities as equal partners in forest management. Yet, this idea
still remains on government shelves. The 2000 Forest Act which gave
legal recognition to the JFM concept has yet to become law. The Forestry
Director has not prepared a Statutory Instrument, the last piece of paper
work required to activate any Act into law. In the meantime, forest
encroachments are on the rise. And as history has shown so far,
whenever a forest has been heavily encroached, illegal settlers have
always won – those forests always get degazetted!28 In short, the strategy
has been successful and underscores the fact that central government is
aware of its power limitations over communal lands, and is therefore

28

FD, Annual Reports from 1988 to 2005; Davy Siame, 1997; Felix Njovu, et. al., 2004
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usually not keen to put up a fight over what is known to belong to the
people.
A point to note here is that this challenge is not peculiar to
Zambia. It is a problem faced by any government where traditional
structures

of

governance

exist

side

by

side

with

the

modern

contemporary state. The real challenge is how should these two layers of
authority be reconciled to become one rather than continue to exist as
two different entities, sharing the power base? I address these questions
in Chapter 6 where I also offer some recommendations.
In terms of policy, although the latest Forest Policy of 1999 places
more emphasis on provision of extension services, overall the policy
intent in the two previous National Forest Policy documents (1947, and
1965) have more or less remained the same, essentially retaining the five
main areas specified in the National Forest Policy of 1965.

The Economic Importance of Natural Forests
As noted in my opening statement, the economic importance of
forests in Zambia is a matter that requires no further defense. To begin
with, forests are the only secure safety net available to most people.
About 80% of Zambia‟s population (or 90% in rural areas) depends on
wood-based energy for cooking and heating their houses,29 including a
host of other products and services mentioned earlier. In other words,

29

MENR, Zambia Forest Action Plan, Vol. II, 1998:16-17
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these natural forests are literally the only source of survival available to
most Zambians in one way or another. Viewed from a modern or western
conception these forests are a drug store, a supermarket, a hardware
outlet for timber and other building materials, as well as being ecological
stabilizers. In terms of actual income, it has been estimated that forests
contribute about US$197 million annually to rural household incomes.
But this figure drops to around US$175 million (roughly 11% reduction)
when forest degradation sets in,30 meaning that when the forests are
denuded of their ability to sustain rural life by providing basic necessities
this has grave consequences on the rural and even unemployed urban
population.
While the effect of forest degradation on rural income might look minimal
to some above average (or well paid) sections of society, for a person
solely dependent on these forests as their only or major source of
livelihood, any decline is monumental. Any loss of income can be a
matter of life and death for families without any other means of
livelihood. This is precisely one reason why forest degradation is or has
become a source of concern, particularly to the local communities
around such forests that have been on the receiving end of the negative
impacts that have arisen from this phenomenon. For many of these
forest-dependent communities, whose survival rests entirely on the
bounty provisions from mother nature that these forests provide in the
30

Puustjarvi, Mickels-Kokwe and Chakanga, The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National
Economy, September 2005;
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form of food, wood energy (fuelwood, charcoal), building materials,
medicines and a host of other services e.g. the protection of headwaters,
streams and rivers, etc., the loss of any forest has meant a corresponding
loss of income and a slump in their socio-economic well being.
From a national perspective, forestry still occupies a very
important and strategic position in the national economy through its
connection to numerous industries in the manufacturing, mining,
construction, transportation, energy, water, agriculture and, tourism
sectors, including all the wood processing and allied industries that
derive their existence directly from these natural forests. Left unchecked
forest degradation has the potential to bring these industries to their
knees, and the ripple effects on the economic well being of the nation are
quite obvious.
For a long time forestry was perceived as a twin pillar to copper
mining,

Zambia‟s

economic

backbone.

Thanks

to

previous

FD

management teams who successfully marketed the department as
deserving this position and recognition. Prior to 1970s timber served as a
major and cheapest energy source in the mining operations. Though not
extensively used as a source of energy, timber still remains an important
input for underground construction and support works.31
Unfortunately,

these

economic

connections

have

not

been

highlighted and reinforced by latter FD management teams thereby
31

Dennis Musaba, Snr., Geologist (and Retired Mine Captain) under Chibuluma Copper Mines – personal
communication, 2007.
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making forestry look as though it has no economic value of national
importance. This is one area where the FD has terribly failed. When
forestry was seen as sustaining copper mining, the economic muscle of
the nation, the department had unparalleled prominence in the policy
arena. And this helped in making both the general and specific
arguments about the economic importance of forests. Now FD‟s linkage
to copper mining has waned off, leaving us to question why.
Although it is not easy to state with certainty how and why copper
mining and forestry ceased to be seen as two sides of the same coin,32
one can speculate that the „divorce‟ occurred (or at least that relationship
was weakened) when the copper mines switched to using electricity as
their source of energy. Timber was no longer the critical resource it had
been portrayed to be for copper mining. As a result, the policy makers‟
perception of the importance of forests also changed. And since FD
management has failed to re-invent or re-position the department either
by reclaiming its previous position with the copper mines since timber is
still extensively used for underground works, or connecting the
department to other sectors such as health, agriculture, tourism,
construction, wood processing industries, etc., where forests have close
ties, this managerial failure has driven FD almost into oblivion, despite
the various opportunities available. For instance, the heightened global
interest and concerns about sustainable development and environmental
This is another possible area worth investigating since no specific study has been conducted
in this respect.
32
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management gives FD a seamless opportunity to be seen again as an
important bureau. Also FD can still reposition itself using the numerous
sectors and services that forestry supports and provides, respectively.
The second reason for FD‟s fall from grace can be found in the
perceived sense of accomplishment that central government felt seeing
the department‟s achievements. What do I mean by this? Simply put, the
success of the industrial plantations project which culminated into
planting over 60,000 hectares of plantations in the Copperbelt Province,
home to copper mining, clearly demonstrated to central government that
the country was able to handle any timber needs for the mines as well as
other sectors. Consequently, this gave central government a sense of
security to move on and support other sectors to reach a similar level of
achievement and independence.
The third reason is the financial hard times and the regional
political engagements that the Zambian government found itself in, both
of which necessitated cutting down support to some sectors which in this
case included forestry.
Finally, but definitely not the least, there is the question of
national security. As a land-locked nation surrounded by eight
neighbors, in a region still not completely free of civil wars and political
upheaval,33 Zambia‟s national security owes a lot to how its forests

33

For instance, political liberation movements that characterized the region since 1960s to early 1990s
offer good examples of how FD‟s professional excellence kept Zambia free of these potential problems.
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within and along its borders are managed. Both rebel groups and
migrating civilians running away from conflict zones are a political risk
and can pose potential problems for a receiving peaceful nation like
Zambia whose forests can easily be turned into illegal camps if they are
not well policed and managed. And the opposite has been just as true.
With respect to management [in]capacity, FD‟s failure to manage
these natural forests and especially its inability to deal with the problem
of deforestation for so long raises concerns that there is much more to
this problem than just inadequate funding and labor shortage at field
staff level. Looking at this issue from a higher level, this may probably
suggest that this type of work ethic permeates the Zambian bureaucracy
so much so that it could explain why the country has not taken
advantage of its natural capital to push its economy to a higher level.
Therefore, FD‟s failure to manage the nation‟s natural capital
compromises

people‟s

livelihoods

and

negates

the

department‟s

usefulness to society. For this reason, it becomes pertinent to question
why the department is failing to fulfill its mandate and obligations.

The Global and Local Perspective
Although countries differ in the route they took to attain higher
levels

of

economic

development

there

is

however

one

common

denominator: those who excelled built their institutional capacities and
However, the ongoing civil war in Congo DR, up north, and the political instability in Zimbabwe now
stand as new challenges Zambian foresters have to be on the lookout for.
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used their resources prudently.34 Of course this does not gloss over the
fact that some countries learned this the hard way: they mortgaged longterm benefits for short-term economic gains. Japan, which harvested
almost all of its forests for the ship industry, is a good example in this
respect. However, Japan later embraced plantation forestry to rectify the
error, which again speaks to the idea of having or building institutional
capacity to do this. It takes visionary leaders to do this, which is clearly
lacking in FD. In fact, if what is happening in the Forestry Department is
an indicator of a general trend across the Zambian civil service, then it is
time institutional capacity is taken as an issue requiring immediate
attention on the national agenda.
As the world has come to appreciate, effects of forest degradation
go beyond the immediate vicinity to affect people miles away, both within
the national borders and beyond. In some cases land degradation has led
to misplacement of people as such lands become inhabitable. In extreme
cases such developments have ultimately lead to conflicts as people
compete for the remaining parcels of land. The conflict in Dar Fur, Sudan
presents itself as a classical example accelerated by shortage of land due
to degradation.35 For example, forest degradation in Zambia has been
found to be an underlying cause to water shortage in some parts of the
34

Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World, (Oxford University Press),
2003; Edward B. Barbier, Natural Resources and Economic Development, (Cambridge University Press),
2005; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence, (Cambridge
University Press), 1994
35
For more details on Dar Fur, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Gadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace,
(Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder), 2006.
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Copperbelt Province and else. Forest depletion in the Lamba headwaters
catchment area (source of the Kafue River and its tributaries) is causing
soil erosion and choking the streams that feed into the Kafue River, the
main supplier of

water to the

Copperbelt and other provinces

downstream. If not mitigated this problem could escalate to affect other
infrastructure such as the Kafue Gorge hydro-power station which is fed
from the same river. As other case studies have shown, environmental
problems associated with forest depletion are not unusual. They have
been noted in varying degrees elsewhere too. For instance, Nepal, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Guinea faced similar challenges that
fortunately have since been reversed with USAID‟s help.36
Globally about one quarter of the world‟s rural population directly
depend on forests for its livelihood.37 And when forest degradation sets in
their livelihood is compromised. Thus, forest degradation has gone
beyond

creating

energy

problems

to

affecting

whole

livelihoods.

Indirectly, forest degradation has and continues to exacerbate food
insecurity (and by extension poverty levels) as whole communities lose
their crops due to flooding, soil erosion or drought thus creating more
impoverished people in need of help.
In Zambia, the Eastern, Central and Northern Provinces, especially
areas along the Luangwa River, have particularly suffered from flooding

36

Robert Clausen and Amelia Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods,
Landscapes, and Governance, Vol. I, 2007:2-3
37
Clausen and Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Resources, Vol. I, 2007:1.
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while the people in Southern Province have been victims of drought.
Either way the loss of crops (and farming areas) has accelerated their
vulnerability to food insecurity. Also because forest loss, mainly due to
unsustainable agricultural activities,38 is higher in these provinces than
elsewhere, forest degradation has been identified as having a connection
to these problems in these provinces. Yet, for all these years the Forestry
Department (FD) has just continued to stand by doing nothing to stop
forest degradation. In an era when the global community has embraced
sustainable development and its attention drawn towards achieving the
millennium goals, one of which is poverty reduction, unfortunately FD is
completely unaware of its role in working towards these global goals.
This is in spite of the enormous potential that forests have to supply
countless products and services all of which can lift people out of
poverty. As case studies from across the globe have shown when forests
are well managed there is a corresponding level of well being among
those who derive their livelihood from there, either directly or indirectly.39
National Economic and Political Importance
Strictly speaking Zambia is not poor, at least not from its natural
resource endowment. All across the country there is an abundance of
natural resources both under and above ground, and all of it with

38

The Chitemene system of agriculture is overwhelmingly blamed for being responsible for extensive loss
of forests in Northern and some parts of Central Provinces.
39
Clausen and Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods, Landscapes, and
Governance, Vol. I, II and III, 2007.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L , P a g e | 29

enormous economic value.40 None of the 9 Provinces can be singled out
as not having anything of value. And this is particularly true on natural
forests that are estimated to cover 60% (about 446 Km2) of the country‟s
landmass; of which 9.6% are protected forest reserves,41 directly
managed by the Forestry Department, and another 8.4% are in the form
of National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas (GMAs)42 that fall
under the jurisdiction of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Thus, in
total 18% of Zambia‟s landmass is technically classified as a protected
forest area (Figure 1.2), while the rest are open forests that fall under
the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (local Chiefs) or Ministry of Lands
(State Land).
In respect to other natural resources, Zambia is also blessed with
abundant water resources (Figure 1.3), fertile soils and a good tropical
climate all of which are important ingredients that could propel a nation
to economic and social well being. Furthermore, apart from its natural
resource

endowment,

Zambia‟s

other

strength

lies

in

being

a

demographically young nation which means that finding young energetic
labor suitable for forestry jobs would not be a problem.
Out of its 11.7 million total population 51.4% is between 15-64
years of age, 45.8% is under 15 years, and only 2.8% is above 65 years
40

MENR, Zambia Forestry Action Plan, Vol. II – Challenges and Opportunities, 1996:1
A note of caution is appropriate here. These figures have not been updated in years. The area under
PFAs is less than what Forestry Department reports as this study has discovered and subsequently
highlighted. See for instance MENR, ZFAP, Vol. II, 1996:58 and FD Annual Report for 2005 both of which
quote the same figures 9 years apart despite their central argument that deforestation has been in the rise.
42
Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, The Environmental Impact of the
1991-1992 Drought on Zambia, Proceedings of the IUCN Drought study Follow-up Workshop. 1997:74
41

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L , P a g e | 30

old.43 At 89% literacy level, and with 65% of the population living in rural
areas,44 availability of skilled labor force is also not a problem: it can be
found everywhere. This social capital is clearly an economic asset if put
to productive use.

Figure 1.3: Zambia: Major Freshwater Bodies.

Source: http://unimaps.com/zambia/index.html.

43
44

Accessed: Sunday, May 25, 2008

CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:15
CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:14. This literacy rate refers to people 15 years and older.
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While the nation‟s social capital is under threat from the HIV/AIDS
pandemic (15.6% of the adult population was estimated to be HIV
positive in 2001-2002),45 there are positive signs that the situation is
getting under control. Therefore, with the above factors of production in
place the cloth is well cut for both government and private entrepreneurs
to derive some economic benefits from these assets.
However, despite this enormous natural endowment, Zambia has
slipped from being a medium income country to join the [in]famous club
of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), a status earned in 2005.
Unlike some countries that have had political upheavals, Zambia has
enjoyed

a

relatively

peaceful

and

stable

political

climate

since

independence.46 The question then is why is a country so rich be poor?
Could this be due to lack of institutional capacity in respective
government agencies that are mandated to oversee how the country‟s
resources are managed and utilized? Or are there other factors beyond
this managerial capacity equation?
One

such

possibility

would

be

climate

change

that

has

intermittently caused drought and floods, particularly starting from the
1990s. However, there is no evidence yet that shows a direct destructive
effect of drought/floods over the forest resources.47 The forests have been
45

CSO, Zambia: Sexual Behaviour Survey 2003, CSO: Lusaka. March 2004a
It is important to note that the country has experienced two coup attempts; one each during President
Kenneth Kaunda‟s and Frederick Chiluba‟s administrations. But none of them caused any major
disruptions.
47
No research has been conducted on this topic yet. But the general observations shared during a review of
the impact of the 1991/92 drought point to the fact that forestry and other sectors such as agriculture and
46
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quite resilient to these climatic changes. Instead, the impact from climate
change may be rather indirect. For instance, loss of agricultural
production (crops and livestock) due to drought and, or floods has
generally forced the affected populations to look to and (I dare say)
“mine” the forests for their survival and livelihood. And this has been
particularly telling in an era of high unemployment (over 50%) that has
been accelerated by a poor economy.48 In this context climate change
may qualify to be on the list of “drivers” to forest loss.
Another factor relates to the policy choices or policy shifts that the
Zambian government has embraced over the years, some of which were
not sympathetic to forestry. The SAP qualifies here for its role and impact
that arose from downsizing the Zambian bureaucracy (which cut down
forestry personnel). While the SAP‟s underlying rationale of promoting
fiscal responsibility, a free market economy, and reducing government
expenditures to balance the national budget were all noble in principle,
their impact in forestry circles have been devastating. Reduction in
government expenditure translated into low allocations to forestry
programs and therefore ultimately dictated what could and could not be
done. Currency devaluation, which was meant to make local products
cheaper and therefore supposedly stimulate more exports, did the exact

tourism all suffered either directly or indirectly. For more details on this, see IUCN-The World
Conservation Union, The Impact of the 1991/92 Drought on Zambia, 1997.
48
Based on its poor economic status, Zambia was finally classified in 2005 as a Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC). See CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/za.html. Accessed May 28, 2008
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opposite both at individual and corporate levels. At the very best,
currency devaluation only eroded people‟s lifelong savings and made it
difficult for new investments to emerge. Put together these and other SAP
conditionalities indirectly created a new set of challenges that forestry
managers were hardly prepared to deal with. For example, privatization
of parastatal companies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), one condition
and outcome of the SAP, led to the closure of these companies and
ultimately contributed to the high unemployment. This loss of jobs forced
more people to seek a livelihood from forests. Hence, like climate change,
the impact from SAP has also been indirect.
Furthermore,

the

increase

in

national

population

and

unemployment rates, all of which have potential to drive changes in
forest status, are issues that need close examination. As population has
grown from 3.4 million people at independence49 in 1964 to 11.7 million
to date,50 so has the need for land and other resources. On the other
hand, the high unemployment is in double figures, 11% in 2002-03,51
and currently estimated at around 50%. Therefore, forest loss may come
not as a consequence of managerial incapacity but as a natural
progression responding to population growth. I return to discuss these
issues in Chapter 5 and 6.
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And finally, the policy reforms on land ownership cannot be
ignored. There have been numerous changes to the Land Policy, one of
which introduced title to land in Chiefs‟ areas to encourage private
property ownership.52 Prior to this no title was allowed. Instead, land in
Chiefs areas was (and still is) held as communal property, overseen by
the local Chief, and passed along through generational inheritance. By
allowing title to land in Chiefs‟ areas, the new policy has not just created
new land tenure arrangements but has also opened up such lands to
outsiders too who do not necessarily belong to that ethnic group.53
People want to have security on property ownership, which title to land
provides. And this is likely to encourage more people to seek land in
Chiefs‟ areas.
What the discussion points to is that whether acting individually or
together, put together, these factors have the potential to cause changes
in forest estates. It is, therefore, reasonable to take them as alternative
hypotheses that could affect forest quality. However, in spite of these
connections I have just highlighted, how managers responded to these
challenges will remain the deciding factor between good and poor
performance. I return to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6 where I show
why managerial in[capacity] still stands as an overriding factor to forest
degradation and not these other possible factors.
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The National Land Policy of 1996.
Although people can access land and settle anywhere they like, however, land in Zambia is split along
ethnic Chiefdoms, each region representing a particular ethnic grouping.
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Although natural resource endowment is no guarantee that a
country would automatically be propelled into economic well being,54
however, there are also numerous examples across the globe pointing to
the fact that resource endowment plays an important role in the
economic development of a nation.55 A case in point comes from early
empires such as Great Britain that derived their economic power from
their natural endowments such as coal as well as additional supplies of
other commodities from their colonies.56 In recent times, Malaysia stands
out as another good example of a resource abundant nation that has
demonstrated the economic power of natural wealth when supported by
appropriate government investment behavior.57 And of course the
success story of the four “Tiger Nations” confirms that building strong
economies and strong nations takes more than resource abundance.58
Therefore, managed properly natural wealth has always acted as a
springboard to the economic well being of many nations.
Notice here that by implication the word management suggests and
brings into focus the presence and influence of managerial capacity and
human capital on the natural wealth, thereby introducing it as an
54
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important input. As Abidin (2001) explains, one reason for Malaysia‟s
success lies in the fact its government “invested heavily in human
resource development,”59 a strategy meant to create a large pool of skilled
workers especially for the manufacturing industry that was expanding
rapidly. By 1991 Malaysia‟s total expenditure on education was 5.5% of
its GNP, a figure that surpassed even some developed countries such as
the United States and Japan which invested 5.3% and 4.7% of their
expenditures, respectively.60
And all this is in agreement with what many scholars and
practitioners have pointed out: the major determinant to economic
development lies in how each nation uses its resource endowments,
which is essentially an aspect of state / institutional capacity. Therefore,
having a country that is naturally rich but economically poor, as Zambia
is, raises an interesting question worth investigating. Given that Zambia
has a rich natural resource base, state capacity seems to be a possible
missing link that could explain government‟s poor performance. And
since state capacity comes from the performance of individual bureaus,
the best way to investigate state capacity is to look at what is happening
at bureau level. Taking the management of indigenous forests in Zambia
as a case study I pursue this line of inquiry to illustrate the point that
managerial capacity matters. It is as important as the commonly known
capacities, vis-à-vis the factors of production.
59
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Forestry offers a good example in that Forestry Department‟s
achievements up until the 1970s stand in stark contrast with the current
forest degradation that has become the order of the day. There is
sufficient evidence of good performance prior to 1970s (a time when the
department had a leaner and less educated work force and a moderate
annual budget). And there is supporting evidence too for poor
performance since the 1980s, a time when FD had slightly more and
better qualified personnel. Yet, for the most part, Forestry Department
claims that insufficient field staff and poor annual allocations are
responsible for forest degradation. As a category of employees responsible
for monitoring field operations field staff are essentially the first
responders to all forest activities. And since they are right where action
takes place, field staff are the department‟s eyes in the word‟s true
meaning. Hence, field staff have a crucial role to play in ensuring that
forests are managed well. Clearly, one can sympathize with the FD that
operating from a position of insufficiency at this level puts the
department in a tight corner. And of course the situation is made worse
when the department is perpetually underfunded. This makes it harder,
if not impossible, for its staff to get out in the field such that undertaking
any fieldwork clearly becomes an uphill battle.
Indeed, the above arguments are credible, but considering that
capacity includes far much more that human resources and finances, as
some scholars have argued, should the department‟s argument pass for a
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final conclusion? Is underfunding and insufficient field staff the only
factors at play? This is where this study comes in. It sets out to test the
department‟s assertion, to find out how true or valid this argument is. So
we ask the question: Why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in Zambia in
a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality of stock
they contain? Is this decline really due to inadequate labor force and
insufficient annual allocations? Could these problems be due to lack of
institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or could this be due
to other factors beyond the department‟s control?
Learning from the department‟s brief history – its successes,
failures and apparently untamed opportunities – it is justifiable to believe
that the department‟s shortcomings cannot simply be explained away by
insufficient labor force and financial resources, though there is some
credibility in that argument. Instead, the managerial dimension seems to
be a plausible explanation which urgently requires scrutiny too. And this
dissertation does just that. I posit that managerial capacity is a very
important factor worth bringing to the fore because, as the data
indicates, during the early days of FD‟s existence when the department
had a relatively lean work force compared to its current level which is
slightly higher (as in number of staff), the department was able to
increase its forest estates and these forests were also well managed.61
Furthermore, FD has more and better qualified personnel now than in
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See Appendix 5.
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the early years of the department‟s existence. Therefore, the question we
need to answer is: how did the department do so well at a time it had
fewer and less technically qualified personnel? What capacities can we
point to beyond labor and funds? Against this background, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that managerial capacity is probably the
missing link that has contributed to the current state of affairs. The
stronger the department‟s managerial capacity the more likely that its
forest estates would be well managed and vice versa. A quick look at the
department‟s brief history seems to agree with observation. To help put
this argument into context I sketch, in very broad strokes, the
department‟s successes and current challenges to show why managerial
[in]capacity seems to be the missing link. And I employ this historical
approach because the data it offers serves both as a laboratory and a
validation tool. We should not ignore the facts (i.e. what has happened).
Rather we should use these facts to understand and, possibly try to
explain, the present even as we plan for the future. Thus, FD‟s past
experience is an excellent laboratory that should serve its rightful
purpose in shaping the future of forest management in Zambia.

The Forestry Department: Its Successes and Current Challenges
If there is one public agency in Zambia for which there are still
some „remnants‟ of evidence as having been effective in its performance
at one time, the Forestry Department scores not one but several
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accolades. I call them remnants because much of what used to be
protected forest areas are no longer there, except on paper. And this is
where the argument becomes fluid. What should be counted as protected
forests areas? Is it the hecterage of gazetted areas even when no forest
exists on such lands anymore? Is it the number of forests with quality
stock in them? Or is it both? From FD‟s point of view, the department
seems content with counting the area covered regardless of the state of
such forests – meaning that the area is counted even when that land has
been depleted of its forest stock. But the big is question is: of what use is
it to count an area which has been turned into farmland or human
settlement? Isn‟t it misleading to count such areas which no longer have
the resources they were reserved for? I choose not to offer any opinion
now but come back to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6.
The other „remnant‟ relates to the industrial plantations that the
department established in the Copperbelt Province. Once a prominent
feature in that province, these plantations are slowly disappearing even
as arguments to privatize or keep them as state property remain
unresolved.
From its humble beginning in 1931 as a section under the
Department of Agriculture, the Forestry Department later emerged to
become one among the best performing public agencies in Zambia. Prior
to this the department‟s contributions were almost insignificant,
generally absorbed under the agricultural extension services as a section
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that provided technical advice to farmers on trees. Later as forestry
became more defined as a discipline quite separate from agriculture, this
led to the creation of a Forest Department in 1947. Over the years the
Forest Department vigorously pursued an ambitious mission of making
Zambia self-sufficient in timber and related forest products and ensuring
that the forests are well managed.62 All this has been achieved.
Initially, forest research and forest inventories dominated earlier
work that ultimately laid to a firm foundation for the scientific
management techniques that followed and guided the FD‟s operations,63
and whose dividends are now evident both in the extent of protected
forest areas and the industrial plantations that were established across
the nation over the years.
As at 1962 the Forest Department had 5 million hectares (ha.) of
PFAs for which it has direct control, in addition to the open forests where
the department also has indirect control. By 1983 PFAs had been
increased to 7.6 million ha., the highest level reached.
On the exotic plantations side, the department planted over 1,000
ha. exclusively devoted to research purposes. And these research efforts
later

supported

the

establishment

of

56,149

ha

of

industrial

plantations,64 of which 50,490 ha. were planted in the Copperbelt
Province to supply timber to the copper mines. Based on the copper
62

For details see Forest Department, Zambia National Forestry Policy 1965; an abridged version of this
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mines demand for wood, which outweighed the regeneration rates of
natural forests, foresters were quick to point out that such consumption
could not be supported by natural forests alone. It therefore threatened
their existence. Instead, there was urgent need to grow fast growing
exotic species to supplement wood from the natural forest. And this
marked the beginning of the industrial plantations project. In short, the
industrial plantations were meant to become a buffer to the natural
forests, while at the same time supporting copper mining. They helped
deter over-logging (deforestation) of natural forests.
Although plantation establishment took place in all the 9
Provinces, the Copperbelt Province was taken as a special case due to the
high demand for wood from the copper mines. Hence, FD deliberately
concentrated its efforts of establishing the industrial plantations in
Copperbelt

Province.

To

speed

up

the

process

of

plantation

establishment, at a rate that matched demand for wood from the copper
mines, the FD accessed a $5.3 million loan from the World Bank in 1968
to finance the industrial plantations project.65 And a new division, the
Industrial Plantations Division (IPD) was created to oversee the project.
Elsewhere, plantation establishment was undertaken through their
respective Provincial Forest Offices, financed by central government. The
success of these endeavors has made Zambia become self-sufficient in
timber with surplus for export.

65

This project phase ran from January 1, 1969 to June 30, 1977.
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In the meantime, the Forest Department also pursued a vigorous
human resource development program, raising the level of its staff from
zero (local) professionals at independence (1964) to over 50 by 1981.66
This figure reflects only those people who remained to work in the Forest
Department and not necessarily the total number trained which is
definitely higher. Some professional staff left the department for greener
pastures elsewhere. A similar positive trend occurred in other staff
categories too. By 1982 the department had 597 technical and field staff
(up from 416 in 1970), an increase of 43.5%.67
While the department scored numerous achievements from all its
divisions – Forest Research, Forest Management (indigenous and
plantations), Human Resource development and, Extension Services –
the industrial plantations project deserves special mention. It stands out
as the biggest landmark achievement not only in the extent of the
plantations established but more importantly in its positive economic
impact on society. This is one example where Forest Department clearly
demonstrated its ability to translate government policy into tangible
achievable goals as exemplified in the professional and managerial
competence to deliver on government policy. The department successfully
implemented each and every policy prescription68 as I pointed out earlier,
and

has

numerous

positive

outcomes

to

show

for

each

policy

66
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Annual Reports from 1965 to 1987 and Appendix 5 in this dissertation.
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prescription, an amazing achievement for a department that for the most
part was least funded compared to other bureaus.69 And nowhere is this
achievement so visible than under the industrial plantations project
whose positive economic impact endures to date.
The industrial plantations project was so successful that IPD, the
project management unit, was eventually incorporated into a parastatal
company called ZAFFICO and became the largest timber company to own
both the plantations and the sawmills. The other timber companies are
wood processors that depend on ZAFFICO plantations or the natural
forests. ZAFFICO employed over 3,000 people, and its impact on society
is larger than this due to the ripple effects it has had on other industries.
For instance, ZAFFICO plantations support numerous wood processing
companies, carpentry and furniture shops. And there are also other
industries that are indirectly supported by ZAFFICO such as the
transportation industry, and so on. All this arose out of the wonderful
work that FD executed so successfully.
Unfortunately, despite this seemingly solid foundation, the FD has
not sustained this momentum. Since mid (and especially from late)
1980s the department‟s performance indicators all went south. Most of
the activities that used to done are no longer carried out. Apparently, the
department has lost its vision and or the motivation to exist. Its
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managers are frustrated and highly de-motivated. Consequently, the
department has moved from being a star agency on the block to one that
policymakers do not even pay attention to (or count) as an important
bureau.
FD‟s performance since late 1980s has not been inspirational at
all. Its forest estates are degraded and most of them illegally settled or
exploited. Compared to the department‟s achievements in earlier years
and the current deplorable state of its estates one wonders and questions
what has befallen this previously high performing agency. Why has the
department degenerated into a non-performer? Is this due to external
pressures or simply a lack of institutional capacity within the
department? I‟m persuaded to think that this problem has its roots in
managerial capacity and here is why I think so.
When one looks at the history of forestry development in Zambia
two things stand out prominently. First, compared to other government
agencies the FD has generally operated on a modest budget and a lean
structure over its lifetime. Yet its achievements defied those constraints.
Second, for a long time the Zambian government was engrossed in the
political liberation struggle of the region by supporting freedom fighters
in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe;70 a
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For instance, Namibian SWAPO and South African ANC had bases in Zambia, while the other three
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commitment that deviated resources to this regional endeavor instead of
being invested locally. By allowing freedom fighters from the region to
have bases in Zambia, South Africa and Zimbabwe subsequently
classified Zambia as aiding terrorists and therefore deserved to pay for its
involvement. In fact, South African President, John B. Vorster, is on
record as having vowed that, “South Africa will hit Zambia so hard that
she will never forget”.71 And both Zimbabwe and South Africa waged
military campaigns against Zambia though Zambia never responded,
which helped to stop such military confrontations from escalating into
full blown war. Based on such threats and subsequent direct military
reprisals from South Africa and Zimbabwe72 the Zambian government
was kept on its toes to secure its borders. Consequently, military
spending was substantially increased to contain the situation.
Therefore, it is not an overstatement to say forestry programs paid
the price as can be seen from the reductions in government funding to
the department.73 In fact, these political choices also created an
additional layer of challenge for forest management in that foresters had
to be even more vigilant in securing the forests to ensure national
security.

White South (Africana Publishing Corporation: NY), 1970; Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict
(Davison Publishing Limited), 1974;
71
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(Zed Press), 1982:125.
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Remember, as I mentioned earlier, five out of eight countries that
share boundaries with Zambia were actively engaged in political
liberation struggles which had potential for their freedom fighters to use
Zambia‟s forests as a safe haven, especially those groups not officially
recognized by the Zambian government. Also the movement of refugees
from conflict areas, freedom fighters, soldiers and even traders were
issues of great national concern74 in which forestry staff played a crucial
role. But due to strong managerial competence the Forestry Department
was able to handle these challenges with ease.
Notice that in spite of these constraints, FD achieved wonders
under those difficult circumstances. The largest increase in plantation
establishment, indigenous forest reservations, and human resource
development occurred at the very time when the Zambian government
relentlessly committed its national resources to the liberation struggle,
determined to free the region from all forms of colonialism.75
It is no secret that Zambia‟s role in the political liberation of the
Southern African region did not come cheaply as government‟s degree of
involvement suggests. In particular, the Kenneth Kaunda administration
made a deliberate choice to house liberation movements from Namibia,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. These included: the South-West African
People‟s Organization (SWAPO) from Namibia, headed by Sam Nujoma;
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Nelson Mandela‟s party, the African National Congress (ANC) from South
Africa; and Joshua Nkomo‟s Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (ZAPU)
from Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Zambian government also gave
unwavering support to those who did not set up camp in Zambia but
remained in their countries e.g. Jonas Savimbi‟s UNITA (National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola and, Samora Machel‟s
FRELIMO76 (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique.
Surprisingly, all these political challenges that characterized the
nation (and the region), which would have otherwise slowed the FD‟s
operations, never did. Instead, the department defied all these odds and
forged ahead, reaping so many successes that are now slowly becoming
part of the good old days history and “there used to be”… is quickly
becoming part of the everyday forestry vocabulary.
Without getting weighed down in the details of the broader
challenges of the day, one simple question we can at least attempt to
answer is: why is FD failing to manage its forest estates? What has
happened to the once „star‟ agency? It is important to get to know what
has caused the FD to fall from grace because failures at agency level
ultimately spiral upwards to national level. In any case the success of
any nation is a mirror image of what happens at agency level, and vice
versa. Therefore, getting to know the problems and solving them at
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agency level is the best way to solve what generally end up being national
problems.

Conclusion
As I have repeatedly pointed out, Zambia is not poor. What has
driven the country into becoming one among the poorest and highly
indebted countries is clearly not lack of economic resources. Rather the
problem can be attributed to lack of capacity to wisely manage and
utilize its natural resource endowment. The lack of institutional capacity
(at agency level) offers the only plausible explanation to this problem.
In this study institutional capacity is conceived as having adequate
and appropriate productive resources required to undertake a given task.
It means Forest Department has the ability to create and sustain an
environment and relationships that facilitate and support purposeful,
collective action geared towards achieving its objectives. 77 Extending the
definition of IC in this manner makes it possible to quantify and analyze
how IC becomes a defining factor in institutional performance from all
the different angles. In fact, this Zambian case study provides a good
example in that FD‟s past strength was derived from the strong ties and
relationships that the department had with the local Chiefs and their
people. But as central government assumed dominance, wanting to
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control all aspects of forest management in a policing fashion, this
alienated the local people communities who eventually withdrew their
support. Add this development to the modest budget that the department
operated under, the result is total disaster. FD‟s capacity was
subsequently weakened and therefore could not effectively manage its
estates.
Given the Forestry Department‟s humble beginnings, counting its
achievements over the years, and now observing its apparent death, the
FD offers an excellent case study to test the hypothesis about state /
institutional capacity and its effects on performance outcomes.
In this study, I argue that although FD was clearly affected by
external factors, such as the IMF/World Bank sponsored Structural
Adjustment Program, the main reason that accounts for its poor
performance now is lack of institutional capacity. In particular, the
department lacks visionary leadership and managerial capabilities to
bring it back to its past glory. I follow this line of inquiry and
demonstrate that given the modest budget and lean structure that FD
has always operated under, the potential for failure or under-achieving
was quite high. Forestry Department could have failed to achieve what it
did had it not been for its managers‟ competence to plan, mobilize and
utilize the resources at their disposal. Their effectiveness and footprints
are easily noticeable in the presence of strategic and management plans,
district management books, public-private partnerships (e.g. TV and
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Radio Programs); a variety of programs they initiated and executed, and
above all their active and enduring presence in the policy arena that
helped influence government policy in favor of forestry to an extent where
forestry and copper mining (Zambia‟s economic back-bone) were seen as
two sides of the same coin, even though there was hardly any forest
exports to brag about at the time. How did these managers do it? FD as a
supplier of timber, a major source of energy in the copper mines at that
time, forest managers seized the moment; they tied forestry to copper
mining portraying it as a twin pillar to the copper mining industry.
Naturally, this raised the department‟s profile and forestry in general.
This also helped to make people to see forests as an important national
asset.
Generally speaking, these managers were highly visionary and
creative: they thought and operated outside the black box, mainly
tapping into other types of capacities outside the department. For
instance, as part of its vigorous campaign strategy, aimed at reaching a
wider audience, FD developed TV and Radio forest extension programs
and offered them to private companies interested to sponsor them in
exchange for “free” advertising. The initiative was highly successful,
private companies grabbed the moment. As a result, the department was
able to air numerous TV and radio programs and this paid back
immensely. Not only did this strategy enhance public awareness on
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forestry but more importantly it created some loyal forestry supporters
across all sections of society.
With international recognition of the important of and advocacy for
sustainable development becoming stronger, the moment couldn‟t be
better for these forest managers. In a triad partnership between FD,
IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the Natural Resources
Department, a National Conservation Strategy was developed. This
document went beyond forests to emphasize integrated natural resources
and environmental management.
became

a

building

block

to

The National Conservation Strategy
what

later

became

the

National

Environmental Policy.
Other landmark initiatives, to mention but a few, included the
development of forestry clubs at schools (K-G12), community agroforestry clubs and the declaration (by the Republican President, Dr.
Kenneth Kaunda) of the National Tree Planting Day (December 15th) and
National Tree Planting Month (December 15th

to January 15th)78. Not

only was this national tree planting program launched by the Republican
President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, but he remained a constant Guest of
Honor thereafter, which helped to keep the department‟s profile visibly
high in the policy arena. Similarly, in each respective province, high level
officials in government and the private sector emulated the president‟s
78

To encourage tree planting, each year the Forestry Department gave up to a maximum of 100 free
seedlings to any individual or group (e.g. community, „conservation‟ or school clubs) who wanted to plant
some trees during the annual tree planting day/month. See for instance, FD Annual Report for the Year
1988, p.1
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example.79 All these initiatives demonstrate not only managerial
competence but their creativity too. Sadly, none of this is happening
today.
Therefore, as these examples demonstrate, it is reasonable to argue
that, in addition to the other capacities, managerial competence has
always been the department‟s strongest asset and not necessarily the
quantities of other productive resources at its disposal, which have
generally been meager. Of course this does not in any way underestimate the importance of the other productive inputs but to emphasize
the point that managerial competence acts as the glue that unites the
other resources together to achieve the desired outcomes through
collective action. Of course the availability of the primary factors of
production is always an added advantage. However, without managerial
competence these inputs would not yield much on their own.
The point I am making is that sometime back the Forest
Department had strong management competence. Consequently, the
department was able to design and implement government policy
effectively going by the numerous achievements accrued over the years.
Unfortunately, this momentum has been lost along the way, at least

79

This tree planting program attracted such national attention and appeal that FD had to adjust its seedling
distribution: 100 for each Primary and Secondary (High) School, 500 to each Institution of Higher
Learning. ZIMCO had an obligation to finance the program – K50,000.00 for the Lusaka Fuel Wood
Project, and K50,000.00 for the raising seedlings for the National Tree Planting Program. Refer to FD
Annual Report for the Year 1988, p21-22.
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since late 1980s. And its effects are particularly evident in the deplorable
state of the forest estates.
As several scholars and practitioners80 have unanimously agreed,
institutional capacity clearly matters for any organization to function
effectively. But I also add that knowing which capacity is lacking is even
more important; it is the only way a dysfunctional organization such as
FD can be pushed back on track by making the missing capacity
available. Any organization with a weak institutional capacity is most
likely doomed to fail. I build on this theme in the chapters that follow to
illustrate that IC is clearly the only viable bridge that connects the policy
implementation highway to the final destination – the policy outcomes.

Dissertation Layout
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the
question under investigation, “why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in
Zambia in a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality
of stock they contain?” Besides highlighting the research question,
Chapter 1 also provides a brief historical perspective on the case study,
giving a general overview on the extent of forest estates in Zambia, who is

80

See, Kate McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects,
(Routledge: London), 2002; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old
Problems, )Earthscan Publications) 2002; Goran Cars, et. al., Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity
and Social Milieux, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner, Evaluation
and Development: The Institutional Dimension, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998;
Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and Organizational Performance…” Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 25, number2, 2006:371-393; Patricia W. Ingraham, et. al.,
Government Performance: Why Management Matters, (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2003.
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responsible for what, and how this fits into the different land tenure
arrangements.81
In particular, Chapter 1 also lays in very broad strokes the
development of forestry in Zambia, vis-à-vis, how forestry has evolved
over time both as a science and as an enterprise. The Chapter highlights
Forestry Department‟s achievements and traces the challenges the
department has confronted as a forestry manager over the years, and
then questions why that momentum has been lost. Given the current
deplorable condition of the forest estates, Chapter 1 ends with a question
wanting to know what has led to this situation and leads us into the rest
of the Chapters (4-6) that are devoted to answer this question.
Government policy goal on forestry aims at having at least 15% of
Zambia‟s landmass to be reserved as protected forest areas;82 a mandate
that Forestry Department (FD), the sole manager of Zambia‟s forestry
resources, is supposed to pursue. But as the foregoing discussion
illustrates, this task is becoming more illusive each day that passes.
81

Zambia has two land tenure systems: State land, and Trust land / Reserve land. Central government
owns the State land, while Trust / Reserve land falls under the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (Chiefs). To
create PFAs or alienate land for any purpose in the Trust / Reserve land, government has to get permission
from the Chiefs.
For more details on this topic see: GRZ, Report of the Land Commission, (Lusaka), August 1967; GRZ,
Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970; GRZ The Land Policy 1995; D.J.
Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, University of London Press,
Ltd, 1971:48-49; M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System, (NecZam:
Lusaka), 1980; M.P. Mvunga, Land Law and Policy in Zambia, (Mambo Press: Institute for African
Studies, Zambian Papers No.17), 1982; Gear Kajoba, The Landmarks of Zambia’s Land Tenure System:
From Protectionism to Empowerment, (A Paper presented at the International Conference on Land Tenure
in the Developing World with a Focus on Southern Africa, held at the University of Capetown, South
Africa, 27-29 January, 1998); M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land
allocation in Zambia", in Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal
Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45
82
Zambia Forestry Policy 1965: Item 5
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Evidently, FD‟s most productive years in working towards this goal were
during the 1960s through to early 1980s. Since then hardly any forest
reservations have taken place; instead forest degazettions83 have become
the order of the day.
Apart from degazettions the remaining forest estates are also in a
deplorable state; either there are illegal settlements or someone is
illegally over-exploiting the resources thus compromising the purpose for
which these forests were established.84 It is these sad developments that
have inspired this study asking the question: are these problems due to
lack of institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or is it due to
other factors beyond the department‟s control?
Chapter 2 delves into the theoretical basis of institutional capacity
and its practical application. In particular, the Chapter gives a road map
on how institutional capacity is connected or related to effective
management and how this eventually influences [performance] outcomes.
The chapter argues that it is almost inconceivable to talk about outcomes
without looking back at IC, which covers both the physical (tangible)
resources and the rules that regulate people‟s behavior: both as
employees within an organization or as that organization‟s clientele.

83

Refers to the forest estates that cease to be protected, declared through an act of law. It is the opposite of
the protected (gazetted) forests or the legal process of setting aside a forest for conservation. Degazetted
forest estates are released back to the owners (e.g. the local Chiefs, Central or Local Government) who will
have expressed the desire to put such land to other land uses.
84
PFAs are established to serve as protective or productive forests. Protective forests provide protective
roles e.g. for water catchment areas, on mountains and along lakes to deter soil erosion; whereas productive
forests are reserved as reservoirs of forest resources to be accessed in an organized manner based on
Forestry Department‟s license system.
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Since human resources drive action in any given situation, much of the
discussion on IC revolves around people: how their actions can (and do)
orient

an

organization

towards

success

or

failure.

Managerial

competence is identified as one important ingredient that leads to
creation of effective organizations.
Chapter 3 explains how this study was conducted, and is linked to
the theoretical aspects discussed in Chapter 2. It explains how
institutional capacity is connected to forest degradation (one of FD‟s
performance indicators) and how this connection has been assessed in
this study.
The study findings are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4
deals mainly with secondary aggregate data that were collected from
public documents, from which we establish some connections between
changes in the extent and quality of PFAs (a dependent variable) and
institutional capacity (the explanatory variable) that is represented by
levels of annual government funding to FD, and the number of staff in
the Forestry Department. Given the central position that rules85 and
norms86 occupy in shaping people‟s behavior and choices, the wider
discussion also covers national statutes on forestry, traditional norms as
well as other regulations that have a bearing on forestry (e.g.
international treaties). These are part of the institutional capacity

85

Douglass North, Institutions, 1990; Oliver Williams, The Mechanisms of Governance, 1996.
Powell and DiMaggio, Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 1991; André Lecours, New
Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (University of Toronto Press), 2005
86
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variable, which in this case are considered as a control variable. The
purpose is to highlight how these statutes have shaped the department‟s
choices. The discussion in Chapter 4 is further complemented by a
second layer of data from a survey of forestry officers, a subject of
Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 discusses the field survey part of this study, based on
information collected from 91 forest managers (drawn from senior,
middle and junior management ranks)87 who participated in the survey
and commented on the extent of their involvement in the administration
of the department as well as their knowledge about the structural
adjustment program (an economic reform policy that Zambia has
pursued since 1985).88 In particular, this chapter highlights how much
these managers know about government policy on forestry, and their role
in working towards achieving the policy prescriptions. This is a chapter
that dwells on management style and practices and their role in charting
the department‟s path towards achieving its mission.
Finally, Chapter 6 pulls together the issues that have been
identified as contributing to the department‟s poor performance, and
offers some suggestions on how these problems can be resolved.

87

Senior Managers typically are 4 year degree holders and above, Middle and Junior Managers must have
a Forestry Diploma (equivalent to a 2 year Associate Degree) and a Certificate in Forestry, respectively.
88
Although official records indicate 1985 as the year when Zambia adopted SAP, in reality this program
started in 1973 when the Zambian government accessed the first stabilization loan from the IMF. By all
stripes and intent, stabilization loans always marked the beginning of the road to SAP. 1985 marked the
adoption of a full SAP.
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Chapter 2
Institutional Capacity: An Overview
In this chapter I discuss the concept of institutional capacity (IC)
and show how IC relates to effective management and performance
outcomes. The first section focuses on the conceptual framework of IC. It
traces the theoretical underpinnings of IC from classic management and
administrative theorists89 to the current schools of thought on state
capacity,90 the news ways of governing91 and capacity building.92 Arising
from this literature review, it is easy to notice that IC is a multidimensional and multi-disciplinary concept that embraces management,
organization,

administrative,

political,

sociological,

and

economic

theories; with each discipline emphasizing certain aspects of IC – e.g.

89

A sample of this literature includes: Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science
Quarterly, vol. II, No. 2 (June 1887), pp.197-222; Herbert Simon, “Proverbs of Administration,” Public
Administration Review, vol. 6 (Winter 1946), pp. 53-67; Herbert Simon, et. al., Public Administration
(Knopf: NY), 1950; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.),
Papers on the Science of Administration. Sentry Press: New York. P.3-45; Frederick Taylor, “The
Principles of Scientific Management”, in: Shafritz and Hyde (eds.), Classic of Public Administration, 1987;
Henry Fayol, The Administrative Theory in the State”, in: Gulick and Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science
of Administration 1937:106.
90
Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” in: Peter Evans et. al. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In,
1985; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in
the Third World, 1994; Merilee S. Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America
and Africa, 1996.
91
For more details on this topic see, Kate McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), New Public Management: Current
Trends and Future Prospects, (Routledge: London), 2002; Goran Cars, et. al., Urban Governance,
Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and
Eduardo Wiesner, Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension, (Transaction Publishers:
New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and
Organizational Performance…” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 25, number2, 2006:371393
92
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems, (Earthscan
Publications) 2002
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focusing on tangible resources, skills, relationships, the environment or
simply rules.
Although some exceptions abound in each discipline, generally
speaking, the administrative, management and organization theorists
tend to emphasize management of productive inputs (tangible resources),
people skills, the work environment and relationships among workers,
which help to organize people and other factors of production. On the
other hand the political, sociological and economic theorists lean towards
rules (commonly referred to as institutions in economic conceptions),
skills

(strategic

particularly

maneuvers),

emphasize

that

and
rules

relationships.
determine

While
the

economists

outcomes

by

manipulating human behavior,93 all the other groups also agree that
rules are a common denominator: not only do rules influence human
behavior and their choices but they particularly create and structure the
environment where people finally operate.94 Thus, there are clearly
overlaps in how the different disciplines characterize and or define IC.
In the second section of this chapter I look at the applied version of
IC: how different scholars and practitioners have defined and applied this
concept. As noted above, their differences are cosmetic in nature; they

93

See for instance, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
(Cambridge University Press), 1990; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, (Oxford
University Press), 1996; Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development (Transaction
Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Anchor Books: NY),
1999.
94
The new institutionalism is particularly strong in this respect. See, Water W. Powell and Paul J.
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (The University of Chicago Press),
1991

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 61

tend to hold certain aspects of IC constant to emphasize other aspects
perceived to be more important in their respective disciplines.
Finally, the third section deals with the importance of IC and its
implications for today‟s organizations. For our case study, I use a policy
history road map as a narrative tool based on its strength that enables
us to see the effects of policy change over time.95 This is especially
important for this case study because the development of forestry in
Zambia, both as a science and a business, is a product of incremental
developments that have occurred over a long period of time, caused by
shifts in government policy. A policy history road map enables us to see
through the different phases and how each phase influenced the
department‟s operations. Having said that what is institutional capacity?
And how is it connected to outcomes? Does institutional capacity matter?

What is Institutional Capacity?
The word ‘institution’ means different things to different people. It
may mean the rules, regulations, laws or statues that shape the work
ethic or behavior of an organization96, or it may refer to an entire
organization; in which case it includes both the people and the rules97

95

Julian E. Zelizer, “Introduction: New Directions in Policy History,” Journal of Policy History, vol. 17,
No. 1, 2005:3,6-7
96
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Jeffrey Nugent, “Institutions, Markets, and
Development Outcomes” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development, 1998: 9-10
97
Kent R. Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, “Assessing the Effects of Institutions,” in: Weaver & Rockman
(eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, 1993; Joseph
Litterer (ed.), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, 1980; Arturo Israel, Institutional Development:
Incentives to Performance, 1987; Thrainn Eggertsson, “Comments on „Institutions, Markets, and
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that govern their behavior.98 Attempting to define institution is as
problematic as agreeing on its application; it depends on the discipline
and the thematic area.99 For instance, within the old institutionalism
movement institutions were generally conceptualized as material entities.
“They were constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, bureaucracies, courts,
armies, .…and in some instances, party systems. In other words,
institutions referred to the state” or more precisely to “government.”100
And most institutionalists accept this material or structural definition.
However, not all new institutionalists agree with this position. For
instance, the rational choice institutionalists conceptualize institutions
from an actor-centered perspective101 that focuses on the rules of the
game

and

highlights

how

institutions

shape

action by

creating

opportunities and constraints.102 Their main concern is “not so much
what institutions are but what they represent: an equilibrium.”103 Yet,
other new institutionalists with a rationalistic orientation concentrate on
the

relationship

between

institutions

and

agents

arguing

that

institutions only provide the context within which agents (actors) drive

Development Outcomes‟ by Nugent” ” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development,
1998:24
98
For a detailed treatment of this application, see: Max Weber‟s Bureaucracy (1987) [original work 1922],
where he conceptualized government as an institution with people and rules to regulate their behavior. See
also Harold Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, (The Dorsey Press, Chicago, Il.),
1987:3
99
André Lecours, New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (University of Toronto Press), 2005:6-11
100
André Lecours, New Institutionalism, 2005:6
101
Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
(Westview Press), 1997
102
North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of
Institutions,” American Political Science Review, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3
103
Lecours, 2005:6; Crawford and Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” APSR, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3
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action.104 This stands in contrast with the other strand of conception
that comes from those who posit that institutions drive human action by
influencing their behavior by constraining people‟s choices.105 But others
are quick to point out that human behavior is not only shaped by utility
calculations

but

more

so

from

cultural

norms

and

values

or

institutionalized standards that by themselves reproduce anticipated
expectations, identity and habit.106 Sociological institutionalists agree
with this conception. They too view institutions in terms of norms,
beliefs, values, and cognitive frameworks.107 They stress the fact that
cultural norms, beliefs, values, and ideas are internalized and once
formed such institutions become entrenched (or institutionalized),
allowing little room for acting outside the black box. This is problematic
because it tends to stifle innovation or acceptance of new ideas.
Despite the different angles these definitions emphasize there are
some common features or overlaps that bring these groups together. One
is that the common purpose of institutions is to create a sense of
continuity rather than change. For this reason, institutional continuity
encourages and produces repetitive behavior, which ultimately affects
the outcomes. Second, institutions (whether they be rules, values or

104

James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (Free
Press), 1989; James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life,” American Political Science Review, 78, 1984:734-49; James March and Johan Olsen, Democratic
Governance, (Free Press), 1995
105
North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance,
1996
106
Lecours, 2005:10
107
Richard W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (Sage), 1989:21
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organizations)

are

people-centered

and

people-oriented.

They

are

intended to organize and regulate human behavior with a view of
achieving some desired outcome.
It follows therefore that whatever angle one takes in defining and
analyzing institutions it is impossible to ignore their connection with the
people.

For

instance,

those

who

look

at

institutions

as

rules

conceptualize them in the context of how rules shape human behavior
and

their

environment,

while

those

who

view

institutions

as

organizations consider them as complete entities encompassing both the
rules and the people that constitute them. Therefore, although coming
from different entry points, both groups essentially look at people, the
environment and the outcomes.
In this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated, institution means
an organization. It refers to an entity comprising of people engaged in
specialized yet interdependent activities108 and, who have agreed to
cooperate to accomplish a common goal.109 And this institution is subject
to the rules that give it its mandate and jurisdictional boundaries,
prescribes its structure (e.g. the reporting hierarchy and resource
requirements), and ultimately regulates the behavior of the people that
constitute it. Although much of the literature on institutions portrays
organizations as “passive, reacting entity entrapped or responding to

108

Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, (The Dorsey Press), 1987:2
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Harvard
University Press), 1965; Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory, 1987:2
109
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coercive or cultural forces in its environment,” I take

the view that

organizations are active entities, comprising of “purposeful rational
actors who are goal-oriented and in control of their own fate.”110 An
organization is a place for collective action that may happen through
bounded rationality, producing “institutions which in turn control and
govern an organization‟s actions.”111 Thus, it is almost impossible to
separate organizations from institutions, they tend to create and
reproduce each other. For this reason, institution and organization will
be used interchangeably here. However, for purposes of clarity, whenever
reference is made to institutions as in rules, laws or statutes this will be
stated explicitly as such.
How about capacity, how is this understood? Capacity also has
various meanings: ranging from the notion of physical or mental space to
hold or accommodate knowledge/something, to the ability to perform a
duty/role, or as a force to induce a particular outcome.112 In this study,
capacity refers to an institution‟s ability to effectively perform its
functions and attain its goals. Capacity is considered as an enabling
force113 that leads to particular desirable outcome. For our purposes, this
latter definition is preferred because it operationalizes capacity as being a
facilitator to achieving an outcome. It implies having adequate productive
110

Joseph Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable: Institutional Building in Minneapolis-St.
Paul,” in: Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism, 1991:293.
111
Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable,” 1991:293
112
These meanings are paraphrased from Merriam Webster‟s Collegiate Dictionary, 1993.
113
The word force as used here denotes those motivating elements that stimulate people to work as well as
power relations between individuals, groups, or institutions – whose outcomes are usually dependent on the
type and quality of resources at one‟s disposal.
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resources – (e.g. human, capital, technological resources and an enabling
environment) – that are necessary for an organization to function
effectively,114 which simply means that an organization has the ability to
follow through its mission and achieve its goals.
However, in so far as capacity implies the ability or effectiveness in
getting the expected result, measuring the final outcome also requires
attention to quality as well as quantity. Just as absence of an outcome is
an indicator of lack of capacity so too are poor or inferior outcomes; they
also point in the same direction. For instance, it is better to have one
good outcome than several outcomes of poor quality. For reason, no
organization would qualify as having capacity if it produces poor
outcomes. That by itself is an indicator of lack of capacity that would
need to be addressed.
Similarly, attention to quantity and quality applies to resource
availability too. When people talk about adequate capacity there is an
implied assumption these resources are of good quality and in the right
amounts

needed

for

the

job.

Hence,

adequate

capacity

implies

availability, quantity and quality of that ability. Based on the strength of
this assumption, rarely do people even care to specify what capacity
means. In short therefore, capacity simply means having adequate and

114

Paul C. Nutt, Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision-Making,1989;
Victor A. Thompson, Decision Theory, Pure and Applied, 1971; Herbert A. Simon, et. al., Public
Administration,1950
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appropriate productive resources required to undertake a given task.
And this is the working definition adopted in this study.
As can be seen from these explanations above capacity too (like
institutions) has strong connections with the human factor; either as
part of the capacity itself or as a resource at the center of organizing and
utilizing other capacities (resources) to achieve a particular goal.
Although capacity may be reduced to mean only what constitutes it (i.e.
its inputs), at that level it remains only an abstract concept until it is
attached to an outcome. In other words, the existence of capacity, be it at
individual, group or national level, can only be confirmed when there is a
product (outcome) to show for it. What do I mean by this?
For instance, if an organization has all the resources it needs to
undertake a particular activity but fails to attain the anticipated
outcomes, does it have the capacity or not? Asked differently, how do we
know an organization has capacity? The best way is through its ability to
achieve its goals. If an organization fails to achieve its goals that means
there is a lack of capacity somewhere. And this may not be necessarily
due to lack of resources (e.g. the quantity of its productive inputs) but
probably be due to the type, or the environment is not conducive, or
simply a lack managerial skills to put the available resources to good
use. And because some of these aspects are embedded in other
resources, they may not be easily identifiable and might be assumed as
available, when in fact they are not, just because the resource they are
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associated with is available. For example, if an organization has the
required number of personnel as the organization structure prescribes
one might assume there is adequate human resource capacity. Yet this
might camouflage lack of managerial skills. This is a case in point in the
Forest Department. Although its senior managers have more than the
minimum professional qualifications115 required for these positions, all
(but one senior manager with a Bachelor‟s degree) have Masters‟ degrees
with over 8 years of field experience, yet the department‟s performance is
way below the expected standards, suggesting that there is a managerial
problem and not the quantity problem. Therefore, when analyzing
capacity it is important that special attention is paid to these intricacies,
which also tends to replay at national level as Bade Onimode (1988) and
Nicholas Van de Walle (2001) have illustrated for Africa.116
As Christopher Clapham (2004) further explains, organizational
failure is not necessarily due to lack of resources, sometimes productive
resources might be available but that does not automatically translate
into capacity. He points out that Africa, for instance, is highly endowed
in natural resources yet it remains the least developed continent mainly
due to poor leadership. Consequently, this has led to bad governance
and poor political stewardship in most African states; with only a few
exceptions such as Botswana, which at least has managed to use its
115

The minimum requirement is a Bachelor‟s degree.
Bade Onimode, A Political Economy of the African Crisis, (Zed Books: London), 1988; Nicholas van
de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis,1979-1999 (Cambridge University
Press), 2001
116
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resources wisely to sustain both political and economic stability.117 In
this case managerial and technical skills, integrity over public assets,
etc. are just as important as other tangible resources. Therefore,
whenever we discuss institutional capacity, it is important to put it into
context. Capacity in and by itself is meaningless until measured in terms
of outcomes, and as this will soon become evident, human intervention
almost always is the defining factor. And this brings us back to the
original question, what then is institutional capacity?

The Concept of Institutional Capacity
The literature on institutional capacity is rather sparse, and those
who have done some work in this area don‟t seem to agree on one single
definition.118 In general, institutional capacity refers to an organization‟s
ability to do what it is designed to do. In the case of a government
institution – the focus of this study – this means being able to formulate
and successfully implement and evaluate government policies.
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I define institutional capacity (IC) as an organization’s ability to
create and sustain an environment and relationships that facilitate and
support purposeful, collective action

geared towards achieving its

objectives.119 I find this definition to be most appropriate in the sense
that it encompasses key aspects of what constitutes institution and
capacity that I talked about earlier. It also operationalizes the concept
making it possible to assess and analyze how IC becomes a defining
factor in institutional performance.
First and foremost, creating a productive environment starts with
the availability of factors of production, vis-à-vis: human, capital,120
infrastructural and technological resources121 as well as entrepreneurial
skills. It is from these resources that an organization draws its strength
to operate effectively. Second, it requires harnessing the skills of the
social capital (employees) towards achieving an organization‟s objectives.
In order to have a healthy and productive working environment people
need to work cooperatively, both within and outside the organization,
and that they are motivated to work towards a common goal, supported
by the prevailing rules. Collective action is not something that creates
itself; it comes from different levels of capacities and motivation such as
management skills that create a sense of teamwork, individual choice to
119
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belong or self-interest propelled by anticipated gains from being involved
in a particular activity. Hence, whatever angle is taken on IC, one fact
remains intact: it is a bridge between the means and ends. It facilitates
policy implementation. Put differently, when an institution has capacity
it can be seen in its ability to plan and set goals, to create and sustain
productive relationships,122 to solve problems and finally in its ability to
achieve goals.123
From an operational stand point IC can be broken down into three
broad categories. The first represents the factors of production: human,
capital, infrastructure, and technological resources; as basic inputs that
any organization needs to function. The second relates to the rules that
regulate human behavior both within and outside the organization. The
third covers administrative competences of the staff to organize and
utilize the other factors of production, and their ability to make decisions
on what should or should not be done.

It follows therefore, that an

organization has capacity if it has these levels of capacities (inputs) that
are considered essential for pursuing an organization‟s mandate.124
As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the presence of
capacity (i.e. the availability of resources) does not automatically
guarantee effectiveness in attainment of goals. Other parameters come to
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bear, and these relate mainly to staff competences. For instance, how
effective are managers (or supervisors) in organizing and utilizing the
other resources under their jurisdictions? How well connected is the
head of the organization to the political powerhouse – in or outside that
organization?125 Do all employees understand their role in achieving the
organization‟s objectives? These and other managerial and political
abilities are extremely important in pursuing an organization‟s mission.
As Lambert and Oatley remind us, those who are “well connected and
well

informed”

are

able

to

mobilize

quickly

and

capture

the

opportunities.126 And the opposite is just as true for those who are not
politically agile.
The Forestry Department provides an excellent example. Although
the department oversees a sector from where more than 80% of the
Zambian population derives its energy needs, senior managers have not
marketed the department to policy makers and elected officials in a
manner that highlights this and several other aspects of national
importance. Consequently, the department hardly exists in the policy
arena. This stands in contrast with previous forest managers who
marketed the department as a backbone to copper mining, which
depended on wood energy for its smelter plants. Naturally, government
paid high priority to the department until some mines switched to
electric power, which somehow weakened the marriage between forestry
125
126
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and copper mining. The point I‟m making is that what determines the
effectiveness of an organization is not necessarily the availability of
factors of production, although this is clearly essential. What is more
important is the ability of its managers (or staff in general) to mobilize
(organize) and utilize (allocate) those resources in a way that leads to
accomplishment of an organization‟s goals.
An organization may have the resources but if it lacks the
administrative competence to utilize them it would be as good as not
having those resources. For this reason IC should be considered as a
cocktail of capacities, representing both tangible and intangible inputs. It
reflects an organization‟s ability to effectively mobilize and utilize these
capacities, with managerial and political abilities being key ingredients in
the policy implementation process. Expressed differently, capacity exists
if an organization has these ingredients that are considered essential for
policy implementation.127 In short, institutional capacity boils down to
the administrative competences of an institution to pursue its goals.
Therefore, in analyzing the Forest Department‟s institutional capacity to
effectively manage its estates, I rely and draw upon these benchmarks
discussed above.
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The Importance of Institutional Capacity
Why should we study institutional capacity? What benefits or
additions will this bring to the scholastic menu? One good reason is that
IC is both the fuel and engine that propels action in any organization.
Studying IC helps us to understand why some institutions perform better
than others. This is especially valuable and timely for those interested in
the Third World economic development dilemma.
In particular, if one takes the policy implementation framework to
be schematically represented as an input-output-outcome-impacts process,
clearly, the inputs in this equation represent institutional capacity. And it
is these inputs that facilitate policy implementation, and therefore tends
to determine policy failure or success depending on how they are utilized.
An inquiry into the IC of Third World governments allows us to start
addressing the problem of policy failure from the first portion of the
policy implementation framework, instead of focusing on the effects of
policy outcomes. As Arturo Israel (1987) and Peter Evans (1985) remind
us weak state capacities, especially in the developing countries, has been
a defining factor on how they have performed administratively,
economically and politically.128 The economic turn around and the
ensuring

economic

boom

that

some

East

Asian

countries

have

experienced in the recent past confirm this reality. As Robert Wade
(1990) explains, government leadership through targeted investment
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accelerated

development

in

these

East

Asian

countries.

Hence,

government leadership, which promoted certain activities before others
should be considered an important “variable, not a constant.”129 And
many lessons abound in the global arena. The gap between rich and poor
countries, which has also continued to grow wider, can easily be
explained by the differences in the IC of their governments.130 However,
the best way be confirm or refute such speculations is through evidencebased research as this study does. And Israel also notes:
“When that [institutional] capacity is particularly weak, as in many
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and elsewhere, the real choices are quite
dramatic – but the choices become apparent only after a detailed
analysis of the institutional capacity, and such analysis is seldom
made.”131 (text in italics is my emphasis).

But analyses on institutional capacity need not be scarce because
this is the only way to see if an organization is able to achieve its goals.
Therefore, when evaluating a country‟s economic performance or its
[in]ability to execute specific programs, such work ought to take into
account state capacity132 because a country‟s “pattern of strengths and
weaknesses” is not the same for all policies.133 And this scenario repeats
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itself at agency level too.134 The point I‟m trying to make is that
institutional capacity should be considered as an important variable in
explaining performance, and its use should be “optimized” for future
program design and implementation.135
I begin by acknowledging that organizations are created for a
particular purpose.136 To accomplish its mission an organization requires
a certain type and quantity of resources.137 Therefore, assessing an
institution‟s capacity would help to establish whether or not that
institution is capable of realizing its mandate,.138 Yet despite this
straightforward sketch of what IC entails and why it is important to
study it, it seems there is no agreement on its definition, and
consequently this has implications on how its connection to outcomes
are analyzed and explained.
Grindle (1996) defines institutional capacity as the presence of
rules to “regulate economic and political interactions” of a nation i.e. “the
ability to assert the primacy of national policies, legal conventions, and
norms of social and political behavior over those of other groupings.”139
She differentiates institutional capacity from the other forms of
134

Grindle, 1980:10
Israel, 1987:119
136
Litterer, 1980:110; Florence Heffron, Organization Theory and Public Organizations, 1989:2; Harold F.
Gortner, Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, 1987:2-5; Weber, 1987; William G. Scott and
Terence R. Mitchell, Organization Theory: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis, 1972:37; R.M. Cyert and
J.G. March, “A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives,” in: Litterer Joseph (ed.) Organizations,
1980:419; Harold Gortner, Administration in the Public Sector, 1977:4
137
Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Study of Organizations, (Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, California),
1980:81
138
Aaron Wildavsky, “The Self-Evaluating Organization,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 32, Sept-Oct
1972, pp509-20
139
Grindle, 1996:8
135

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 77

capacities, namely: technical, administrative, and political.140 Grindle
highlights the fact that capacity entails having the resources as well as
the ability to use them. However, Grindle does not say what these
resources are. For Michael Bratton (1994) “capacity exists when an
organization possesses the full range of resources – human, financial,
material, coercive [power], and symbolic [recognition]141 – that are
required for the implementers to get things done.”142 Bratton‟s argument
is that unless these resources are available there is not much an
organization can achieve. On the other hand, Israel (1987) views
institutional

capacity

from

a

technical

and

administrative

skills

perspective. He is especially concerned with the human component and
specifically advocates special investment in human resources because
“…human resources are more important to development than natural
resources or technology.”143 In this respect, Israel is in agreement with
the extensive literature on organization management, which argues that
people are the primary building blocks of any organization.144 According
to Israel institutional capacity is a scarce resource and therefore needs
special attention.
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“Institutional capabilities are not only one of the most important
resources for development, but also one of the most scarce, if not the
scarcest. It should be explicitly considered a separate resource in the
design of development strategies.” 145

Furthermore, Israel argues that because IC is scarce, this in itself
should provide a new perspective why its use should be optimized.146
But Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985) view IC
from a political angle. They emphasize the state‟s political ability to
effectively use the resources at its disposal to get things done.147
Skocpol (1985) specifically defines capacity as the means “to
implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition
of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic
circumstances.”148 But capacity need not be appreciated only when there
is some form of opposition as Skocpol seems to suggest. In my view,
being able to get things done even when there is no opposition on an
issue also reflects capacity.
For Migdal (1988), state capabilities “include capacities to
penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and
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appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”149 Peter Evans (1985),
on the other hand, understands the “classic locus of state power” as
being its ability to regulate relations with the outside world.150 Evans is
more concerned with the state‟s capability to handle trans-national
challenges than internal matters.
The current schools of thought take institutional capacity to mean
a state‟s ability to govern. In this group, they too take availability of
resources for granted and instead focus on creation and sustaining
relations and environments that support achievement of goals.151 They
argue that having the resources without the skills to motivate people to
cooperate and work towards achieving a common goal is as good as not
having those productive resources.152 Sociologists and economists are
particularly strong on this type of characterization. They point out that
outcomes are a product of both the choices people make as well as the
relations they create in working towards a common goal or for self-gain,
as in the case of economists and rational choice theorists.153
Another level of capacity is identified as relating to the institutions
(rules,

laws,

norms)

that

shape

human

behavior.

Economists,

psychologists and even sociologists define capacity as something
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embedded in the rules that regulate human behavior.154 In their view,
not only do rules shape human behavior, they also limit the choices
available to the people too!155 This line of argument runs deeply in
Douglass North‟s renditions. Because rules have potential to facilitate or
inhibit resource availability, this means that rules ultimately influence
the final outcomes. They further argue that institutions also demarcate
boundaries on what can and cannot be done and consequently tend to
influence how people operate and what resources they can tap into.
Therefore, when evaluating the performance of any organization rules
have a central role in shaping not only people‟s behavior but how much
of each resource an organization can have at any given time. But
Douglass North is quick to acknowledge and point out that people do
ultimately influence the outcomes because “they define and enforce the
economic rules.”156
Mustapha Nabli (1998) also agrees with this line of argument and
advises that for this reason those dealing with institutions need to
provide a clear definition of what they mean by institution. Specifically,
Nabli argues that there is need to make a distinction between
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institutions and policies and how to measure their impact on
outcomes.157
“Whether one uses a restrictive definition of institutions, such as
“formal and informal rules that constrain behavior” or a more
extensive one, such as argued by Jeffrey Nugent, the distinction
has to be clearly kept in mind.”158

According to Nugent, quoted in Picciotto and Wiesner (1998), an
institution is a set of constraints that governs the behavioral relations
among individuals and groups”.159 In this context, therefore, most
organizations are institutions because they provide rules that shape and
govern the relationships between their members and non-members.
Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between how rules apply in
an individual institution (institutional arrangement) and to a set of other
institutions in which the institutional arrangement is embedded (the
institutional structure).160
For instance, rules prescribe the size of organization, such as how
many employees an organization may have and what other resources
would be at its disposal. Depending on the circumstances, such
prescriptions may become limitations and probably work against the
survival of an organization or its desire to try new ways of doing things.
157
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This is especially true for a public institution like FD which is restricted
to follow prescribed procedures. Unlike in a private company where
owners can make changes anytime as circumstances dictate, FD does
not have this flexibility. As a public institution it is bound to follow
established standards of doing things.
For

instance,

its

managers

cannot

alter

the

labor

force

requirements even though particular categories of staff may or may not
be needed. This can only be done after such clearance is granted from
Personnel Division at Cabinet Office. And neither can the department
change the way it issues licenses until Parliament gives that approval.
And for each of these actions there is a process to be followed that is also
governed by its own rules. Thus, when evaluating the performance of
public institutions it is important to factor in these institutionalized
standards that quite often cause public organizations to be slow in the
way they respond to various situations.
For whatever this is worth, advocates argue that observance of
such

procedures are

not

meant

to cause

delay

but to

create

transparency, accountability, and more importantly to protect employees
and civil society at large from abuse of power from those who may be
privileged to hold such offices. If the recent fiasco at the World Bank
involving its President, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, over his girlfriend‟s (Shaha Ali
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Riza) pay161 has anything we can learn, I am persuaded to think that the
advocates for adherence to rules and procedures have something in their
favor. As Murray Waas points out, “Had the bank's board adhered to its
ordinary rules, as Riza was shifted over to the State Department, she
should have only been eligible for a raise of about $20,000. Instead she
was given a raise of $47,340, whereupon her salary became $180,000.
Then last year, she received yet another raise which brought her salary to
$193,950. That salary increase not only meant that Riza earned more
than Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but apparently made her the
single highest paid State Department official.”162
Looking at the role of institutions, Oliver Williamson (1996) takes
the topic to another level arguing that rules tend to influence capacity by
creating transaction costs, which stop or prompt people from responding
in a certain way. As rational creatures, people evaluate their choices
using a cost-benefit scale. Before taking a particular course of action,
they weigh their options against the transaction costs and this has
implications the type of choices taken and eventually on the final
outcomes. Of course, unlike in the economic perspective where this sort
of calculation is mainly from a monetary point of view, in the political
and policy arenas this quite often includes moral considerations as part
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of the cost-benefit consideration, and the concern revolves around the
impact of the outcome and who would be affected positively or negatively.
As Deborah Stone (1997) puts it these considerations have no easy
solutions: policy interventions and rules almost always tend to draw
boundaries by permitting some aspects and excluding others, in which
case they become exclusionary.163 Similarly, public programs are
analyzed in the same way such that an agency whose program
intervention promises the highest positive impact is usually looked upon
favorably.
The Forestry Department provides a good example of how these
considerations play out in the real world. Because the effects of poor
forest management are not usually immediate or as obvious as the ones
from agriculture (e.g. food shortage due to drought) or health (due to
disease outbreak), forestry hardly takes any front seats in the policy
arena. It is not considered as important as agriculture or health. Thus,
when central government shares the national cake, the Forestry
Department is one among the least funded agencies.164 I return to
discuss these issues in greater detail later on in Chapter 5 and 6. The
point I‟m trying to make here is that even at central government level
cost-benefit considerations are a key factor in deciding what bureau gets
the most support.
163
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Douglass North (2002) concurs with Oliver Williamson (1996) and
notes that even without the issue of transaction costs, political and
economic institutions (rules) in and by themselves do set the parameters
for what is permissible, and this makes people to react in a certain way
and therefore shape the way people behave and make choices. Clearly,
rules and individual choices are important determinants of the
effectiveness of organizations. They argue that governance, including
economic, social and political behaviors are shaped not only by choices
people make but more importantly by the rules that create the
environment to which people respond.165 In other words, institutions do
facilitate or inhibit the way people operate, and by extension the
outcomes.
But the rational-actor and public choice theorists take a slightly
different view, highlighting the fact that actually it is the people who
create such environments through their opportunistic, self-interested
tendencies. They argue that people develop institutions that can yield
what they desire. And it doesn‟t matter whether this is at individual or
national level or for public or private gain. The motive remains the same.
These individual choices have an enormous impact on the institutions
that eventually get created. Therefore, it is erroneous to portray
institutions as creating the environment that people eventually respond
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to. Instead, it should be the other way round: people create their own
environment and by extension determine their fate.
The

new

sociological

institutionalists

take

issue

with

this

characterization.166 Arguing against some institutional economists and
public choice theorists that posit that people “construct the institutions
that achieve the outcomes they desire,”167 Powell & DiMaggio concur with
Douglass North (1990) and Oliver Williamson (1996) and note that the
opposite is what happens: institutions force people to adapt and behave
in a particular manner, not vice versa. Although Powell and DiMaggio
acknowledge “individuals‟ attributes or motives” as factors in the larger
equation, they still reject the rational-actor models arguing that
institutions must be taken as “independent variables”168 to which people
respond.
Like Douglass North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991) see
institutionalism (e.g. institutionalized norms, beliefs, standards, etc.) as
being potently powerful in creating certain social relationships and
actions, which over time comes to be taken for granted. For this reason,
they see the public choice, rational-actor, and self-interest theories as
being wrapped wrongly. In their view, institutions have a stronger impact
on the people than people do on the institutions. “In the sociological
tradition, institutionalization is both a „phenomenological process‟ by
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which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for
granted” as well as a “state of affairs in which shared cognitions define
what has meaning and what actions are possible.”169 Powell & DiMaggio
(1991) further note that:
“Institutionalized

arrangements

are

reproduced

because

individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives
(or because they regard as unrealistic the alternatives they
imagine). Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish
the criteria by which people discover their preferences. In other
words, some of the very sunk costs are cognitive.”170

Powell and DiMaggio (1991) further explain that this type of
assumption jumps the boat in that some institutional economists and
public choice theorists rarely ask “where the preferences come from” and
most likely do not even consider “feedback mechanisms between
interests and institutions.”171 To drive their point home Powell and
DiMaggio (1991) ask the question: “Do institutions reflect preferences of
individuals or corporate actors, or do they represent collective outcomes
that are not the simple sum of individual interests?”172 In their view,
there is no cut and dry response to this question due to various reasons.
One is that individuals cannot choose their options outside the accepted
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“institutions, customs, social norms or legal procedures”.173 People are
confined (and in a way forced) to follow institutionalized standards. For
example, “one cannot decide to divorce in a new manner” outside the
institutionalized procedures. The other is that individual choices mirror
the “cultural and historical frameworks in which they are embedded.”174
Although Powell and DiMaggio (1991) agree with economic and
public choice theorists that people‟s options are constrained by “sunk
costs in existing arrangements” and “technical interdependence” that are
partly responsible for creating institutional inertial and sometimes
yielding “unintended effects”, they however still maintain their ground
arguing that the thrust of this argument still remains the same: it is
meant to convey the idea that institutional arrangements are a product
of “opportunism, imperfect or asymmetric information, and costly
monitoring” mechanisms.175
Another

consideration

relates

to

autonomy,

plasticity,

and

efficiency of institutions as well as response to change – the question of
which has the most influence over the other; is it the institutions or the
people? Powell and DiMaggio point out that institutions have a greater
impact on the people because they are not easily malleable,176 and they
find alliances on this point from some political science and economic
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institutionalists too.177 Shepsle (1986, 1989), in particular, agrees to this
view and gives an example of political institutions that are wired in such
a way that it is not easy to change them, starting with the constitution.
Instead, elected officials must adapt to those institutions if they have to
make any progress. Economists, Nelson and Winter (1982), also agree
with this view and single out the role of rules, norms, and culture in
organizational change. Furthermore, Powell and DiMaggio emphasize
that not only do institutional arrangements restrict individual behavior
by rendering some options unviable, or simply prohibiting certain actions
all together, but more importantly these constraints also restrain certain
“patterns of resource allocation.”178 As I have pointed out earlier, the
point to note from these arguments is that any action that affects
resource availability and allocation will ultimately affect capacity,
performance and finally the outcomes.
In fact, when discussing capacity, individual preferences and
economic development in general, Amartya Sen (1999) brings out one
interesting point; he notes that institutionalism and individual choice or
“freedom of choice” actually tend to be at each other‟s throats,
particularly in this era of modernity. According to him when societies
embrace a “freedom-oriented perspective” people essentially strive for the
177
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liberty “to participate in deciding what traditions to observe” and don‟t
want any restrictions to be imposed by the institutions, national or local
“guardians”, the “ayatollahs (or any religious authorities)”, political
rulers, and not even by “cultural experts” be they local or foreign.179
However, what this freedom generates is a struggle and conflict in
deciding whether to preserve and what traditions should be preserved
versus embracing the advantages of modernity.180 And there are no easy
solutions to these choices or considerations. Instead, they are or become
real challenges for many organizations, especially those wanting to try
new ways of doing things.
The US experience on “reinventing government” during Bill
Clinton‟s administration, over which Vice President Al Gore presided,
stands as a good example.181 With respect to our case study,
decentralization

of

the

Forest

Department‟s

operations

whereby

provincial forest offices are supposed to fall under the local government
jurisdiction in their respective provinces and districts has always failed
because FD Headquarters has always been uncomfortable relinquishing
their control and power over the provincial offices.
As the “power to people” movement has taken a stronger voice all
across

179

the

nation,

as

part

of

a

process

of

implementing

the
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Decentralization Policy, all Provincial Forest Offices now fall under their
respective provincial jurisdictions. However, their linkage to central
government still remains through Forestry Department Headquarters
rather than their Provincial Permanent Secretary‟s office. In other words,
Provincial officers have to report to two offices – FD Headquarters and
Provincial Permanent Secretary (PS). But since their funding now comes
through the Provincial PS‟s office, their relationship with FD HQ is slowly
becoming weaker, and there is no motivation for them to report to FD HQ
since the FD is not responsible for their budgets.
Indeed, all the issues raised in the foregoing arguments are quite
pertinent, especially to public organizations where their employees are
expected to follow existing procedures, almost to the letter. And yet in
their daily activities these public employees do have some level of
autonomy and freedom to decide on what is the best course of action,
which might include whether to adhere to the established „standards‟
and „traditions‟ or to try something new. In my view, this is where the
response to the question what impacts the other most would simply be,
“it depends” on the timeframe and possibly the prevailing circumstances.
By timeframe I mean the point being evaluated.
For instance, is it at a time when the institutions are being
developed or are they already in existence? If they are just being created,
the architects of such institutions will definitely try to cater for their selfinterests – whatever purpose they envision to achieve. This is the point at
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which rational-actor and public choice theorists are discussing. However,
if these institutions are already in existence, people would have reacted
to them over time, and established some sort of „tradition‟ on what
values, standards, norms, etc. that such institutions have helped to
create and society has chosen to preserve them. Over time those
standards, norms or expectations become institutionalized. This is the
point where sociological conceptions (and others who think institutions
impact people more) are taking place.

In short, both groups have

something to offer.
For capacity building specialists, institutional capacity is almost
synonymous to good governance182 whose general indicators include
having a representative government183 that arise through democratic
means (e.g. competitive elections); a transparent government free of
corruption184 that is accountable and efficient in its use of public
resources; has a free judiciary, practices fairness and the rule of law, and
upholds human rights185. As a performance indicator, adherence to good
governance (GG) is expected to ensure that government institutions are
efficient and effective in serving civil society; meaning that they ought to
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have a vision and goals to work towards, and be accountable to the
people in delivering public goods.186
However,

Kettl

(2000)

quickly

cautions

that

government

institutions may not achieve this level of effective delivery systems until
they orient themselves to a market economy in which chief executives of
government agencies are rewarded just like their counterparts in the
private sector. This would act as an incentive for them to work hard and
be innovative in their service delivery.187 By extension this would ensure
that GG flourishes.188 The problem with this incentive strategy is that
rewarding the top tier only and leaving out the people below those ranks
would clearly de-motivate the very people who are policy implementers.
According to our survey results, the Forestry Department currently has a
highly de-motivated workforce partly because their counterparts in other
agencies e.g. in the Department of Agriculture are on higher salary scales
than forestry personnel although they have similar workloads. Having
been short-changed in this way, forestry personnel are not motivated to
work hard. As can be expected this is having a toll on their department‟s
overall performance.
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According to the IMF, their view of GG concentrates on those
aspects of governance that contribute to creating a stable macroeconomic
environment that supports efficient private sector activities. It is from
this perspective that the IMF/Bank uses GG as a surveillance tool to
monitor success of the programs they have financed. But GG is as
problematic to define as it is to measure simply because it is loaded with
concepts such as democracy that have no single definition.189 Even
accountability is not easily agreed upon depending on what aspects one
emphasizes. And neither have the IMF and the Bank, the strongest
advocates for GG surveillance, provided any measurable indicators of
these requirements thus leaving this issue open for anyone to set their
own criteria and targets. This is where the GG concept starts to unravel.
Accordingly, instead of being useful for capacity building GG, in fact,
continues to attract suspicion and resentment from Third World
governments who see the IMF and the Bank as overstepping their
jurisdictional boundaries as project financiers to becoming political
surveillance institutions. Except for the IMF and the World Bank who
insist on GG as a measure of institutional capacity, its use as an
analytical tool has not yet permeated the mainstream research arena.
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In another arena, management scholars and practitioners define
institutions from two angles: first, as an entity (with structure shaped by
its mandate and job positions) and second, as a system in which human
interactions and resource allocation takes place. Their concern is on how
to harness these interactions to promote good working relations that
would eventually lead to high productivity.
In

recent

years,

practitioners

have

taken

transparency,

accountability and good governance as new measures of productivity and
effectiveness. That is to say, how open is the public entity to outside and
inside oversight (audit); how good is the system at service delivery; and is
that organization responding to people‟s needs in a fair and effective
manner? Hence, capacity building has become an operative song. But a
word of caution is appropriate here. When some practitioners talk about
capacity building they tend to imply building technical skills that would
ultimately lead to or enhance accountability and good governance190
rather than the general view this dissertation has taken for which
capacity improvement means making available the necessary productive
resources, including technical skills.
As the above literature suggests, there are numerous conceptions
and

definitions

of

institutions.

However,

whether

one

looks

at

institutions from a materialist, rules or values (principles) perspective,

190

Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development, 2002; Patsy Healy, et. al., “Transforming Governance,
Institutional Analysis and Institutional Capacity,” in: Goran Cars, et.al., Urban Governance, Institutional
Capacity and Social Milieux, 2002:12-15.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 96

the arguments converge on one point that: institutions shape behavior
and influence the actions people take. People are motivated or
constrained in one way or another by these institutions.191 Furthermore,
despite how differently institutional capacity is different, it also converges
on one theme: that capacity deals with “how implementation is
achieved.”192 And this is the theme this dissertation draws its strength
from.
As the foregoing discussion shows, the concept of institutional
capacity is not new. The only difference is how it is labeled. Skocpol193
labels it as state capacity, Stepan194 and Shue195 call it state power, while
Migdal196 sees it as state authority / domination or in a more general way
as state-society relations.197 For example, Skocpol (1985) claims that the
state has control over policy, underscoring the fact that state capacity
matters in national development.198 Stepan (1985) and Shue (1994)
follow a similar angle but emphasize social power, showing that state
power is not cast in steel but that it is a shifting target constantly
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redefined by social forces.199 Migdal too walks the thin line on statesociety relationships to show how state and society impact each other to
shape a nation‟s socio-economic choices.200 The general theme is that the
state and society both play a role in a nation‟s development process, and
that quite often each group has its own priorities at any given time. For
this reason, some form of compromise between state and society is
always necessary. Therefore, success with any government policy
depends on the level of support government receives from society. And
this is where state capacity to solicit cooperation from civil society comes
into play.
Clearly, Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985)
assume the resources exist and only care about how they are used. They
view capacity from a functional role of putting resources to use and not
from an input side that looks at what type of capacities exist. And their
view generally resonates with the underlying assumptions found in the
economic, management and administration literature. This, however, is
the point of departure between their work and this study, which does not
take resource availability for granted. Instead, we try to establish,
starting at the input side, if the Forestry Department in Zambia had the
capacity to design and implement government policy. The department‟s
ability to design policy and programs it can effectively implement would
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be a good indicator of both its leadership and managerial capacity. Since
IC drives policy implementation and by implication determines policy
outcomes, an assessment of the department‟s capacity will make it
possible to see which type of capacities are lacking and how this has
affected the department‟s performance. In a way this might also help us
understand the sector‟s [poor] contribution to the national economy,
which ranges between 0.02 to 0.09% of GDP.201 Therefore, unless we find
out what capacities exist or are lacking in the department, any strategies
to fix the department‟s poor performance will at best be speculative in
nature. Solving this problem is most likely going to resolve the larger
question too on why the sector contributes minimally to the national
economy. Indeed, on a wider scale, investigations into the institutional
capacity of nations are just as worthwhile if we can link a nation‟s ability
to

successfully

implement

programs

that

propel

it to

economic

development.202
Yet, as Israel explains, not many people are keen to take on this
challenge. Researchers find institutional capacity a messy area and
therefore unattractive to delve into. Neither management science nor
development administration can easily be applied, especially to the
problems of developing countries.203

201

Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, [1965 to 2005]
Peter Evans, “Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State,” in: Bringing the State Back
In 1985:192-226
203
Israel, 1987:1-7
202

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 99

“Institutional weakness is considered to be one of those problems about
which not much can be done. Until recently many practitioners had
given up trying. Instead, they suggested intensifying on other factors –
investments, education, even cultural change – to see whether these
troublesome institutional weaknesses could be overcome or bypassed, or
whether institutions might solve the problem by themselves. Other
specialists have adopted an intellectually elegant form of escapism; they
ignore those aspects of the development process, such as institutional
issues, that cannot be nicely quantified and concentrate on those that
can be analyzed through equations.”204

Furthermore, Israel explains that the field of “development theory
and practice” has been dominated by economists who have placed
emphasis on “resource allocation and allocative efficiency” rather than
“on the most effective ways” of using the available resources.205 In
addition, even development strategies focus on planning and appraisal
instead of implementation206.
But, as reality on Third World development issues shows, none of
the above reasons offers a solution. Therefore, it is not right to succumb
to escapism. Careful diagnosis of policy failure is important if the right
treatment is to be prescribed for any ailing economy.207 And taking
institutional capacity for granted is definitely not the best option either.
Although the aforementioned scholars have addressed the general
theoretical question, “why some governments are more effective in their
204
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roles than others,” and agree that state capacity matters in shaping the
socio-economic status of a nation,208 their perspective has generally
looked at this question from a political stand point as in state-society
relationships that tend to influence policy implementation rather than
from an administrative perspective. They gloss over the issue of IC, which
apparently they take for granted. Instead, they focus on how state
capacity or social forces shape policy outcomes; and do not tell us what
these states and social actors have that allows them do what they do. In
other words, the question that needs attention is: what makes statesociety capacities and their relationships with civil society work or fail to
achieve policy objectives across nations? Is this due to their political
systems, [in]ability to use the resources at their disposal, or simply lack
of resources? Whichever route is taken is likely to circle back to the issue
of capacity because organizations “have real limits” in what they can and
cannot do.209 Knowing what the state-society actors have (an issue not
addressed by these scholars) and how these resources are utilized is one
of the core themes this study addresses. In fact, this is one of the
contributions this study brings to the table in the way institutional
capacity should be assessed and understood.
The limits of state power on society or society‟s influence over the
state can be linked to the resources at their disposal as well as the
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prevailing circumstances that the state and society have to work with,210
e.g. in times of peace versus war time. Knowing the locus of such limits
is only possible if their capacity is assessed from an input perspective.
Because governments are an amalgamation of various agencies, and
knowing that the state‟s power (and economic development) depends on
the contributions of each agency, it is important that states are
disaggregated to understand the influence of their power at agency level.
Thus, assessing the institutional capacity of individual state agencies –
as this study does – is a good starting point in coming to grips with what
makes some states (or their agencies) more effective in implementing
their programs than others. This is one way to detect agencies that might
have competence problems and specifically in which areas.

Theoretical Basis of Institutional Capacity
Conceptually, if we take the inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts
process as a universal framework for analyzing policy outcomes,211 and
therefore an institution‟s performance, one can see that institutional
capacity is represented by inputs, which would then lead to the
anticipated policy outcomes depending on how those inputs are utilized.
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In theory, institutional capacity does not necessarily stand alone; it
is wired indirectly in the organization, management and administrative
theories212 where it is conveyed through various underlying principles
such

as

organization

structure;213

division

of

labor;214

scientific

management;215 personnel relations and behavior;216 and leadership
styles and patterns.217 Thus, institutional capacity is a multi-discipline
concept that cannot be reduced to one single theory. Therefore, it is
important to understand what constitutes the theories in which it is
anchored – namely, organization, management and administration.
Discoveries made by theorists in these areas offer a road map on how to
deal with management problems that may arise due to institutional
capacity challenges.
The literature on these theories is extensive. What is used here is
just a snap shot giving the historical context of their development and
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the

key

concepts

embedded

in

them.

Without

underrating

the

contributions that have been made over the years by various scholars,
organization management is generally traced back to Max Weber and
Frederick Taylor. Other classics of the time include Luther Gulick and
Henry Fayol.
Max Weber developed what is known today as common features of
an ideal bureaucracy.218 According to Weber, an ideal bureaucratic
organization would have 1) career bureaucrats who are 2) appointed to
specific positions based on their 3) technical qualifications and whose 4)
positions reflect some form of hierarchy in seniority among officers.
Legally, each officer would have a 5) clearly defined sphere of official
responsibility reflecting 6) the competence required for that position. 7)
None of these officers own the organization but work for it. The job would
be 8) a full time occupation, with 9) a salary commensurate with the
position‟s duties and required skills. Other rewards of the job include 10)
promotions, which are dependent on the judgment of superiors, and 11)
pensions.219 According to Gortner, it is these features that make the
public bureaucracy a superior organization over others in that it
guarantees precision, stability, discipline, and reliability.220
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While the ideal organization concept may offer promise for
effectiveness and possibly efficiency, the same features also create
problems. For instance, a defined hierarchy among officers, which
creates unity of command and is good for formal communication, may
also create conditions ideal for abuse of authority by senior officers who
may not be questioned by their junior staff, except through whistle
blowing. Fortunately, Weber was aware of the limitations of his ideal
model in the real world. His expectation was that organizations would
perform better as they approached the ideals he envisioned. The
challenge is that only a few of these ideals are achieved in most
organizations

and

“no

organization

achieves

all

of

the

ideal”

characteristics described.221 But the problem is not Weber‟s model,
rather these problems occur because what is supposed to be a rational
model is put into effect by limitedly rational human beings, whose
rationality is constrained by numerous factors.222 These include, but not
limited to: the extent of knowledge and information an individual has for
a particular activity; the capacity to analyze all the available alternatives;
one‟s skills, habits, values as well as conceptions of purpose.223
While Max Weber looked at the entire structure of an organization
to find “one best way to arrange the offices and tasks so that maximum
organizational coordination and efficiency could be attained,” Frederick
221
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Taylor (and his followers) concentrated on the individual and the actual
job performed. Taylor, in his “scientific management,” was concerned
with finding “one best way” to do a particular job;224 convinced that
increased productivity required improvement in how each job was
performed, and his investigations led to the development of numerous
job evaluation techniques. He observed that many employees performed
way below their full capacity, as he noted in an article published
posthumously that, “…the average government employee does no more
than one-third to one-half of a proper day‟s work.”225 He therefore
advocated for maximizing production from each employee through
division of labor and specialization; arguing that this would not only
increase productivity but also efficiency.226 In order to gain cooperation
from workers, Taylor and his followers also acknowledged that human
motivation was important.227
These two major strands of organization management developed by
Weber and Taylor (including their respective followers) were afterwards
found inadequate in that they forgot or simply ignored the human side of
the organization. As Morgan explains, classical management theorists
such as Frederick Taylor and others viewed “the design of organizations
as a technical problem” until this was reduced to a problem of “paying
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the right rate for the job.”228 Following the Hawthorne studies,
integrating the needs of individuals and the organizations became a
burning issue.229 Theorists on the human side of the enterprise argued
that Weber and Taylor‟s theories presented a closed system, which did
not reflect the real world.
“In each case the theorists have ignored the implications of the fact
that they are dealing with human beings. In order to improve the
theories so that they are useful in managing the modern
organization, it is essential to rediscover human beings. It is
impossible to recognize man as a sociological and psychological
being who may be rational, but who may also be irrational, and to
maintain the closed system concept for which the theorists are
striving.”230

Thus, another group emerged that focused on investigating the
structure of the organization in search of “one best way” to organize the
offices and tasks. These men were convinced that if the “universal rules
of organization” were used, “functions of management would be made
more efficient and successful.”231 Gortner further explains that, “the
number and order of these principles varied according to the author, but
most rules were subsumed under five categories: unity of command;
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authority commensurate to responsibility; maximum delegation of
authority; limited span of control; and power to organize.232
Various scholars further elaborated on the importance of these
concepts arguing that not only does an organization require structure
but also how labor is organized functionally, e.g. who supervises who
and what are their accountabilities.233 It was during this time that
Luther Gulick coined the popularly quoted acronym POSDCORB
(Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and
Budgeting) to highlight the importance of organization theory in
management.234

For

practical

application,

POSDCORB235

simply

describes the basic management functions / duties every manager
should perform if the organization is to run smoothly and effectively.
Another management practice widely used is PMOC, which stands for
Planning, Motivating, Organizing, and Controlling.236 Unfortunately, out
of all these important functions, the only activity forest managers
perform is budgeting mainly because they have no choice or else the
department would not be funded.
Concerns

regarding

the

important

role

of

humans

in

an

organization paved the way to what is widely referred to as the behavioral
sciences, which incorporated the human aspects to improve on earlier
232
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theories.

Thus,

organization

theory,

management

theory,

and

administrative theory became dominant areas of study.
Organization theory (OT) aims at efficiency; it offers the principles
aimed at allocating and utilizing the available resources in the best way
possible. It is a theory concerned with the structure, inter-relationships
and functions of the individuals and groups that constitute those
organizations.237 It seeks to maximize “organizational rationality –
narrowly defined as efficiency: the ratio of outputs to inputs.”238 And
even though there is some disagreement on what areas OT emphasizes
e.g. structure or human relationships, and whether organization
behavior is a separate area of inquiry or a subfield of OT, 239 one can see
that the theory is people-centered and activity-oriented; covering
decision-making, human relations within or among organizations and
resource utilization.240 In practice, organization theory is also about
management and administrative practices. Hence, OT is not a single
theory. Rather it is multi-discipline in character, and draws its strength
from various disciplines such as administration, political science,
economics, psychology, 241 to name but a few.
For instance, public administrators and political scientists have
enriched organization theory through policy analysis, where they
237
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investigate ways in which the political, professional, and technical
characteristics of public organizations influence public policy making
and execution. “These disciplines study the relationships between public
organizations and their political environment.”242 Economic analyses
have also contributed to decision-making theories, while behavioral
studies in psychology (and in particular industrial psychology) have
focused on leadership, motivation, group interaction, and conflict.243 In
sum, OT is a loose aggregate of various approaches that deal with
organizational analysis.244
Like OT, management theory (MT) does not stand alone either. It
incorporates aspects of OT and administration. Generally defined as
“getting things done through others,”245 MT is concerned with efficiency
in resource utilization. The theory embraces the idea of assembling the
resources and directing them towards achieving the organization‟s goals.
Management is also process-oriented as reflected in Taylor‟s “scientific
management” theory, where he argues that there is more than one way
to manage people, and offers a set of universal principles to be applied,
e.g. providing staff training so they can do the work well; gaining staff
cooperation to do the assigned job; and division of work based on staff
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weakness and strengths.246 That is to say the right person for the right
job.
Management involves administration in that both theories focus on
people and decision-making. Specifically, the process of managing draws
heavily on the fundamental principle of administration, that of efficiency
maximization. As Simon puts it, “good” administration means adopting a
decision (e.g. an intervention) that uses the least expenditure which
leads to the greatest accomplishment.247 And this is just as true for
management too. Thus, in practice, the line between management and
administrative theories is not that obvious. The two theories seat side by
side. Managerial functions constitute an administrative component just
as administrative functions also constitute management functions. The
other way to look at this is that management functions are long term,
involving aspects of planning and resource allocation. On the other hand,
the administrative role is transactional, making things done. It is a tactic
to achieve a management goal. Management focuses on what needs to be
done, while administration looks at how it needs to be done. In short,
management equals effectiveness whereas administration goes for
efficiency.
It should be clear by now that administrative theory shares
common ground with OT and MT, and that all of them are intertwined.
246
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Administrative theory is concerned with “how an organization should be
constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently.”248
The theory emphasizes efficiency and effectiveness in managing the
resources under one‟s jurisdiction.249 According to Dahl, quoting Luther
Gulick: “in the science of administration, whether public or private, the
basic “good” is efficiency.”250 Administrative theory is centered on
decision-making and advocates the principle of choice and rationality.251
“A fundamental principle of administration, which follows almost
immediately from the rational character of “good” administration,
is that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure
the one should always be selected which leads to the greatest
accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among several
alternatives that lead to the same accomplishment, the one should
be selected which involves the least expenditure.”252

Administration entails the ability to plan, organize, command,
coordinate, and control the activities relating to utilization of the
resources.253 Administrative theory is both human and process-oriented.
The theory is human-centered in that it takes the human resource as a
center of activity: one that should decide what to do with the other
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resources. Yet it is also processed oriented because it emphasizes the
aspect of input versus outcomes. Each activity – from planning to control
– is aimed at efficiency: using the input with the least cost that gives
highest outcome.254 Because information is never complete for any given
situation and the fact that it is not possible to evaluate all possible
alternatives, decisions adopted are often a matter of speculation.255 In
practice, administration is management as its application suggests.256 In
short, administration is about decision-making and selecting the best
choice among several alternatives.
“Since the “principle of efficiency” is basically characteristic of any
activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of
certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is characteristic of
economic

theory

as

it

is

of

administrative

theory.

The

“administrative man” takes his place alongside the classical
“economic man.”257

Evidently, the general theme that runs through the above theories
suggests that resource availability is a must if an organization is to
operate as intended; needless to say these resources ought to be
efficiently allocated to achieve the desired goals. The theory clearly takes
resource availability for granted as can be seen from its emphasis on how
to get the best out of the available resources. Like in the economic
254
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literature where efficiency theory runs deeply and assumes availability of
the resources to be utilized,258 the administration, organization, and
management

theories

follow

similar

reasoning.

They

too

take

institutional capacity for granted and assume that the resources are
available. The only challenge, therefore, is to figure out how [best] to
organize and utilize those resources to achieve the best results at a
minimum cost possible.259 In other words, management develops the
policies and procedures, while administration implements them.

Theoretical Implications
How does institutional capacity relate to the above theories? One
simple answer is that an assessment of capacity does not end at
itemizing the resource inputs. The principles espoused in the above
theories are part of what constitutes institutional capacity. However, in
addition to having the actual inputs required for a particular task, an
institution‟s ability to mobilize, organize, and utilize these resources to
attain its policy goals are even more important aspects of institutional
capacity.

The

latter

reflects

the

managerial,

leadership

and

organizational skills of the human resources who are supposed to
mobilize and allocate other resources for various tasks.

258
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Human relationships within and across organizations are an
important factor that too often either gets overlooked or simply taken for
granted as if they fall in place automatically. And this is where Skocpol‟s
(1985), Migdal‟s (1988; 1994), and Evans‟ (1985) state-society functional
models become helpful because managerial capabilities are very
important. But quite often managerial capacities are subject to societal
forces whose interests the state has to accommodate, at least in a
responsive government. And since no organization operates in a vacuum
devoid of such forces, be it from within or outside the organization, the
effectiveness of an organization will depend on how well it responds to
such pressures.
Fortunately, there is some agreement that organizations are
dynamic social systems, driven by “patterned activities” of their
members260 whose combined effort makes it possible to attain a common
goal.261 As a resource responsible for mobilizing, organizing, allocating
and utilizing the other productive inputs, managers (and their staff) have
a direct influence on an organization‟s ability to achieve its goals. Sadly,
not all institutions possess this capacity: to supervise, coordinate and
manage the other productive resources to achieve their goals.262 In our
case study, this is one among the several challenges the Forestry
260
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Department is facing. The department‟s physical presence to monitor
forest activities has been declining since 1986 due to reductions in labor
force and budgetary allocations from central government for its
programs.263 For instance, its total labor force declined from the highest
level of 3,280 in 1986264 to 814 (2004), while capital funding fell from
K794.1 million (1986) to K57 million in 2000;265 representing a reduction
of 25% on labor and 7.2% capital allocations to the dept, respectively.
Because policy implementation is a process that requires inputs on
one end, and projected outputs/outcomes on the other end,266 a
reduction in its inputs would clearly affect the outcomes. On the other
hand, taking up another program, as Zambia did with the structural
adjustment program (SAP), introduces additional responsibilities and
increases performance expectations for the organization and its clients.
All this requires additional capacity. This is where priority setting
becomes crucial. However, deciding on what programs to implement first,
let alone what changes to introduce in the course of implementing a new
program is not an easy task because information to guide the decision
making process is never complete.267 Also human inadequacy to precisely
predict what the future holds adds to the complexity managers have to
face and overcome to steer their organizations to success. Due to these
263
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uncertainties, incrementalism in decision making tends to have more
appeal.268
The theories that underpin institutional capacity also convey the
idea that resource utilization is about making choices. In our case, this
means that the type of policy choices central government took
subsequently

determined

the

type

of

outcomes

that

could

be

anticipated.269 However, it is important to note that political commitment
to follow through its policy choices, the zeal and commitment career
bureaucrats attach to implementing these decisions have a huge impact
too.270 Given the layers of decision makers in government, and the
numerous policy choices to select from, information overload and
uncertainty on which of the policy choices might work better can be
daunting. It is therefore not surprising that agencies tend to adopt policy
choices with minimum risk; not because these offer the best solutions
but because it is not easy to fully account for uncertainty in the
future.271 It may also be the safest way to avoid blame for failure to attain
projected outputs, just in case unintended consequences outweigh
projected benefits.272 Somehow, this is happening in forestry circles in
Zambia, a topic I explore further in Chapter 5 and 6.
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After implementing the civil service reforms, and noticing a
corresponding increase in illegal activities in the forest estates, one
would expect government officials to own up to the problem as part of the
unintended consequences of the reforms, and hopefully hear some
possible strategies being offered to address the problem. Surprisingly, FD
managers have been busy blaming the victim, civil society, for the
deplorable state of the forests, claiming that resource users are
uncooperative and are fomenting a culture of lawlessness. Yet as this
study has revealed, this problem lies internally in the bureau, whose
capacity has been reduced and does not match its obligations: FD is no
longer able to reach its clients and provide the necessary services.
While the foregoing theories are useful in linking capacity to
performance, resource allocation across government agencies is a highly
contested political battle that invites questions of who should get what,
when, and how;273 and I would add why. From an administrative angle
this almost always raises the question of resource availability and
optimality. Does the agency have the capacity to implement a particular
program? What type (and or quantity) of resources are needed? At what
level is a particular resource optimal? And what level is performance
ideal?274

Since

individual

organizations

have

different

optimal

benchmarks, theory has not prescribed a universal standard applicable
273

Stone, 1997:part I and II; Grindle, 1980.
In this case study, a department‟s structural requirements are dealt with by Management Development
Division (Cabinet Office) while financial allocations are handled by Ministry of Finance, as approved by
Parliament.
274

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 118

to all: it is simply not practical to do so. Even Frederick Taylor in his
extensive work on scientific management did not attempt to do this.
What comes close to being practical, in my opinion, is the use of an
organization

chart

as

a

benchmark.

Since

an

organization

structure/chart275 shows not only a hierarchy of ranks and authority
boundaries but also the implied activities to be carried out, it can serve
as a basis for estimating, at least, the human resource required for an
organization.276 The human resources then estimate the other input
requirements that are needed to carry out their respective functions. This
study draws heavily on this structural-functional model in determining
the human resource requirements for the Forestry Department.
Obviously, the level of autonomy that managers have in making
decisions and implementing them has enormous implications on an
institution‟s performance.277 Managers can delay, facilitate or simply stop
a program from being undertaken. The Forestry Department has
numerous experiences in this regard. The department‟s successes in the
1960s to 1970s can easily be traced to the professional and highly
inspirational leadership that existed in the department at the time, reenforced by teamwork – a spirit of working towards a common goal. The
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creation of the industrial plantations and protected forest areas are some
of the success stories.
Accountability is another factor worth mentioning. When employees
are held accountable, they tend to be more responsible both in their
decisions and how they execute the functions of their offices. But for
most government agencies this is where institutional weakness also
begins. Despite their well-defined structures278 that neatly arrange
employees in a “hierarchy of authority,”279 apportioning blame to
individuals for program failure is not common in government, except if it
takes the shape of theft, abuse of power, or corruption charges.
Generally speaking, government work is considered as collective action
that involves all employees.280 This feature has enormous implications
not only on the role of institutional capacity on performance but also on
how to explain its interactions with other confounding factors such as
the influence of policy elites,281 the political regime, and changing trends
in the global markets. The Forest Department is a classical example in
this respect. Despite the deplorable state of the forests, no one has been
charged for negligence in carrying out their duties.
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The influence of the policy elites on public policy and the interplay
of politics in governance is a matter that needs no elaboration.282 Politics
is part of administration and has a huge influence on government
choices.283 As Oliver Williamson (1996), quoting Douglass North explains,
people do have a significant impact on economic performance because
they define and enforce the rules.284 On the other hand, government is
also big business in so far as its policies influence economic activity.285
Thus, the interplay of politics and administration is a real challenge on
matters concerning public policy and its implementation. Although
policy-making is a shared responsibility between enactment (policy
makers) and implementation (bureaucrats), quite often implementers
tend to control the outcomes of any policy,286 underscoring the influence
that staff have in determining program success/failure.
A country may have good policies and programs but if the
implementers (bureaucrats) do not support or understand those policies,
such programs remain policy wishes. Quite frankly, the Zambian forest
service fits in this mould from all dimensions. If achievements of yester
years in forestry (e.g. the establishment of industrial timber plantations)
can be taken as indicators of effectiveness, it seems the department‟s
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personnel at that time fully understood government policy goals on
forestry, and worked towards achieving them. Zambia today has surplus
timber because the bureaucrats in the FD pursued this policy goal. But
the opposite is what is happening now. Out of 80 people (senior and
middle managers) that responded to our survey, 55% said they have no
idea whether or not the department develops annual plans; 89.6% said
they don‟t have any plans to implement; and 70% are not involved in the
department‟s performance evaluation, if at all any takes place. If senior
and middle managers, who are the program implementers, do not know
the policy goals they are supposed to achieve, can the department
operate effectively?
Indeed, a theoretical presentation of institutional capacity (and
performance) would be incomplete without mentioning incentives.
Organizations, like individuals, respond to incentives. Starting with
Taylor‟s

scientific

management287

to

Maslow‟s

human

motivation

theory,288 it is evident that people respond to incentives provided by their
environment. However, Israel cautions that despite this general belief
that incentives motivate people to perform better and that there is a
linear relationship between incentives and performance, this does not
stay constantly positive.289 As in any utility function, incentives stimulate
performance only up to a certain peak point after which any additional
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incentives have no effect on improving performance. At that point,
performance may remain the same or decline despite additional
incentives.290

By extension, this law of diminishing returns applies

equally to the production function of an organization too.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, none of the theories
spells out what constitutes institutional capacity, much less how to
assess it. Instead, they offer principles that would help create efficient
and

effective

organizations.

Organization

management

and

administrative theorists concentrate on how best to organize and utilize
the available resources, while political scientists dwell on relationships
and ensuing outcomes, and barely show what capacities lead to those
outcomes – which apparently is usually their main focus. All of them
simply take institutional capacity for granted.
But in order to know what makes some institutions perform better
than others understanding the differences in their institutional capacity
offers a good starting point. Among the scholars that have touched on
institutional capacity, only Bratton offers a framework that is possible to
do this. Thus, this study draws heavily on Bratton‟s291 conception of
institutional capacity, and combines it with Grindle‟s292 definition, which
together offers the input and functional aspects of capacity. As mentioned
earlier, I conceptualize institutional capacity representing those basic
290
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inputs needed for an organization to do its work, which includes: human,
financial, and technological resources. In discussing the human element,
their technical, administrative, and political capabilities are also
covered.293

My

argument

is

that

when

evaluating

institutional

performance it is important to start from the inputs side rather than
focusing on policy outcomes and impacts. I should point out that policy
can be evaluated at any stage of the inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts
framework. The point I‟m making is that in order to understand the role
of institutional capacity on performance (outcomes), it is important to
assess the availability of the inputs first because this is what drives
achievement of the outcomes later on.
Probably the more complex question is the one I raised earlier: how
does one know when the inputs are sufficient in relation to or
independent of the anticipated outcomes? There is no simple answer to
this. As I suggested earlier the organization structure is a good starting
point; it specifies the initial human resource requirements and their
managerial competences. These people would later determine what would
be needed to pursue the mission of the organization, and adjust these
requirements as they go along. It is for this reason that this study takes
special interest in both the tangible inputs that were at FD‟s disposal as
well as the managerial competences of its managers to design and
implement government policy. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the above,
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the nature of the bureaucracy is also likely to influence and eventually
determine how these resources are organized and utilized.294 Agency
rivalry in respect to sharing the national cake is another case in point.
Those bureaus with prominent images on the policy arena are likely to be
favored.
In conclusion, it is gratifying to note that regardless of the different
conceptions people have of IC at least there is agreement that the
presence of capacity and, more importantly, how it is applied are two
fundamental ingredients that separates dysfunctional from effective
organizations. In fact, the question we should be answering is not
„whether institutional capacity matters‟ because of course it does matter.
Instead, what we should be concerned with is to investigate ‘what
capacities matter’ most if dysfunctional organizations were to perform
better. The chapters that follow build on this principle and illustrate how
this has played out in the Zambian case study.
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Chapter 3
Understanding the Connections
Interest in institutional capacity has been gaining momentum
since the mid 1980s; the first of these concerns having been raised by
political scientists295 who framed the issue in terms of state capacity.
Later economists,296 practitioners (especially the multi-lateral lending
institutions),297
scholars

298

policy

analysts,

administrators

and

management

also joined – each highlighting specific aspects of capacity

and their implications for the state‟s ability to govern. Although these
scholars differ in how they conceptualize capacity, their view on how
institutional capacity (IC) is related to performance outcomes is somehow
a straightforward issue. They all agree that a strong institutional
capacity matters if an organization is to perform effectively and achieve
its goals. Where the debate becomes slippery is on the question of what
constitutes institutional capacity, which capacity matters most and,
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especially how each of the various (or potential) IC parameters contribute
to or impact the outcomes. None of the above provides a comprehensive
solution.
As we saw in Chapter 2, management practitioners generally tend
to interpret institutional capacity to imply availability of factors of
production (including the technical skills) and argue that performance
outcome

depends

on

them.

But

political

scientists,

economists,

sociologists and institutional scholars (from across different disciplines)
disagree with this emphatic conclusion. While agreeing that these are
important, they also point to other aspects such as the presence of an
enabling environment e.g. the presence of appropriate statutes, national
policy choices, stable government,299 etc. as being more important. They
argue that performance outcomes are not strictly a function of factors of
production but also depend on how people respond to their environment.
In their view, the environment facilitates or inhibits certain choices. Even
if the factors of production were available, if the environment is not
supportive it could hinder the way any organization operates. Therefore,
capacity is much more than the traditional conception of having
productive resources. The question then is: what constitutes capacity?
What is an ideal level of capacity? And how can we measure what portion
of capacity is responsible for what outcome(s)?
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See for instance Douglass North, Institutions, 1990; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of
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This study addresses these questions using the Zambian Forestry
Agency as a case study. We ask whether inadequate financial and
human resources, as the bureaucrats in FD claim, are the only
constraints contributing to forest degradation. Or are there other factors
at play, as the literature suggests? As we have seen already, current
theories leave this challenge for managers (or management teams) to
decide what is appropriate in their situation. It is at this point that this
study comes in to bridge the gap, albeit in a small way.

Defining the Problem
This study explores the nexus between public administration and
policy implementation, looking specifically at institutional capacity and
performance

outcomes.

Considering

the

department‟s

previous

achievements versus its current failures today this raises a red flag and
makes us to ask what has caused this negative transition from being a
high performing star agency to one that is almost non-existent.
For a long time forest managers have been complaining about
inadequate labor force and financial outlays as two major reasons why
the department has been failing to perform below expectation, vis-à-vis,
effective management of its estates. They have espoused this claim for
over two decades and no solution seems to be in sight,300 in spite of

300

MENR, ZFAP Vol. II, 1998.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 128

numerous recommendations offered by various researchers.301 In
addition, despite the re-organization of the Zambian civil service as a
whole, which incidentally which started with the Forestry Department as
the first bureau to be restructured in 1997 (as a part of a broader
intervention geared towards making the government more effective and
efficient), unfortunately this too has not helped either. Gauging from the
state of its estates, the department‟s performance has continued its
downward spiral. Are inadequate labor force and financial outlays for
forestry programs the only factors contributing to the department‟s poor
performance? Can we continue to trust this assessment? Or could there
be other factors at play that the department may have overlooked?
The best way to address the department‟s position is re-examine
its assessment to find out how true this is. And this is the central
question for this study. We take the department‟s complaint and turn it
in a research hypothesis that the state of the forests depends on the
strength of the institutional capacity. The stronger the institutional
capacity the better and well managed the department‟s estates will be,
and vice versa. In other words, institutional [in]capacity accounts for the
decline of forest estates in Zambia, decline measured in terms of
hecterage (or acreage) and quality of forest stock.
Therefore, taking the input-outcomes production process as a
simplified framework in assessing an organization‟s performance, this
301
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study looks at the inputs side first and then relates it to the outcomes to
see how those inputs influenced the outcomes. Hence, rather than
focusing on the outcomes this study contributes to the left side of the
input-outcomes production process, and argues that since resource
[in]adequacy (the capacity) is reflected in the outcomes, it is important to
establish what capacities are available and whether or not that is
adequate to accomplish the set goals.302 More importantly, the analysis
goes further to find out how each of these layers of capacities influenced
the outcome(s) namely, the state of the forests, in this case measured in
terms their extent and stock quality (which in this case is manifested in
forest degradation). To illustrate this connection between inputs and
outcomes, forest degradation is used as a performance indicator.
However, since it is likely that several other factors could also be at
play, this investigation does not take FD‟s argument for granted. Rather,
although this study argues that IC is the major underlying factor, we also
reflect on those other possible factors such as government policy,
population growth, and climate effects.
As the literature review in Chapter 2 reveals, the questions this
study addresses have no standard answer and therefore challenge the
existing administrative, economic and management theories that take IC
for granted and instead focuses on how to organize and utilize the
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productive resources. These theories assume resource availability and
indirectly convey the message that all one needs is to figure out the best
way [how] to use those resources. This assumption is so deeply
engrained in the organization and management theories that they focus
more on the best way to manage the available resources. The economic
field, anchored in efficiency and effective use of the available resources,
also suffers from this weakness. They assume resource availability (the
idea that capacity exists) and emphasize tactics to maximize that
capacity.
This study, on the other hand, seeks to find out first and foremost
what capacity exists in terms of personnel and finances. Second, we seek
to establish how each of these factors is contributing to the problem at
hand, forest degradation. In other words, this study asks: does the FD
have the capacity to carry out its mandate? And what part of its capacity
is more important? Rather than just counting resource availability (the
first question), this investigation is also interested in knowing the impact
each of the different types of capacities exerted on the performance
outcomes, i.e. how each is contributing to forest degradation.
Therefore, as part of a central argument of this study, knowing
how each type of capacity contributes to or affects the outcomes is
clearly important because not only does that knowledge help in designing
the right interventions but more importantly it would be useful in timing
and applying it at the point of weakness where the problem lies. As some
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experiences have shown from capacity builders in the international
development community most of the failures encountered arise precisely
from this disconnection; not knowing how each input influenced the
outcomes.303 And this brings us back to the original question: what
constitutes institutional capacity? How can one tell when a particular
resource is adequate? At what level is a given resource ideal and
adequate? Between efficiency and effectiveness, which one is more
important? These questions are addressed in subsequent chapters. This
Chapter lays out the methodology used in this study and highlights why
this was found appropriate.
Taking Mills‟ advice that the best way to analyze a scientific
problem depends on the phenomena being investigated,304 a longitudinal
approach rendered itself suitable and desirable in this case in the sense
that it allows us to observe, over time, certain trends that are then used
in explaining the relationships between forest degradation (the dependent
variable) and factors that are assumed to accelerate it, namely a weak
institutional capacity. IC is measured in terms of annual allocations to
forestry programs and availability of forestry personnel, whereas forest
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Timely examples abound across the globe. See for instance, Robert Clausen and Amelia Hube,
USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Landscapes, Livelihoods, and Governance Vol. II,
Accessed from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/forestry/pubs/volume2_report.pdf October,
2007.
304
Wright C. Mills and Irving Louis Horowitz (eds.), Power, Politics and People [The Collected Essays of
Wright C. Mills], New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 132

excisions, illegal encroachments and deforestation305 are taken as
proxies for forest degradation, all of which culminate in changes in PFAs.
As acknowledged earlier, although there are several factors that
could be contributing to forest degradation in Zambia, in this study I
posit that a weak institutional capacity in the Forestry Department offers
the most plausible explanation for the loss and poor state of protected
forests. First, without adequate levels of budgetary allocations and
forestry personnel to plan and oversee overall forest management, it is
not possible to get out in the field to monitor or evaluate the field
operations. Second, as an enterprise that relies on the physical presence
of field personnel who patrol the estates to ensure that forest resourceusers abide by the provisions of their licenses, the need for a strong
human presence cannot be over emphasized. However, in between
availability of these resources there is also the role of the forest managers
(the managerial capacity) – are these people making the best use of what
is at their disposal?
Since forest estates in Zambia are essentially public lands, held in
trust for the people, this has tended to complicate the situation in terms
of ownership and access to the forest resources.306 With an exception of
the forest estates in State land, which belong to the central government,
government (in this case represented by FD) does not own the estates
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that fall in Chiefs‟ areas. Instead, it only has a surrogate managerial role
over them. Therefore, as a public good, owned through generational
inheritance, and I dare say, which had previously been well managed
communally before government “took over”, does FD still tap into this
community capacity to manage these forests? Considering that most of
these forests are now heavily encroached, would one say these forests
suffering from the tragedy of the commons,307 a phenomenon that never
existed prior to government‟s take over as a new manager? Or is this
phenomenon a consequence of the absence of the manager or a perceived
owner?

Research Questions
Government‟s policy on forestry can be summarized in two broad
goals: To set aside sufficient forest areas in each district (at least 15% of
Zambia‟s total land mass) as forest resource reservoirs to cater for the
needs of both the present and future generations. Second, as part of a
broader strategy on rural development, and in view of the challenges
posed by the rural-urban migration, rural development was identified as
a priority area308 in which forestry was expected to play a major role in
creating job opportunities in rural areas where the bulk of the forests are
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found.309 Consequently, government looked to forestry and agriculture as
possible solutions to this rural development dilemma.
For instance, between the 1960s and 70s the department scored a
lot of successes in research on the ecology, protection, management, and
restocking of indigenous forest areas; including the establishment,
protection and management of plantations310 as per government policy
expectations.311 Its personnel worked diligently towards reaching the
15% policy benchmark on PFAs. Forest estates steadily increased from 5
million ha. in 1962 to over 7 million ha. by 1986 (roughly 9.8% of the
total forest area), just short of 5.2% to reach the 15% national goal.312
And each of these forests was fairly well managed.
For each forest estate there was a management book outlining the
annual activities to be carried out, which were quite useful in monitoring
and evaluating not only changes in forest stock but in the overall
stability of the forest ecosystem. But none of this is done anymore. The
last management books were prepared in 1986, the very year Mr. BOM
Chiyabwe, the person most people affectionately remember as the last
visionary leader to head the department,313 left on promotion to become
Under Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources – where
FD belonged at the time. In short, although the FD was quite successful
309
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in some other areas, just mentioned above, unfortunately the department
has not lived up to the expectation of creating job opportunities in the
rural areas.
Looking at the department‟s prior successes and comparing the
same to the current deplorable state of affairs, it attracts interest to
investigate what has caused such drastic changes. Why are forest estates
in Zambia in a state of decline both in the area they cover and the quality
of the forest stock? Is this due to lack of institutional capacity in the
department or is it due to other factors outside the department‟s
purview? To answer these questions one would need to look at the
department‟s performance over the years.

 What is the extent of the forest estates that the department has
established over the years, and why is it declining?
 How well managed are these forest estates?
 What is the status of its labor force? Is it adequate (and sufficiently
qualified) to manage these forests?
 What has been central government‟s level of financial support to
forestry programs?
 Considering that public policy is a political contest, how much
political support is the department receiving from elected officials
and policy makers both at central level and in respective local
jurisdictions?

It is important to proceed in this manner of inquiry because unless
the department is working towards fulfilling its primary mandate (the
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establishment of forest reserves for protection and production purposes)
there will be no basis to assess the rest of the policy expectations simply
because there won‟t be any estates to assess. A point to note is here is
that my emphasis on forest reservation does not in any way trivialize the
fact that how these estates are managed is not important but to
emphasize the fact that one would not talk about how well managed the
forests are if the forests do not exist in the first place. At the same time
to have the forests that are not well managed is as good as not having
them at all. Therefore, achieving government‟s goal of creating the
protected forests is as important as managing them, both of which
depend on the department‟s institutional capacity to fulfill these policy
expectations. It is for this reason that institutional capacity has been
identified as a common denominator that accounts for changes in these
performance indicators. But why should we care pursuing this line of
inquiry?
There are several reasons. First, this apparently small question
helps us to indirectly address a larger question on why forestry in
Zambia contributes so minimally to the national GDP. Furthermore, one
would like to know why Zambia, a relatively rich nation (so well endowed
in natural resources both below and above the ground), is nonetheless so
poor. In fact, I would argue that this apparently small question also
indirectly

addresses

the

larger

question

of

challenges

of

[under]development in the Third World. What are the underlying causes

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 137

to this dilemma? Is it the statutes that shape and govern the economic
and social interactions,314 the national policies that set government‟s
agenda,315 or the implementation challenges?316 Is it the social and
economic demands exerted by the public317 and or corporations,318
respectively, or is it a question of state capacity to harness all the
above?319 The challenge, as Daniel Little (1991) reminds us, lies in how
the data collected on all these areas is assessed, analyzed and
interpreted.320
One plausible explanation for the country‟s failure to pull ahead
economically seems to be the lack of institutional capacity in respective
bureaus: the failure to prudently use Zambia‟s natural endowment.
Because state capacity comes from the sum of its parts (bureaus), when
problems at agency level are not resolved they spiral up and affect the
center which, in this case, is central government. In this context, we can
all agree that state capacity is a reflection of the strength of its
agencies.321
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The third reason, which is also closely linked to the above point is
that, instead of using national indices such as the national GDP to
understand Zambia‟s economic performance, one way to get to the
bottom of this problem is to undertake sector case studies to see how
individual agencies in each sector are performing. This permits us to
identify the opportunities and problems peculiar to each agency. Because
each agency (or sector) is likely to be affected and respond differently to
government policy interventions, knowledge of their specific challenges
becomes useful in finding appropriate interventions that would ensure
that each agency is pushed to perform to its full potential. A sector
approach, therefore, offers a great opportunity to see what is happening
in each sector, and these results might be useful in raising hypotheses
for other sectors too. Hence, the importance of these case studies cannot
be over-emphasized. And this is the rationale behind this study.
Investigating what is happening in each sector will help us get answers
for the larger question on what is keeping Zambia in such economic
despondency, despite being a rich country.
Coming back to the question under investigation, in order to
understand why the FD‟s estates have been declining in size and quality,
there is also a need to look closely at the manager and the other inputs
at that person‟s (or the department‟s disposal) rather than the policy
impacts. Resource availability, as I have argued earlier, is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition in the performance equation. Instead, a
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skilled, entrepreneurial manager that has to put the other factors of
production to good use is an extremely crucial input.322 As Lynn (1996)
explains, managerial “leadership counts” a lot.323 Not only do managers
set the tone and direction on what is to be done, but they are in a
privileged position to motivate or de-motivate the labor force both of
which have enormous implications on the outcomes. And it is also
important to note that availability of managers would not automatically
fix the performance challenge if these people lack the necessary inputs to
do their jobs. An ideal situation, therefore, requires the presence of both:
a good manager and the other factors of production and, preferably both
must be of good quality, not one or the other. Having said that, the
responsibility of finding and utilizing these other resources still rests
with managers. And this is why the role of forest managers, as in any
organization, is so important.
For this reason, a total package of institutional capacity is
considered as comprising adequate resource availability of good quality.
For instance, is the FD adequately staffed and funded? Does it have
skilled managers? And do these managers understand government policy
on forestry? Have they translated these policies into attainable goals?
What incentives does the department offer to motivate and retain its
staff? How are the working relationships between FD and other
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stakeholders? These and other questions open doors to a maze of
structural,

organizational

and

management

issues

facing

the

department, which in a way explains (or at least allows us to speculate),
why the department is doing so poorly. In other words, what this study
does is to answer a small question, which then contributes in explaining
the larger problem on forest management, in particular how the FD
performance fits into this larger picture.

Methodology and Study Design
This study utilizes two data sets: secondary and primary data
generated from a desk research and a field survey, respectively.

The

survey took the form of a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire324 and
personal interviews with senior government officials at various agencies
including some all weather friends of the Forestry Department from
bilateral agencies.325 Secondary data was generated through a desk
research.
Overall, our analysis utilizes a mixture of qualitative and
quantitative approaches, both of which have been very useful in getting a
clearer picture on the various interactions. For instance, observing the
changes (e.g. from line graphs) in forests estates, human resources and
financials outlays helped to establish the direction of change both in the

324

Appendix 1
325
For a list of people consulted, see Appendix 3.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 141

dependent and independent variables. However, it is not possible to tell
the impact or degree of influence each independent variable is exerting
on the dependent variable326 by simply looking at the trend of change.
This is where quantitative analysis became useful; it clarified the data
further. On the other hand, it was also important to understand what
caused (or were causing) these changes in the first place (i.e. the
underlying root causes). The qualitative analysis took an upper hand
here. Thus, the two methods complement each other very well in this
study. The regression analysis helped to clarify our findings that could
have otherwise been misinterpreted or exaggerated the impact of some
independent variables on the forest estates.
As King, et. al., (1994) explain, using a combination of quantitative
and qualitative techniques is not unusual because “most research does
not fit clearly into one category or the other. The best often combines
features of each. In the same project, some data may be collected that is
amenable

to

statistical

analysis,

while

other

equally

important

information is not”.327 And this was clearly the case in this study. The
qualitative approach was found particularly appropriate in explaining the
influence of policy elites on forestry policy and programs, which could
not easily be operationalized to suit the quantitative analysis approaches.
The managerial and organizational abilities of the forestry managers (or
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lack of it), which is a major theme of this dissertation, also easily fits into
this category too.

Desk Research
Secondary aggregate data was mined from public documents328
through a desk research and helps us to trace changes in three
variables: 1. the status of forest estates, 2. forestry staff (with special
emphasis placed on forestry trained personnel who are the front liners on
forest management) and, 3. Central government‟s funding329 to the
Forestry Department from 1962 to 2005.

Considering that forestry programs have greatly benefited from
external financiers such as FINNIDA, UNDP, the EU, World Bank, etc.
(and continues to do so), these organizations were a great source of
information too especially on the achievements and problems relating to
forestry work in Zambia.

328
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The Model
The first part of this study utilizes a quantitative analysis using a
multiple linear regression model to analyze the hypothesis above, which
posits that change in protected forest areas is dependent on FD‟s
institutional capacity, herein represented by number of staff and annual
financial allocations the Forestry Department has had over the years to
implement its plans. In other words, forest degradation (a performance
indicator, also a dependent variable) can be explained by changes in
institutional capacity (the independent variable).330 The stronger the
department‟s institutional capacity the better managed its forests would
be, and vice versa.

To get a better understanding of how each category of forestry
personnel influences this relationship, this variable is further broken
down into three categories, namely professional, technical and field staff;
based on the department‟s classification.331
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Only government funding is included in this model. External sources such as loans, grants and any types
of aid are excluded because the bulk of this was not for management of natural forests. See Appendix 5.
331
Professional staff includes all those with a 4 year degree and above, Technical covers those with a
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forestry training. Senior and middle managers are appointed from the professional group, while junior
managers are drawn from the technical group too.
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As a multiple linear332 regression model this hypothesis can be
expressed as follows:
CPFA = B0 + B1Staff + B2Funds + e

where, B0 = slope intercept;
B1, ...Bn = slope coefficients;
CPFA = Change in Protected Forest Areas;
Staff = number of staff per annum;
(broken down at three levels: professional, technical and field staff)
Funds = annual allocations to the department;
(broken down at two levels: operational and capital funds).

e = error

A full model is expressed as:
CPFA = B0 + B1ProfStaff + B2TechStaff + B3FieldStaff + B4OpFunds + B5CapFunds + e

Because this study deals with one case study (one bureau in one
country), it was possible to initially control for some factors that can
potentially also cause changes in forest estates such as population
growth,

political

ideology,

government

regulations

on trade,

and

climate333 primarily to make the analysis manageable but also based on
the fact that these conditions also applied equally to other bureaus not
only to FD. The only difference is how the managers in each bureau
332
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333
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However, in this case study climate has not caused any drastic changes apart from making the forests more
susceptible to fires in times of drought.
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responded to the changing circumstances – be it to resource availability
or policy shifts, and this matters a lot. Note that these variables were
hardly static, they changed over time, which required a similar approach
from the managers to adjust to the changing environment. Apparently,
FD has not been responding in a similar manner. For this reason, the
analysis pays special attention to management aspects over the various
policy periods and highlights how the department‟s activities/programs
were impacted and why.
It is worth mentioning at this point that funds from external
sources have been excluded from the regression analysis due to a
methodological constraint. This variable could not fit into the model.
Second, although external financiers334 have pumped in over $494
million335 into forestry programs between 1986 and 2005, much of this
(about 73%) was not for indigenous forest management. Out of 52
externally financed projects/programs only 16 of them (equiv. to 27%)
with a total amount of $135 million went into activities related to
indigenous forest management such as training in beekeeping and
provision of forest extension services. Slightly over $2 million was
specifically spent on capacity building, generally reduced to technical
training and specifically in forestry. The rest went into industrial
plantations development and baseline studies.336 However, despite this
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imbalance in favor of exotic plantations, the fact that these finances
supplemented government‟s efforts is something that cannot be ignored.
Therefore, this is brought back in under the discussion dealing with
policy changes.

Survey Research
The second level of analysis is based on survey data generated
through a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire administered to senior
middle and junior managers337 in FD as well as from personal interviews
conducted with a few of them. The questionnaire was found ideal for its
cost-effectiveness. It is easier and cheaper to reach large samples of
respondents via a questionnaire than by any other means.338 And this
worked well in this case where respondents were spread across the whole
country. Both the questionnaire and personal interviews were aimed at
assessing forest managers‟ knowledge about government policy on
forestry as well as their level of involvement in planning and
management of the department‟s programs. Unlike the questionnaire was
restricted to the primary target group, coverage for personal interviews
was expanded to include people from outside FD, namely: senior

337

Senior managers include the Head of the Department (Director of Forestry), the Head of the Branch (the
Chief Forest Research Officer and Chief Extension Officer), all Provincial Heads as well as Heads of
specialized sections such as Forestry Research Sections. Middle Managers are the second in-command to
the Senior Managers. They serve directly under the senior managers (equiv. to deputies). Junior managers
are typically in charge of districts. They fall under the Provincial Heads.
338
Peter Nardi, Doing Survey Research, 2003:59
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government officials from Cabinet Office,339 Ministry of Finance, MTENR,
Central Statistical Office, National Archives, retired forest officers, faculty
at

the

University

Departments),

and

of
the

Zambia

(Biology

Copperbelt

and

University

Development
(School

of

Studies
Natural

Sciences), which offer degrees in natural resource management, and
forestry, respectively.
Apart from the generic questions seeking to find out the root
causes to the problems FD faces today, the interviews were generally
open-ended and unstructured. Unstructured interviews were preferred
for their suitability to “exploratory research”340 such as this one where
there was not as much information to work with. They also create a
relaxed atmosphere that makes the conversations less formal and
therefore permits both the interviewer and interviewee to converse
freely.341
Furthermore, unstructured interviews give the interviewer the
flexibility to probe further on an issue or simply to adjust the interview to
the unfolding scenario thereby achieving more clarity, which would
otherwise not be possible in a structured interview.342 And since
recording the interviews makes people uncomfortable and therefore not
free to express their views freely, most sessions were not recorded for
339

Out of four divisions under Cabinet Office, the researcher interviewed senior personnel from three
sections: Management Development Division (MDD), Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC)
and Public Service Management Division (PSMD). Gender in Development Division (GID) was not
covered due to its low relevance to this study.
340
Nardi, Doing Survey Research, 2003: 60
341
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342
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verbatim transcription except where the interviewees expressed no
concerns. Instead, the researcher took notes freely which were later
transcribed.
The survey generated data on FD‟s management practices/style
and how well its managers understood government‟s policy on forestry,
their role in achieving those policy goals, especially the ones promulgated
under the structural adjustment program (SAP), which has been a
dominant economic policy instrument since mid 1980s. Due to the
disastrous effects that have occurred in the forest sector since adoption
of SAP, we use it for this study as a demarcation line for before and after
to see if this policy intervention has any connection to the question
under investigation.
Because senior and middle managers are the first line of policy
implementers (since they have the onerous duty of translating policy
statements into achievable goals), this survey took them as the primary
target group. But after a pre-test343 of the questionnaire in the field, the
target group was expanded to include junior managers based on the
recommendation from some officers344 in Lusaka (at Lusaka Forest
Provincial Office, MENR and FD headquarters). They pointed out that
under the department‟s organizational set up345 junior managers were, in
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This researcher is grateful to the dissertation committee for this recommendation.
Davy Siame, Thompson Musonda (MENR HQ); Kenneth Kambeu (PEO, Lusaka Province); Obote
Shakachite, Jack Mukosha (FD HQ) - Personal communication, July 2005
345
According to FD‟s organizational set up the Director, Heads of Extension and Research Branches at FD
HQ (the Chief Extension and Chief Research Officer) and Provincial Heads (PEOs) belong to senior
344
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fact, the actual policy implementers. They are the first people to know
whether or not a particular policy would be successfully implemented
given the challenges they encounter in the process. Hence, junior officers
have always been useful in helping senior managers make the necessary
modifications to steer whatever is being implemented in the right
direction.
The survey was particularly useful in understanding the forest
managers‟ degree of involvement in the day to day running of the
department, and particularly what management style was in use. Taking
our analysis to this lower operational level provided an opportunity to
understand how managerial decisions in FD and at individual level were
made and how this management style influenced the overall performance
both at individual and departmental level.
Although organizational performance is expressed in constant
value (e.g. forest degradation), or in aggregate numbers (e.g. revenues,
production figures, GDPs, or whatever measure one chooses to use), in
reality these outcomes are a product of a series of decisions and actions
that managers and their production crews make. Therefore, it is
important to understand how those decisions are arrived at. The other
reality is that the more knowledge managers and their staff have on their
role to implement a program, the higher the chances of success of such a
program would be, and vice versa. For instance, FD‟s previous successful
management category. Those immediately under these positions are the middle managers. And finally, the
junior managers who are in charge at district level.
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undertaking in exotic plantations speaks for itself.346 The program was
initiated and successfully implemented by the department, which
demonstrates the fact that forestry managers who were assigned to
oversee the industrial plantation project fully understood their roles. It is
in view of such inspiring examples that it makes sense to find out if a
similar situation existed on the SAP, which has been a dominant policy
prescription. Did forestry staff understand SAP and their role in
implementing it?
Conducted either in person or by phone, personal interviews were
particularly useful in clarifying inconsistent data from public documents
and also some issues that were raised in the survey. For instance, some
respondents complained that part of the reason they were so demotivated is because they were paid less than their counterparts in other
departments e.g. the Department of Agriculture despite having the same
qualifications and doing similar jobs. My interviews with officials at
Cabinet Office (the office responsible for such matters) confirmed that
this is true and that this scenario is replicated across the civil service.
The officials at Cabinet Office explained that agriculture and health
whose mandates have a direct impact on human life generally have
higher salary scales than other sectors. However, my contact was quick
to point out that these standards are not cast in stone – they are always
subject to change as long as a bureau is able to demonstrate how its

346

Staal and Kufakwandi, 1993; FAO, 1996:5-6; http://worldbank.org/ecternal/project.
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mandate affects human life directly.

I thought this was a missed

opportunity for forest managers who have failed to “promote” the
department in this respect. With over 80% of the population solely
dependent on forests for their daily survival (from building materials for
their homes to food, energy, water, medicines, etc.), in a manner that
essentially resembles forests as providing for their needs “from the cradle
to grave,” how much more connection and impact does anyone need to
show how important forests and forestry are in the Zambian context?!
Since cause and effect associations in social problems typically
arise from the “intentional behavior of individuals,” as reflected in the
rational choice theories, normative values, or moral and ideological
properties of groups and, or institutions,347 the addition of managerial
aspects

to

this

analysis

clearly

complemented

our

attempt

in

understanding how decisions impact action. And since assessing
performance implies assessing human action, adding managerial aspects
to this analysis also improved the reliability of our causal inference.348 In
fact, the very fact that no social problem is independent of human
impact349 makes it imperative that social explanations be anchored in
some form of micro-foundations that links cause and effect to human
action.350 The assertion that forest estates are in a deplorable condition
(alluding to the idea that FD is performing poorly), essentially calls into
347
348
349
350

Little, 1991:16
King, et. al., 1994:29-33
Little, 1991:16, 19
Little, 1991:19
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question the role of forestry personnel in managing these estates or the
sector as a whole.
It is important to note that the addition of this second layer of
factors clearly provided an “additional leverage over

the causal

inference”351 which as our analysis later shows helped in explaining the
department‟s performance. What could not be accounted for by mere
availability of staff and funds (or lack of both) were amplified (or at least
made clearer) by these intervening variables. However, since it was not
easy to quantitatively model this second layer of variables with the ones
observed annually, these additional variables were analyzed qualitatively
to complement the two primary independent variables, namely forestry
personnel and financial outlays.

Important Land Marks
Let me turn to the issue of time frames. Why was 1962 chosen as
the starting point for the question under investigation? Why not any
other year?
To begin with, this study is about trying to understand how a once
star agency has degenerated into non-existence. In other words, it is
about comparing the time when FD performed better and now when
nothing is working. For this reason 1962, shortly before the Zambia

351
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became an independent state, presents itself as an excellent starting
point.
First, 1962 offers an excellent opportunity to see what the Zambian
government inherited from the British colonial government in 1964, an
inheritance that became a stepping-stone for the new government to
build upon. Knowledge about the level of support that the colonial
government extended to the Forestry Department in terms of annual
financial allocations, personnel, statutes, and the general infrastructure
meant to support forestry work are very important benchmarks. For
instance, did the colonial government recognize forestry as an important
sector or was this something the new government had to start building
from the scratch? Considering that more land in Zambia (94%) falls
under the jurisdiction of the local Chiefs, what did central government do
that made the Chiefs release some of their land to be gazetted as PFAs?
Did government get these lands by force or offered some incentives in
exchange? Understanding the contractual details that promoted such
cooperative relationships is very important because these eventually
determine the success or failure of public policies relating to forest
conservation and, or natural resource management in general.352
Second, 1962 also makes it possible to see how the Forestry
Department performed under the colonial government – a period

352

Peter H. Omara-Ojungu, Resource Management in Developing Countries (Longman Group), 1992:
Chapters 3, 4 and 5; Owen J. Lynn and Janis B. Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-based
Conservation,” in: David Western, et. al. (eds.), Natural Connections, 1994: Chapter 16
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associated with an efficient and effective government. Putting aside the
socio-economic and political inequalities that the colonial government
perpetuated during its time in office, generally speaking the government
of the day is credited for good governance and running an efficient social
service delivery system.353 For this reason, 1962 provides a good baseline
on what was inherited from a period of good governance and possibly
good performance. FD‟s achievements dwarfs the colonial era‟s indicating
that the new government certainly paid more attention to forestry or at
least the foresters knew what they were doing. The other reason is that
because forest crops have a long gestation / maturity period their effects
may not be known until long after a program is phased out in which case
what the colonial government may have initiated came to fruition years
later after the new government took office. Picking 1962 gives us the
flexibility to assess previous efforts in relation to what followed.
Fourth, having known what was inherited makes it easier to
compare the department‟s performance before and after independence,
both on its institutional capacity and performance outcomes, which in
this case has allowed us to arrive at some reasonable conclusions.
Furthermore, taking 1962 as the starting point also makes it possible to
establish, right from the birth of the Zambian republic, a time-line of all

353

I wish to point out though that the efficiency of the system was geared towards benefiting the colonial
government and its white settler communities rather than the indigenous people who were largely
exploited. However, this matter is beyond the scope of this study. For details see Walter Rodney, How
Europe Underdeveloped Africa,1972, Chapter 5; Burdette, Zambia Between Two Worlds,1988.
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policy

initiatives

the

new

government

pursued

that

could

have

accelerated or destroyed the momentum built on forest management by
the previous government. Because public policy drives developmental
actions in any nation, using this lens helps us to locate under which
period the Forest Department achieved the most compared to other
policy periods; without overlooking the cumulative effects (positive or
negative) that may have arisen from previous policy periods. In fact, this
is where the challenge lies: to pin point how respective policy initiatives
accelerated or impeded the Forestry Department‟s performance.

Research Challenges
No research undertaking is free from any problems and this one is
no exception. And these problems are noted here as Some of the
challenges encountered are briefly discussed below, starting with the
desk research. Note that these should serve as caveats too.

Desk Research
Contrary to the general notion that using existing secondary data is an
easier and faster way of conducting research than generating primary
data, this researcher experienced just the opposite. Despite all prior
preparations to establish contacts in various government bureaus that
this researcher anticipated to work with, the desk research was not only
time consuming but also the most frustrating part of the field research
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simply because forestry statistics have not been documented in any
systematic fashion. Of course the contacts in FD were extremely helpful;
they provided as much information as was available.

(a) Data Quality and Lack of Consistency
Forestry data, especially on the extent of the forest estates, should be
taken with a pinch of salt. This information has not been updated since
1986 when the last forest inventory was undertaken, which too was not
comprehensive since it covered only a few selected provinces.354

First, there is the issue of inconsistency in their reporting. Sometimes
the Forestry Department reports the extent of its estates in hectares and
at other times in kilometer squares (Km2), and this may appear in one
report. If one is not careful, such figures can be lifted as they are which
can lead to serious misrepresentation. The format of reporting was
another problem. Here too there is no consistence. For instance, between
1970s and 1980s labor strength was broken down at all categories, a
vital statistic for this study. But from the mid-1980s they stopped to do
this, which makes it difficult to know the changes in the different
categories. Considering that insufficient labor has been the department‟s
main complaint, it was quite astonishing that this data is not available.
This researcher had to use the provincial reports (within the same

354

de Baker, et. al., Wood Energy Resource Survey, 1986.
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annual reports) to re-classify labor according to the different categories.
This also applied production figures from various types of forests, which
the department no longer reports. Instead, the department‟s focus is on
revenues where again it is not possible to know which products
contributed what amounts. Certainly, there is need to revisit the
reporting format, it must standardized.
Secondly, there is the issue of discontinuity in reporting.
Previously, provincial offices sent in monthly reports to the FD HQ,
which made it easier to follow events in each province. In the absence of
a departmental annual report, one could extract data from provincial
reports. Currently, this practice has not been enforced vigorously. Some
provinces submit their monthly reports, others do not, making it very
difficult to know what is happening out there.
Clearly, the FD is supposed to be the best source of its data, at
least through its annual reports. Unfortunately, here too there is a lot of
inconsistency; the department has not consistently produced its annual
reports either. There are no annual reports for 1990-1994 and 20012004. The data reported in this study under these years was accessed
from provincial monthly reports (where available) and consultants‟
reports under the Provincial Forestry Action Programme (PFAP).
Furthermore, since 1995 the format of the annual reports has
become highly descriptive, with forestry revenues being the only
prominent tables. As one officer put it, “madam we don‟t have the type of
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data you want. …nobody cares about forest estates anymore. We only
focus on revenues because that is the only item the Director of the
Forestry is interested in.”355 The question then is: since data is not
systematically captured on forest estates (e.g. the status of the forest
stock, encroachment and deforestation rates in each province (preferably
per district too), what information do the forest managers use to plan for
their future activities? And how would they justify the department‟s
existence to government and the public? Is it possible to convince
policymakers for better funding levels in the absence of such figures?
Another constraint relates to inconsistency in reporting periods to
which the data relates. Financial allocations from government are
reported annually while funding from external financiers are in 3-5 year
periods and longer, often overlapping. Why doesn‟t the department report
annual releases from these sources too? I got the impression that such
figures were merely lifted from project documents and had no
resemblance to what was actually spent during the time in question. If a
program is doing well (or badly), sometimes the financier can increase
funding (or curtail) funding. It is important that the department shows
exactly how much it received annually. That way one would be certain
about what transpired.
Regarding data from Ministry of Finance, here too there were
problems. Because of budget constraints, Ministry of Finance rarely
355

Personal communication, July 2005, from one forestry official who requested that the name not be
revealed.
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honors the approved budgets. What is “approved” rarely corresponded
with “actual releases.” In most cases actual releases were lower that the
former. Fortunately, Forestry Department had better information on this.
But at times FD did not report supplementary funding it may have
received during the year. Consequently, it became necessary to use
audited reports from the Auditor General‟s Office356 rather than FD
annual reports.

(b) Lack of a Central Data Bank within the Department
Compounding the problem on forestry data is the fact that even
the department‟s own literature is not in one place. Since the relocation
of its headquarters from Ndola to Lusaka in 1998, most of its documents
are still at its former location in Ndola, piled up in its dysfunctional
library. At the time of this study, none of the managers at FD HQ knew if
a new library would be created in Lusaka, or if someone would be
appointed to run the library in Ndola. From my observation, information
management is evidently not a priority for FD.
This being an information era, it is inconceivable that the
department has no electronic database (or a website) to make its
documents easily accessible. A few reports that are in soft copy (e.g.
those produced under the Zambia Forestry Action Programme (ZFAP)
and PFAP) are also only available from respective project offices, not even

356

Accessed copies from Ministry of Finance.
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from the department‟s headquarters per se. An intra-net set-up would
have made sharing the information easier. And better still this problem
can easily be overcome through interagency collaboration. Since the FD
cannot possibly afford to set up its own website, one way to reach a
wider audience would have been to upload its reports via the Central
Statistical Office (CSO) website. Unfortunately, this opportunity remains
unexploited. Having to access data from various sources was not only
time consuming but extremely tedious too.
Finally, the National Archives357 bridged the gap – it became the
best alternative. Other valuable sources were the University of Zambia
and Ministry of Finance. Yet, if the department was well managed its
data would be readily available because under normal circumstances
information such as what this researcher was looking for would be
captured in the department‟s annual reports, its research bulletins,
occasional flyers (e.g. for extension purposes), or policy briefs (assuming
forestry managers make use of their statistics to guide the policymakers).

(c) Incomplete and Un-captured Data
Another problem worth mentioning pertained to total lack of
collaboration between FD and CSO, which is supposed to be a one-stop
place for all national statistics. Yet, CSO hardly has any data on forestry.

357

Serves as a depository for public documents: the National Archives receives a copy of all government
publications, statutes, newspapers, etc. whenever these are published, including closed files from all
government bureaus.
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Currently, the only forestry data at CSO, which is equally scanty, is on
exports from a few wood-processing companies whose operations are
reported via the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA).358 CSO has no data on
wood consumed locally; an activity supposed to be captured by the FD.
According to one officer at CSO, “Forestry Department does not
self-report its data as other departments do, such as Agriculture, Even
when we ask for data from the Forestry Department no one responds to
our requests. As a result, forestry keeps itself out of national statistics,
and we (I mean CSO) can‟t be blamed for this blackout.”359 The officer
further explained that due to limited financial resources CSO is also
unable to get in the field to collect data from all sectors, and this has
essentially kept forestry out of CSO reports.

(d) Database Management and Staff Misplacement
Another problem relates to the department‟s new structure (since
1997), which has no provision for a planning unit, a section that was
previously responsible for data collection and management. Currently, no
one is responsible for data collection and documentation. It appears each
section (the Extension or Research Branch) has to do its own data
collection and management, an arrangement that simply looked
unattainable. Apart from having a skeleton staff at FD HQ in each

358

CSO captures this data as part of its larger mandate to document annual exports and imports and their
value, and not necessarily out of interest to capture forestry data.
359
C. Muwele, CSO (personal communication, June 2005)
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branch, none of the officers at FD headquarters are trained in data
management, and no one was willing to do a job they have not been
trained for. To compound this problem, trained personnel in forest data
management have been misplaced to do forest extension work in the
Provinces.
As a temporary measure three experts in geographical information
systems (GIS) and data management have been pulled from the
provinces, where their positions exist in the new structure, to come and
help with data management. But even these officers are not happy being
away from family but more importantly their provincial heads need them
too.
By now, it must be clear to the reader that the biggest caveat
concerns data quality. While every precaution was taken to collect good
quality data, the researcher does not guarantee its quality. And if one is
observant enough, most of these problems do not require huge sums of
money to resolve them but only a little ingenuity from the forest
managers, specifically at headquarters.360 Unfortunately, this too is
completely lacking. Searching for data in different sources turned out to
be a problem way bigger than envisioned. Surely, FD can do better than
this!
I do realize that by now someone might be wondering why anyone
should trust the findings from this study, given the problems just
360

Though it applies mainly to the American situation, these colleagues in FD would benefit from Camaron
J. Thomas‟ Managers, Part of the Problem? (Quorum Books: Westport, Connecticut), 1999

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 163

highlighted. First, although data quality is questionable, the reality is
that this is the closest best there is, it is the best that could be found.
Besides that, these problems actually re-affirm and reflect the strength of
this investigation. This confirms the core argument of this study; that is,
managerial [in]capacity accounts for most, if not all, of the department‟s
failures. If these managers ever report for work, which we know they do –
8 hours a day Monday to Friday (and sometimes weekends) – it is
unbelievable that they can even fail to produce an annual report!

Field Research
In contrast with the desk research, the survey research was a
blissful exercise, and definitely compensated for the frustrations
encountered with the desk research. This project had a very good
reception in the Forestry Department as well as from some of the major
forestry financiers.361 In fact, the Chief Extension Officer was so thrilled
with the study he not only agreed to officially inform the provincial heads
about this study but also offered to send the questionnaires to all the
provinces through the official channel and also collected them back
using the same way.362

361

The Finnish Embassy was particularly helpful. At the time of this study the Finnish Embassy had just
commissioned a study to look at the economic potential of the forestry sector in Zambia, vis-à-vis towards
poverty reduction. This researcher net-worked with the Finnish Embassy‟s team of consultants and
benefited greatly from their preliminary findings.
362
I‟m highly indebted to Mr. Obote Shakachite, the Chief Extension Officer (at that time), for embracing
this study in such a manner. Mr Shakachite is currently the General Manager for ZAFFICO.
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For full disclosure, the reader may wish to know that this
researcher is a former employee of the Forestry Department and still has
some colleagues working for the department. How much this contributed
to the good reception is probably an obvious speculation.

Data Analysis and Inference
The foregoing discussion and the preceding chapters have all tried
to make a case for why this study is important. In particular, this
chapter has tried to explain the research agenda, the choice and source
of data and how it was collected, as well as how it has been analyzed.

As alluded to earlier, making a case for cause and effect
associations between institutional capacity and forest degradation does
not imply that inadequate technical and administrative capacity are the
only factors solely responsible for the poor state of forests. The argument
I make is that it is the major one. Obvious, we cannot rule out the fact
that other causal factors are at play at any given time which makes it
impossible to fully account for all effects.363 As King, et. al. (1994) have
extensively argued, this is the “fundamental problem of causal inference.
...no matter how perfect the research design, no matter how much data
we collect, …no matter how much experimental control we have, we will
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never know a causal inference for certain.”364 This study is not spared
from this reality either. The best any causal explanation does is to
approximate causation from one factor at a time and only helps to
explain part of the effect.365 However, one takes comfort in the fact that
any good research should be able to identify the main underlying causes
to a problem366 and be able to explain the links between cause and
effect.367 This dissertation does just that.
We start from the input side of the production process “listing the
observable implications of our theory”368 – staff and finances –
emphasizing the fact that no organization can operate without these two
inputs. And since changes in performance are best observed over a
period of time, and in this case while taking into consideration major
policy changes, this study utilizes this tested technique which also
makes it possible to compare before and after SAP (as one major policy
the Zambian government implemented over the years). We take 1985 as
the cutting point for before and after SAP, mainly as a gesture of staying
within the ambit of political correctness.369
Although this study utilizes a multi-method approach, it is
somehow heavily oriented towards qualitative analysis. But as Gary King,
364
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et. al. (1994) have argued, this must not be a source of concern because
the authenticity of any research findings is not dependent on the
approach used but on the competence of the researcher to observe,
connect, explain and interpret the numerous dots and puzzles that the
data presents.370 In other words, the superiority of a study findings does
not lie in the research methodology and analytical approach adopted but
rather in how well the findings are explained and, or interpreted. Both
quantitative and qualitative approaches have strengths and flaws that
sometimes reside not in the research design but simply in how the
research question is framed. Aware of such shortcomings, that almost all
research suffers from one form of weakness, it is befitting to acknowledge
that this one is no exception. And the biggest caveat is on the data
quality, in particular, on the state of the forest estates, which most likely
do not reflect the reality on the ground. What FD has reported is far more
than the area covered by gazetted forests. This study makes an
adjustment, based on Provincial reports, and shows how this may have
progressed.
Since

policy

reform

is

a

product

of

political

maneuvers,

consideration of the impact of policy elites is automatically part of the
larger discussion. As policy architects, the influence of policy elites on
forestry policy and subsequently on the department itself is quite
obvious. Apart from controlling the forestry policy goals, policy elites also
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struggle to advance and protect their interests so much so that unless
the department is supported by those groups that have the strongest
influence in the policy arena chances of success with its programs would
be next to none. Hence, the influence of policy elites on forestry policy
and the industry in general is a real issue. Infrastructure and other
technological resources that the department has been [un]able to tap into
are also part of the larger discussion.

Conclusion
To summarize, this analysis has been performed from two angles:
the structural and functional capacity of the department. The structural
portion (which I prefer to call the input side) of institutional capacity was
measured in terms of the number and quality371 of forestry personnel
staff and the annual outlays the department received for its programs.
The functional aspect assessed the management practices, personnel
knowledge about government policy (e.g. the SAP) and their role in
implementing the same in the forestry sector.
In the larger discussion, we reflect on the relationships between
forest managers and policy makers as well as the role of policy elites.
Since policies are usually broad statements of intent,372 the study tried
to find out if forest managers planned together to break down such policy
statements like the ones meant to pursue “product diversification” and
371
372

Quality refers to their professional expertise and skills.
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xiii-xv; Grindle, 1980:6
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“growth from own resources”373 into implementable targets.374 Did these
forest managers understand what such policy statements entailed? How
far down the bureaucratic ladder were these policy goals understood?
And

how

much

support

or

opposition

did

the

department

receive/confront, within and outside government, in the course of
pursuing the structural reforms?
This information is important not only because it would highlight
the degree to which forest managers „owned‟ the program (i.e. by being
able to develop their own targets and objectives), but more importantly it
would reflect the department‟s capacity to interpret government policy
into simplified workable goals that are understood by staff at all levels of
the department‟s structure.375 The ability to simplify broad policy
statements into implementable goals does indicate availability of
expertise on policy analysis, the ability to tailor a program to the local
conditions and, a commitment to implement the program.376 A case in
point is the success story about the industrial plantations, which later
became a corporation.
Finally, since it is almost impossible to account for all interactions
among the different variables in any given analysis, likewise, I do not
claim to have accounted for all possible interactions in this study either.
373

GRZ, New Economic Recovery Programme: Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993. Vol. I and
II, 1989:29
374
Grindle, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, 1980:6-7
375
Quick, “The Paradox of Popularity: “Ideological” Program Implementation in Zambia,” in: Merilee S.
Grindle (ed.), 1980; Israel, Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance, 1987:38
376
Cornia, et. al., Adjustment with a Human Face, 1987:8; Israel, Institutional Development,1987:149-50
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And this could be another source of weakness too. However, we should
take comfort in the fact that every study is useful – either for
contributing new knowledge and insights, raising questions to stimulate
debate and further research, or simply providing some lessons on what
pitfalls to avoid. My hope is that this study will be useful in all or some of
these areas, particularly in raising interest for further debate and
research.
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Chapter 4
Research Findings
Taking the 1960s as a baseline for tracking how indigenous protected
forests in Zambia have changed over time, the first thing one notices is that
this has taken a full circle, from 5 million ha of forests in 1962 and back
again to roughly the same figure (5.16 million ha.) in 2005.377 Notice that FD
maintains that it has 7,103,099 ha as if no forest degradation is taking place
anywhere.
Initially, there is a period of rapid increase in forest estates (19621983) from what seems to have been an ambitious expansion program. From
5 million hectares of gazetted forests in 1962378 this area steadily increased
to 7.6 million by 1983, the highest level attained (Figure 4.1), which also
represents a 69.8% increase.379 In fact, it is not an overstatement to say the
first 15 years since independence (1964-1979) truly exemplifies professional
excellence in the Forestry Department.
Sadly, thereafter, forest estates start to decline, at first gradually until
1994 when the first biggest slump occurred in which the department lost
(degazetted) 611,527 hectares, mainly for subsistence farming and human

377
378
379

See Appendix 5 for details over this change.
FAO, Forest Trends, 1967:23
This calculation and the graph are based on data from FD, Annual Reports (1965 to 2005).
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settlements.380 And this trend has continued to date, accelerated in
particular by two more major slumps in 2000 and 2001 when the
department again lost huge chunks of forests: 741,527 ha and 461,908 ha,
respectively (Figure 4.1 and Appendix 4). In general, the loss of forest
estates has been mainly due to illegal encroachments,381 whose roots can be
traced to political economy factors, policy reforms, land tenure and
ownership rights, population growth versus high unemployment dynamics,
and political expedience. But over and above all this forest degradation has
been permitted by a weak institutional capacity in FD, the inability to
manage the internal and external challenges FD has faced.

5

6

7

8

Figure 4.1: Protected Forest Areas in Zambia, 1962-2005.

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year

380

Davy Siame, “Forest Management under Drought Conditions,” in: IUCN, Proceedings of a Follow-up
Workshop to the 1991-922 Drought Workshop, p.74
381
Davy Siame, “Forest Management under Drought Conditions,” 1997:74; Felix Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and
Opportunities for Conservation of Biodiversity, (WWF-SARPRO), 2004:8, 29-35, 45-47
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According to FD‟s reports the extent of its forest estates is just slightly
above 7.1 million ha., though in reality this has dropped to roughly 5.2
million ha.382 as this study found out. Figure 4.2 shows the change in
indigenous forests based on what FD reports and what this study found,
while Table 4.1 shows how these estates are spread across the nation, based
on FD‟s unadjusted data.383

Figure 4.2: Change in PFAs in Zambia, 1962-2005.

When viewed in terms of net gain and loss at 5-year intervals, here too
the trend is quite distinct. Initially, there is a marked increase in net gain up
until 1975. But this pattern suddenly changes to net losses starting from the
1980s with the situation becoming worse at the advent of the 1990s and
382

This figure takes into consideration all those heavily encroached forests which the Forestry Department still
maintains in its books despite the fact that technically these forests do not exist anymore.
383
This table does not adjust for any land that has not legally degazetted though the department is aware of
illegal encroachments all across the country.
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continues all the way into the new millennium (Table 4.1 and Figure
4.2).384 The question is how did this come about? And what are the major
factors at play that caused or are sustaining this downward spiral both in
the extent and quality of indigenous forests?

Table 4.1: Protected Forest Areas by Location.385
Gazetted Forests (Km2) a/

National

Local

Total

% of
Total
Land
Area

Central

3,775

2,244

6,019

6.4%

Copperbelt

5,136

488

5,624

17.9%

Eastern

6,833

1,653

8,486

12.3%

Luapula

2,125

2,271

4,396

6.9%

Lusaka

4

420

424

1.9%

Northern

8,016

3,089

11,105

7.5%

North-Western

20,650

4,026

24,676

23.4%

Southern

1,848

5,155

7,003

8.2%

Western

3,059

2,991

6,050

4.8%

51,446

22,337

73,783

9.8%

Province

TOTAL
a/

1 Km2 = 1 hectare (ha); an hectare being 100 m x 100 m.

Source: FAO, Zambia: Identification of Forestry Investment Projects, (FAO: Rome),
1996.

384

Due to the various levels of jurisdictional authority on land ownership and the numerous players involved in
negotiating for forest protection the process may take anywhere from one to five years before a forest is finally
gazetted, whereas degazettion may take less than a year. See for instance, Forestry Department‟s Annual Reports
for 1984 to 1986.
385
Based on FD‟s figures that have not adjusted for those forests which are severely encroached.
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Table 4.2: Net Change in Forest Estates, 1960-2005.386
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005

PFAs (ha.)
4,800,000
5,236,200
5,800,000
7,160,000
7,600,000
7,378,300
7,375,500
6,492,400
6,363,600
5,160,200

Net Change (ha)
0
436,200
563,800
1,360,000
-440,000
-221,700
-2,800
-883,100
-128,800
-1,203,400

Figure 4.3: Net Change in Forest Estates in Zambia, 1960-2005
1,500
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1,000
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One plausible explanation lies in the Forestry Department‟s capacity
(labor and financial outlays) to manage its forest estates, while the other

386

Based on the adjusted figures from this study.
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involves the external factors that came into play. Together this has created a
complex and conducive environment that has made agents of forest
degradation to thrive. The discussion that follows shows how this happened
and is being sustained, but also offers some possible solutions to this
problem.

Institutional Capacity as an Agent of Change
To understand how forest degradation in Zambia is connected to FD‟s
institutional capacity and why this has been a continuing phenomenon, we
begin by observing changes in forest estates in relation to the two primary
levels of capacities in the Forestry Department – labor and financial outlays –
while holding the external factors constant. It is important to start with
these two inputs because not only does labor and capital belong to the first
layer of required factors of production but more importantly they are
precisely the primary sources of capacity. No organization can become
operational without these two inputs. Therefore, whether it is a public or
private enterprise, availability and adequacy of labor and capital is
important. The second reason is that FD‟s complaints have always been
about inadequate field staff and finances as the two biggest setbacks
constraining its efforts to effectively manage its forest estates. This study
responds verify these complaints, as a research hypothesis.
Except for some occasional peaks here and there, a quick look at the
two sources of capacities reveals that both forestry personnel and funding
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for forestry programs generally took a downward trend. A similar pattern is
observed on the forest estates too, they decline in tandem with reductions in
labor and funding (Figure 4.4). The changes in forest estates, following the
reductions in forestry personnel and financial allocations, seem to suggest
that these three factors are somehow connected. While correlation does not
imply causality the trend is so distinct it is tempting one could easily
conclude that a decline in capacity is contributing to the loss of forest
estates. But a trend such as this one only establishes a direction of change,
it does not tell the degree of impact and therefore it would be premature to
rush to such a conclusion. Most likely there are other factors at play too,
and I return to this later on in this Chapter.
Obviously, the connection between human and financial resources and
the loss of forest estates should not come as a surprise in the sense that as a
field enterprise forestry relies heavily on the physical presence of field staff
who have to map not only forest stock densities but also to license and
monitor forest operations. In addition, they have to establish the rights and
levels of access for resources extraction to promote sustainable use, all of
which requires adequate financial support.
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Figure 4.4: Change in PFAs, Forestry Personnel, and Financial Outlays to Forestry Dept.
b) Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005.1

a) Protected Forest Areas, 1962-2005.
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Therefore, a reduction in human and financial resources is likely to
affect the quality of the forests, as it turned out in the Zambian case study.
But to what degree did this contribute to the problem? I come back to
discuss this later. For now let us take a closer look at these graphs to gain a
better understanding on what is happening.
A related matter to the above, but somehow at a different level,
concerns financial injections from external sources387 invested in forestry. It
is possible, if not plausible, to argue that this external financial assistance,
which somehow increased over the years388 should have helped to cushion
the shortfall after government reduced its support to forestry. Unfortunately,
this argument cannot hold because such monies did not go into natural
forest management, except for the financial assistance from Germany
channeled through Gesellschaft Für Technisihe Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
whose assistance, for a change, was specifically for the Teak forests in
Western Province.
Therefore, although foreign financiers have strongly supported forestry
development in Zambia, their emphasis has been in other areas not natural
forests, and for this reason their efforts did not have much impact in natural
forests. However, since the mid-1990s some organizations (e.g. the FAO,
FINNIDA, and the EU) have financed a few area studies to understand the

387

This includes bilateral and multilateral loans and grants from various sources, notably from the World Bank,
FINNIDA, FAO, EU, IFAD, JICA, GTZ, Africare and others. For more details on this see Appendix 4 and 5.
388
For details on this see Appendix 4
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problems associated with indigenous forest management in Zambia.389 Their
recommendations can be summarized as falling into three themes: 1.
Streamlining the department‟s operations to make it more efficient and
effective, 2. Capacity building (focusing on technical knowledge) to support
the first recommendation, and 3. Introducing joint forestry management
(JFM), a concept that advocates for inclusion of other stakeholders as
partners in forest management.
Under the first theme, these recommendations include but not limited
to: privatizing the department so it could be free of government interference;
improving the department‟s revenue collection mechanism, one that would
assign commercial concessioneers real responsibility for re-stocking or replanting the forests after their logging operations before moving to another
area. Unfortunately, all of these sound recommendations continue to gather
dust on the shelves mainly because they offer radical changes that threaten
the current power base (and source of benefits), both within the department
and the larger political arena. From my humble assessment of both the
forestry law and the procedures that govern issuance of forest licenses,
especially to commercial concessioneers, I do not envision the Forestry
Department to follow through on these recommendations anytime soon
because both forestry officials and politicians benefit from the current
weaknesses in the laws and the chaotic procedures surrounding issuance of
licenses all of which obstruct true transparency and accountability.
389

See ZFAP and PFAP studies, and J.F.W. Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems
(Scanagri: Finland), March 2004
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As some scholars have noted, such behavior is common in public
organizations, particularly if the policy required to be implemented is
unpopular. Bureaucrats will do whatever is in their power to delay or simply
ignore implementation of that particular policy. And this fits what is playing
out in the Forestry Department. The only difference is that not all forestry
personnel support this delay, most would like those recommendations
implemented. But the Director of Forestry is reluctant to move on with the
recommendations, one of which is the creation of the Forestry Commission
to phase out the FD, which essentially amounts to draining one‟s pond.

Dependent vs. Independent Variables
Although the general trend suggests that the forest estates have moved
in tandem with reductions in labor and financial outlays a closer look
actually reveals some interesting contradictions, especially when viewed in
the context of policy history, vis-à-vis bringing in certain policy landmarks
such as before and after 1980s, when the Zambian government embraced
the structural adjustment program (SAP), a World Bank/IMF sponsored
economic policy meant to promote free market economic liberalism in the
developing countries. SAP comes into play here because it stands out as a
major landmark between the time when forests were well managed, the
period before 1980s (i.e. before SAP), and the 1980s and beyond (after SAP)
when everything fell apart as seen in the number of forests lost. Whether the
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SAP is part of the factors contributing to forest degradation is a matter to be
settled by findings from this study.
In the 1960s (and earlier) the department had fewer and less qualified
personnel (Table 5.2) compared to early to mid-1980s and (Table 5.3)390
where there is some improvement, a positive outcome of investments
pursued under the national building policy soon after independence.

Table 4.3: Staff Development, 10 Years after Independence.
Staff
Zambian Professionals

1964
None

1974
5

1

Zambians at Universities

2

19

Foresters

2

97

153

291

5,400,000

6,500,000

7.2%

9.4%

1,060

22,500

2

(trained in Zambia)

Forest Rangers

3

(trained in Zambia)
Forest Estates

Protected Forests Areas, indigenous (ha.)
Percentage of national area
Area surveyed for management plans (ha.)
Exotic Plantations (ha.)
1

The department had 33 expatriate professionals at this time.
Diploma in Forestry (equiv. to Associate Degree)
3
Certificate in Forestry (2-year program)
2

Source: Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9

Out of the 33 professional staff391 available at independence (1964) all
of them were expatriates from Canada, Finland and the UK.392 And the
situation was not great in the junior categories too where the total number is
390

Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9
Under the Forestry Department‟s staff classification system “professional” is loosely applied to cover all
those with a 4-year college degree and above. For consistence, the same application is maintained in this study.
392
Forestry Department, Annual Report for 1964, (1965)
391
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also below the 1970 levels (Table 4.3). But the situation quickly improved as
Table 4.4 illustrates.

The period prior to 1980s also stands out as a period of nation
building in all aspects – socio-political and economic – and this occurred
across sectors393 despite the political challenges at that time.394 In
particular, forestry received special attention on the policy agenda due to its
connection to the copper industry as a source of wood energy as well as for
construction works in the mines. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say
that forestry was regarded as twin industry to copper mining. As a source of
wood energy, forests were perceived as sustaining the economic backbone of
the nation and therefore had its status elevated on the political arena.
In contrast, the 1980s and beyond can be summed up in one word,
chaotic – nationally and worse in forestry circles. It is a period known for
some very unpopular economic policy reforms such as the SAP, a policy that
created more problems than the solutions. Politically, this was also a time
when Zambians started to seriously question [again]395 the moral basis of
being a one Party state, running on a government-controlled economy that
continued to drive the nation further into debt, and therefore unable to

393

Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds, 1988; Richard Hall, Zambia, (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers: New
York), 1967: Chapters 9 and 10.
394
Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South (Africana Publishing Corporation:
New York), 1970
395

I say again because these changes were unpopular from the very beginning as evidenced by loss of life during
demonstrations against the same. But the masses were finally subdued and forced to tolerate the situation by the
strong hand of the state.
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adequately finance its programs. The impact of these policy shifts is also
evident in forestry circles as the previous observations illustrate, which also
implies that we could look beyond the FD to find some explanations for what
is happening to the forest estates. For now these factors are held constant
until the investigation on internal capacity in FD is exhausted.
In terms of professional staff, the improvement that took place did not
hold for a long time. Just after mid-1980s the number of professional staff
suddenly went back to the 1960s levels, partly because most of those
professionals joined ZAFFICO, while others left for greener pastures both
within the country and abroad.
Faced with salary ceilings and restrictions that did not allow
expansion of the department‟s structure, which were part of the SAP
prescriptions, most professional staff found these conditions a disincentive
that did not recognize and reward their expertise and also restricted their
upward mobility. Therefore, they left. And this is not surprising because as
the literature on organizational behavior and personnel management points
out,396 providing the right incentives is important for staff motivation and
retention.

396

There is a huge amount of literature on this topic. See for instance, Frederick Taylor, “Scientific
Management,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) Classics of Public Administration, 1987; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the
Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration, 1937:3-45;
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation, 1973; Gulick, 1937:3-13, 21-30; Rolf E. Rogers,
Organization Theory, 1975:47-61
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Table 4.4: Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005.
Forestry Department Personnel1
Year

Total Staff
Professional

1

Technical

Field

Admin

1970

33

66

350

145

594

1971

36

179

287

109

522

1972

33

166

280

119

598

1973

33

103

284

132

552

1974

26

84

284

132

552

1975

36

53

214

145

448

1976

28

82

267

145

522

1977

26

114

374

144

658

1978

37

118

367

135

657

1979
1980

37
41

150
190

326
222

142
132

655
585

1981

50

213

333

92

688

1982

47

244

353

161

805

1983

40

82

372

82

576

1984

40

81

365

80

566

1985

38

97

365

80

580

1986

35

113

3132

63

3343

1987
1988

29
21

117
108

1410
1303

58
55

1614
1487

1989

21

128

1303

55

1507

1990

19

152

1288

55

1514

1991

23

142

1273

62

1500

1992

23

130

1249

62

1464

1993

28

130

1247

54

1459

1994

28

128

1188

50

1394

1995

17

112

1120

64

1313

1996

21

124

1064

63

1272

1997

26

115

695

47

883

1998

26

115

695

47

883

1999

26

115

695

47

883

2000

41

539

478

60

883

2001

44

434

273

135

886

2002

22

439

384

82

927

2003

23

417

374

76

890

2004

23

418

374

76

891

2005

23

418

374

76

891

No data available from 1962 (the baseline for this study) to 1969.
Source: FD Annual Reports for 1970 to 2005
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And all of these depend on a number of factors, one of which is the rewards
system.397 When the right incentives are not made available, exit always
becomes the only option.
Therefore, what has been happening in the FD is nothing outside the
expected. And because of such exits the number of professional staff
dropped drastically, back to the 1960s level. In this respect, one can argue
that the number of professional staff has generally remained almost at the
same level, with just some modest increase in the 1980s and later between
2000 and 2001. But, notice that at a time when the department had fewer
and less qualified personnel (1960s to 1970s), ironically that is also the time
when it performed very well as witnessed in the enormous expansion of its
estates (Figure 4.4a).398 And its achievements extend to other areas too,
namely forest research, extension and training, and the establishment of
industrial and local supply plantations.399 Local supply plantations, a
smaller scale of the industrial plantations, were established in all provinces
to deviate dependence on indigenous forests.
Its total labor strength between 1970 (the earliest time data is
available) and 1979, when the highest level in forest expansion was
achieved, was almost constant (Figure 4.4a and b). Also notice that the

397

A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50 (July 1943), pp370-396 1943;
Douglas M. McGregor, “The Human side of Enterprise,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) Classics of Public
Administration, 1987; L. Urwick, “Organization as a Technical Problem,” in: William Sexton (ed.) Organization
Theories, 1970; Andrew D. Szilagyi and Marc J. Wallace, Organizational Behavior and Performance, (Scott,
Foresman and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4 th Edition. Part 3 and 5
398
Appendix 5
399
Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9
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largest growth in forest estates (1972-1979) does not coincide with the
increase in labor force; the former occurred at a time when the department
still had a modest number of staff.
What is even more interesting is the fact that as the staff-hecterage
ratio declines, that is the time when forest degradation is increasing. Yet at
a time one member of staff had more forest hectares to “watch” over when
the department did better (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5). Convention wisdom
would make us believe that with fewer hectares to manage per individual the
department should have done better than it did when its staff certainly had
more hectares to manage.
In addition to these achievements, the department was able to plant
over 60,000 ha of exotic plantations in the Copperbelt Province to provide
wood to the copper mines. This project was such a success it was eventually
incorporated as a state company called the Zambia Forestry and Forest
Industries Corporation (ZAFFICO). To date ZAFFICO is the only and largest
company dealing in plantation timber. Up until 2002 ZAFFICO also had
sawmills, but these have been sold in response to the SAP privatization
policy,400 a very unpopular reform policy that has sent a lot of people out of
jobs thereby exacerbating pressure on the forests which became the only
safety net for the unemployed.

400

Zambia Privatization Agency, Privatization Status Report (Lusaka, Zambia), 30th April, 2000
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Table 4.5: Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005.
Year

Forest Estates
(ha.)

No. of Staff *

Ha./Person

1964

5,229,167

153

34,178

1974

7,130,600

420

16,978

1984

7,462,149

486

15,354

1994

7,103,884

1,344

5,286

2005

5,160,137

815

6,331

* This number excludes administrative staff who are not directly involved in
forest management activities.

SAP aside, the achievements just alluded to are by no means meager;
they signify the department‟s capacity not only to formulate and implement
government policy but more importantly its ability to plan strategically and
to achieve its objectives. Notice that all this happened at a time when its
labor force was relatively low, not to mention the fact that even the annual
allocation were far from being magnificent. Yet instead of sustaining this
management style and the fiscal responsibility that accompanied it,
somehow the department lost its performance momentum (measured in
terms of the extent and quality of its forests).
The point I‟m trying to make here is that forest loss occurred when
there was an increase in personnel. Looking at the official statements (mostly
as complaints) from the department, including the various studies it has
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commissioned401 they all point at two factors contributing to forest loss: 1.
inadequate labor force to undertake the necessary field activities, and 2.
financial constraints to facilitate executing the department‟s plans. Yet as
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5 indicate this argument is now highly debatable. At
a time when labor force increased, that‟s when forest loss has also noticeably
increased. How do we explain these contradictions? Why did forest
degradation402 accelerate at a time when the department‟s capacity had
improved (as in number of personnel and their technical skills) and yet
performance is going down?

The best way to handle this is to look at each institutional capacity
variable individually to see how each is contributing to forest degradation.
Starting with labor, the figures indicate that the department generally had a
lean structure in its formative years. Yet this is also a time it did very well in
terms of increasing the size of its estates, including the way they were
managed as evidenced by the degree of importance attached to undertaking
forest surveys and preparation of management plans.

401

See for instance, the work done by various consultants under ZFAP and ZFAP.
I use the word degradation here to signify a precursor situation in which a forest gets deforested such that it
becomes necessary to give it up. Forests are never degazetted if they have not been abused, except under special
circumstances. Usually when such a situation arises FD will bargain to exchange for another area. See for
instance FD Annual Report 1975.
402
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Figure 4.5: Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005.

Several things can be attributed to this but three stand out and
deserve mention up front. First is that the department had established very
good relationships with the local Chiefs403 (and their subjects) and was,
therefore, able to tap into and ride on the local community‟s long established
capacity

and

commitment

to

manage

their

forests.

These

informal

partnerships with the local communities gave the department additional
capacity at local level. And because part-time forest patrolmen were
employed from the respective local communities, this created a sense of
403

Under the nation‟s land tenure arrangements Chiefs own more land (Trust Land) than central government
(State Land) and therefore all forest reservations in Trust Lands require the Chiefs‟ approval. Out of Zambia‟s
total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust Land, followed by 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve Land, and
6% (4.5 million ha) as State Land. For more details on land ownership/tenure see: GRZ, Report of the Land
Commission, Lusaka, August 1967; GRZ, Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970;
M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980; M.C.
Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.),
Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, (Centre
for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45; D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D.
Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, University of London Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49.
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security (and hope) for job prospects and this helped to solidify these
partnerships. It was not unusual for the local communities to apprehend
offenders, or even fight forest fires without calling in forestry personnel.404
But all this has evaporated and replaced by anarchy. Local communities
have become law unto themselves, as witnessed through illegal forest
encroachments. With abolition of part-time positions for forest patrolmen,
and the fact that all commercial sawmills are located in urban areas, local
communities do not see any economic benefits accruing to them from their
forests and therefore are up in arms to regain their property.405 They are
demanding not only access to the forest resources but implicitly inclusion in
the decision making process on what should be done to their land. And this
situation is not peculiar to Zambia; it reflects a common response from
indigenous people whenever their power base is threatened or harbor
perceptions of being short-changed. Latin America provides a timely
example.406
Second, there is the issue of respect for the law. Prior to 1980s the
public had great respect for the laws relating to forest conservation and
utilization. Although forests are a public good, that could haven fallen prey
to the tragedy of the commons syndrome, somehow this did not manifest as
a problem. The public adhered to both the local and national laws and
regulations on forests. But this moral fiber seems to have disintegrated
404

Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems, 2004:28
Fynn, 2004:28
406
Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the
Post-Liberal Challenge, (Cambridge University Press), 2005.
405

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 191

starting around the mid to late 1980s when illegal forest encroachment
suddenly reared its face, and has accelerated since then.407 In most cases
local politicians encourage the practice who in return get votes from the
public as a pay back for “fighting on their behalf” to get their land back from
central govt. Although I might be walking on slippery ground here to suggest
that this break down in morals that caused the public to invade the forests
may have been due to the perceived political liberties that came at the dawn
of a new era – i.e. transitioning from an authoritarian government into a
democratic dispensation – I‟m inclined to think that this political change did
have some effect. As the demand for a reverting to a democratic government
system engulfed the country suddenly there was a sense of liberty and
empowerment across the country, which to some meant having the freedom
to do as they wanted, especially with anything owned by government e.g.
public lands. Suffice to say, this speculation is open for debate or systematic
research. Why was there better forest management under an authoritarian
regime compared to a democratic government?
Third, government‟s adoption of the SAP has had severe implications
on forests and the nation‟s political economy in general. And since the SAP
has been such a dominant as well as controversial policy it provides a good
landmark for a before and after SAP analysis. It is dominant because it has
been in force for over two decades and it is controversial in that no one likes
it – the masses hate it and bureaucrats simply tolerate it – yet the powers
407

Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, The Environmental Impact of the
1991-1992 Drought on Zambia, 1997:73-73
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that be have managed to keep it in play. In addition to the issues pointed out
earlier, the other major problem that arose from the SAP, which directly
affected the forests, relates to how the SAP contributed to increasing the
unemployment rates and subsequently the poverty levels.
For instance, privatization of state-owned companies and market
liberalization led to company closures and increased competition for the local
companies such that local companies pushed out of business, respectively.
And when government, the biggest employer, also downsized this caused the
unemployment rate to swell over night. With no other means of livelihood in
sight, people flocked to the forests to mine whatever could be sold – timber,
wood fuel (used directly or burned to make charcoal), building sand,
grass,408 and a host of other forest products. In this respect forests became
the only viable alternative for millions and because of the heightened influx
this caused dire consequences on the forests.
Although these effects have not been quantified yet, it is quite evident
that joblessness has forced more people to embrace agriculture, which is a
positive development if this transition can be harnessed. What is not good,
from the forestry stand point is that this has increased pressure for
degazettion of forests, especially those near the urban areas.409 Politically,
this issue has become an octopus; both the public and politicians want to
grab any forest claiming that more land is needed to accommodate those
408

Very popular in the leisure/hospitality industry where it is used for roofing e.g. chalets and similar
infrastructure to keep that traditional appeal in play.
409
Njovu, Felix; Pia Chuzu; and Catherine Nguvulu, Key Threats and Opportunities for the Conservation of
Biodiversity in the Copperbelt Province, 2004.
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who want to return back to the land, a policy that never gained any traction
under the Kaunda administration. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear
complaints about land shortage in some areas when in fact this is not the
case. The truth is having gotten used to urban lifestyle, those who have lost
jobs still want to stay as close to urban pleasures as possible. This is why
land shortage is only concentrated near urban areas.
Currency devaluation, one of the conditions of the SAP programs,
eroded not only the local currency‟s purchasing power but worst of all it
completely wiped out people‟s lifetime savings. With inflation rate changing
from 0.02% in 1965, averaging between 0.05 to 0.06% in the 1970s and
jumping to over 300% in the 1990s (before it come down to two figures in the
new millennium), the Kwacha had become almost valueless. Currently, the
exchange rate of the Kwacha to a US dollar stands at $1=ZMK3,148.00!410
The sudden loss of jobs, just mentioned earlier, also made these
former employees vulnerable. Employees who had not anticipated early
“retirement” suddenly found themselves on the streets with no means of
livelihood, and having lost their savings through currency devaluation, this
stripped off any investment possibilities that the savings could have been
put to. As a result, most “retirees” turned to the forests as their only source
of livelihood. Hence, the impact of the SAP on the forests is quite multifaceted, and its contribution to forest degradation is indisputable. I discuss

410

Daily updates on currency exchange rates are available at: http://www.xe.com/ucc/ .
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the SAP dimension later on in Chapter 6, under the section dealing with
external factors.
The forest degradation problem can be approached from various
angles. One is to look at what the department did [well] to stay on top of its
challenges. The other is to try and understand other capacities, apart from
the department‟s internal capacity. I return to this discussion later. For now
let us look at how the department‟s internal capacity, labeled in terms of
inadequate funding and forestry personnel.

Institutional Structure and Organizational Reforms
The other explanation for department‟s performance lies in its
structure and the policy reforms. In particular, it is worth noting how the
PSRP changed both the department‟s structure (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7)
and its mandate. There has been a titanic shift in the department‟s focus
from forest management to forest extension, which as traditional foresters
pointed out, has become the department‟s biggest weakness. As the
department

concentrates

management?

on

forest

extension,

who

will

do

forest
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Figure 4.6: Forestry Department Organization Structure, before 1997.
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The Industrial Plantation ceased to be part of FD in 1985 when it was transformed into a parastatal called the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation
(ZAFFICO) Limited.
2
Western Province had two Provincial Officers, one for the Teak Forests and the other for the rest of the Province.
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Figure 4.7: Forestry Department Organization Structure, after 1997 (post PSRP).
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Western Province now has one Provincial head who is responsible for both the Teak Forests and the other forest types in the Province.
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As observed earlier, FD performed better when it had a lean
structure than when the level of its personnel increased. This does not
imply that a lean structure is the solution, but to pose a question, how
did it do that?
One explanation lies in the cordial relations that existed between
FD and the Chiefs and their subjects. This is where FD‟s strength came
from. There was, for instance, a deliberate policy to employ local people
as part time or seasonal employees, which made the local communities
to be part of the management team.
But it can also be argued that credit belongs to the Head of
Department who provided good leadership both within and outside the
department, which made the department to rise to such national
prominence. Also the team spirit that those managers cultivated among
the six specialized divisions propelled the department to professional
excellence. As the responses from the survey indicate, and also speaking
from experience as a former employer of the Forestry, this researcher do
attest to the fact that that kind of environment encouraged crosspollination of ideas among the managers which were then passed on down
the ranks.
Some of the challenges facing the department relates to changes in
its organizational structure and mandate. Up until the 1980s, the
department had six specialized divisions (Figure 4.6); later reduced to six
in 1986 when the IPD was incorporated into a quasi-government company.
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In 1997, the department underwent a major overhaul under the public
service reform program (PSRP), which further reduced the number of
divisions to two: namely, the research and extensions branch. While all
research work was retained in the research division, the functions of the
rest of the divisions were condensed into the extension branch.
As various change management specialists and organization
development experts have pointed out, change in and by itself can be a
problem if not managed properly because it brings a host of insecurities
about the future of the organization and even at individual level. How is
the organization going to fair in its new outfit? Are the employees
assured of job security? What will be the new focus? How does that fit
into the old one?
Although the 1997 restructuring exercise is considered to have
upgraded staff salary scales, functionally FD lost out by changing from
five specialist divisions to two branches. The idea of retaining the most
qualified for the job was well conceived and, in fact, just reaffirmed
government‟s long established standards on merit-based recruitment for
the civil service. What seems to have gone wrong is how the restructuring
was implemented. The process retained supervisors at the various levels
of the hierarchy and eliminated positions for people who actually carried
out the field jobs.
In particular, the retrenchment of Forest Guards who were
responsible for forest patrols and monitoring forest operations has been
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the most damaging change the department ever made.411 Right now FD
is only relying on the integrity of its clients to abide by the law. Yet,
anyone familiar with the forestry business can guess what is actually
happening, especially on timber extraction.
Both the personal interviews and questionnaire responses from the
forest managers who participated in this study re-affirmed that forests
have

become

encroachment

a

free-for-all

and

illegal

resource!

settlements

General
in

lawlessness,

protected

forests,

forest
over-

exploitation (and subsequently forest degradation) have all increased.
Furthermore, the change of emphasis from forest management, the
department‟s core function, to forest extension has been another blunder
FD committed in the PSRP process. As a result, the department is not
paying attention to the resource base any more. Its main focus in recent
years has been revenue collection, not even forest extension. Yet when
one looks at the department‟s expertise over 70% of its staff are trained
in forest management not forest extension, which has always been
considered a “support” service! What was the rationale for switching from
forest management, its core business, to forest extension? Looking at its

411

Apparently this problem is not confined to forestry alone as one senior official at Cabinet Office
explained. The Department of Agriculture is also in a similar situation. All classified daily employee
positions were also phased out and this has caused havoc on monitoring entry and exit of agricultural
materials to and from Zambia. The 2004-2005 out-break of the foot and mouth disease for which Zambia
has incurred high losses both on cattle and on vaccines to contain the disease, not to mention lost business
on beef export, is a good example of the impact of retrenching the Caught-on-Guard personnel in the Dept
of Agriculture. Management Development Division (MDD) is in the process of approving reinstatement of
lower rank positions that were phased out in the Department of Agriculture (personal communication,
August 2005).
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professional expertise, is the department going to be effective doing what
the majority of its personnel are not trained for?
Connected to these structural and operational changes there has
been a loss of more experienced personnel who were laid off and this has
wiped out the institutional memory creating a knowledge vacuum that
has resulted in corporate Alzheimer.
Already signs of these weaknesses are quite glaring. Despite the
preference to concentrate on forest extension, right now there are no
projects to this effect, not even a radio talk show! Having put forest
management in the back seat, the department has literally been choking
itself. And the impact of this change is evident from loss of and the
general quality of its estates, mainly due to illegal settlements but also
from

unsupervised

over-logging.

With

hindsight,

it

appears

the

department did not anticipate these problems.
In an effort to address over-logging the Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) temporarily suspended
issuing forest licenses to foreign-owned timber companies as part of a
larger

strategy

Environment

to

reduce

Deputy

over-extraction,

Minister,

Nedson

especially

Nzowa

for

exports.

announced

that,

“…because of poor logistical support to the Forestry Department (FD) it
was difficult to patrol the forests and monitor the scale of extraction.
…We are now only giving licenses to indigenous people. .…if the forests
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get destroyed, it will be us to blame.”412 Surely, is this a solution? From a
policy maker?! If the indigenous people destroy the forests, does that
make the act right?
There is no need to penalize private investors who are supposed to
propel forestry into another economically viable sector. Actions such as
the license suspension send insecurity signals to investors. FD needs to
conduct a serious self-assessment of what it needs to do. Considering the
numerous studies that FD and its parent Ministry (MTENR) have
commissioned over the years e.g. through the National Environmental
Action Programme (NEAP), the Zambia Forest Action Programme (ZFAP),
including the ongoing Provincial Forest Action Programme (PFAP), one
would expect FD and MTENR to be well aware of the factors accelerating
forest over-exploitation and environmental degradation in Zambia.413 It is
therefore disappointing that despite all these studies, all of which have
repeatedly pointed to the same issues,414 the FD and Ministry still appear
not to know how to resolve this problem! Suffice to say, forest
degradation is widespread both in open forests and protected forest

412

The Post Newspaper, Govt Suspends Issuance of Forest Licenses to Foreigners, January 09, 2006.
http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=5003
413
For more details on these issues see MENR, 1994; MENR,1999: Vol. I, II and III; and Chapter 5 and 6
of this dissertation.
414
These issues include, but not limited to: a weak institutional capacity in FD to monitor and supervise
forest operations; high unemployment rate; policy conflicts between agriculture policy and forestry policy
and; absence of statistics on real value of forests and its contribution to national economy; poor perception
of forestry by policy makers; and traditional beliefs that see forests as a free resource for all. See: MENR,
1994; MENR, 1999: Vol. I, II and III; and most recently, Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and Opportunities for
Conservation of Biodiversity, (WWF-SARPO), 2004:29-35, 45-47.
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areas.415 Furthermore, it seems the future does not promise anything
better if FD‟s institutional capacity is not improved.416

Forestry Personnel and Annual Allocations
Looking at the status of forestry personnel and finances, two
contrasting scenarios arise (Figure 5.5. and 5.6). With respect to labor
force, the scenario is mixed across the four categories. On average the
professional and administrative (support) staff declined after the SAP,
whereas technical and field staff increased, and quite substantially for
the latter (Figure 5.5.). A word of caution is appropriate here. While the
field staff shows a substantial increase, in reality this is no longer the
case because the positions for part-time forest patrolmen, that added
over two thousand people to the field staff category, were abolished a
year after being in existence, which means that the department went
back to relying on its former labor capacity. With respect to financial
outlays, the general situation is one of complete withdraw; it is as though
the department was being closed (Figure 4.8). How did this come about?

415

The various studies undertaken by MENR, National Environmental Action Programme, 1994; and
under PFAP; ZFAP, 1998 all point to the same issues.
416
J F W Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems. MENR, Lusaka,
Zambia.2004:11-12
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Figure 4.8: Forestry Personnnel, before and after SAP.
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As noted earlier, most of these problems can be explained in terms
of the SAP impacts. Apart from the problems mentioned earlier, the SAP
package also forced government to freeze salary increments for civil
servants as part of the larger objective on fiscal responsibility. This
became a disincentive and caused some foresters to leave for greener
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pastures, thus setting in motion a brain drain with its attendant
consequences on the department‟s institutional capacity.
Another relates to the public sector reform program (PSRP),
basically an extension of the SAP, through which the actual government
downsizing was implemented and the FD was the first department to
undergo that surgery. Tie these two together (effects from SAP and PSRP)
and a perfect stage is set for loss of institutional memory as this study
has just found out (Figure 4.10). The department hired more younger
people with less experience against a few who had more experience. The
implications here are quite obvious.
Clearly, the loss of institutional memory left the new hires in a
position of having to learn on their feet. If what is happening with the
forest estates is anything to go by, the retrenchment of older experienced
managers was definitely not a prudent strategy.
Also another feature arising from PSRP is that the bulk of the
department‟s managers are young Turks: 17% are 20-29 years of age;
48% (30-39 years) and only 12% are above 50 years old (Figure 4.11).
This is good in terms of expecting a longer service from these young
employees. However, it has its down side – inexperience – and its cost is
being seen in the quality of forest estates. Also because the PSRP process
was so sudden417 these young Turks (some of whom are non-foresters)

417

According to one government official at Cabinet Office, speaking on condition of anonymity, the World
Bank gave the Zambia government an ultimatum to cut its size to a level where government‟s wage bill did
not exceed 8.9% of National GDP. Specifically, government was told to abolish all classified daily
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suddenly found themselves in leadership positions but with no one to
mentor them.

Figure 4.10: Forest Managers’ Years of Service.418

Now these new managers are learning on the job and trying to find
their feet. How bad is the situation? 42% of the managers surveyed don‟t
know if the department has any work plans; 40% have no idea who
develops the work plans, if any exist; and 51% are not involved in any
planning sessions. In other words, almost half the department‟s
managers may not even know what a work plan is, let alone how to
develop one! This is a serious weakness which speaks to the very core of
policy/program implementation. In the absence of work plans, what road

employee (CDE) positions, considered non-essential. 24,000 CDEs were removed from the payroll and
later some professionals too. Personal communication, August 2005
418
Refers to the survey respondent‟s working life in the Forestry Department, which works out to be from
1980 to 2005 based on the longest (25 years) serving employees.
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map do these managers have as their guide? What goals are they
working towards?

Figure 4.11: Age Distribution of Respondents,
Years
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40-49
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As van de Walle reminds us, because state capacity is a sum of its
bureaus, it is this type of poor organizational power and “weak
administrative capabilities” that keep most African nations in a state of
permanent crisis.419 van de Walle further points out that “top
technocrats may be very competent and well trained, but ....with very
little data gathering, planning, and policy analysis capabilities”420 this
ultimately translates into poor performance.

419
420

Va de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 2001:55
Va de Walle, 2001:55
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The sudden implementation of PSRP and its implications are not
only felt in forestry but other bureaus have experienced similar
problems. As one government official from Cabinet Office explained, the
unplanned nature of PSRP not only reduced government‟s capacity to
function normally but it has been a costly undertaking.

“we were under so much pressure to cut down the civil service that
our only choice was to meet their deadline or risk having no capital
injection. …Sadly, the repercussions have been so bad, and I regret
to say contrary to reducing government expenditure, as these
reforms were supposed to do, government has not saved a penny
from staff retrenchments. Instead, this exercise has cost us way
beyond the projected savings from retrenchments.”

421

Drawing on one incidence from the Department of Agriculture the
official further explained how the loss of capacity in Department of
Agriculture (DoA), translated into an economic melt-down for the
farmers. As per instructions from the World Bank, government laid off all
classified daily employees (CDEs) and general workers. As a result, the
DoA had no “first responders” – workers that did the field inspections,
e.g. monitoring on-farm activities. In addition, the DoA had also laid off
the staff that dealt with phyto-sanitary certification of agricultural
products at ports of entry. Consequently, national borders became
porous, and people could bring in anything from anywhere. In the
421

Director, MDD – personal communication, August 2005.
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meantime, subsistence and small-scale farmers who are normally
dependent on government, especially for livestock services, had no one to
help them carry out preventive measures. Therefore, when the foot-andmouth disease broke out in Southern Province, which quickly spread to
other parts of the country, government had no capacity to response to
the problem because, as the government official explained:
“We had just let go of the people that would have prevented the
problem in the first place! We were in panic mode! In order to bring
the situation under control, we rehired the retrenched staff as
consultants, which meant paying them slightly more than their
previous government salaries. Then more chemicals were needed to
contain the disease. And since this had to be expedited shipping, it
cost much more than usual. …But worst of all the national cost
came from loss of livestock and business, both locally and
international. Domestic consumers stopped eating beef, while
countries that imported beef from Zambia also put a trade
embargo on Zambian beef. The situation was simply devastating to
livestock farmers and government too. For close to a year Zambia
did not export any beef!

…Put together all these costs were far

beyond the wage bill that was supposedly “saved” through
retrenchments! …government ended up incurring unnecessary
costs way beyond what should have been saved! .…To say the
least, this exercise just taught us another good lesson on the ugly
face of SAP, PSRP422 or whatever name people call it…”423

422

The actual exercise of government restructuring was implemented as a Public Service Reform Program
(PSRP); a condition under SAP.
423
Director, MDD – personal communication, August 2005.
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This official further explained that other departments have
encountered similar problems too and their costs have not even been
quantified yet.

For instance, the health sector was suffering from the

worst ever brain drain as medical doctors have left the public service for
greener pastures abroad, and this impact was having reverberations
across the nation. The only difference was that unlike in the agriculture
department where positions were eliminated, in the health sector the
positions are available, but no doctors to fill them. The out flow of nurses
to other countries is creating a similar problem. Contemplating over the
abolished positions for gauge-readers in the Department of Energy and
Water Development, the officer simply said, “we are keeping our fingers
crossed that we do not end up with another catastrophic situation on the
hydro-power stations. That would simply be disastrous!”424

While reform is good, sometimes it can be destructive. The SAP
certainly falls in this category, not only indirectly but also directly. For a
long time government employees had lived under the veil of fear not
knowing when their bureau would be restructured and whether or not
they would be retained. This job insecurity did a lot of harm. An insecure
worker is usually very unproductive too. Working under a management
style that does not give them an avenue to speak out has been overly
frustrating. Some of them confessed that they just report for work and

424

Courtesy of personal interviews – information provided on condition of anonymity, August 2005.
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hardly do anything. The current environment does not encourage crosspollination of ideas and a team spirit or accommodate dissenting views.
Instead, a culture of clientelism and cronyism425 has captured the
department and is slowly but surely establishing itself as new standard.
Those with no “connections” are at peril.

According to the survey findings, although „management meetings‟
are sometimes held, the Director wields such powers that there is no
collective decision making yet asks for collective responsibility from the
management team. In most cases, the director makes unilateral
decisions affecting the general workforce, often flouting the existing
regulations. At the time of this fieldwork there was an administrative
inquiry why some middle manager‟s positions had more than one office
holder beyond what the establishment provides for. Apparently, the
director had „swapped‟ some officers (demoted and appointed new ones)
for positions way beyond the jurisdictional powers of the director‟s office.
When new appointees demanded their pay raises commensurate
with their “promotions” Cabinet Office raised an issue wanting to know
who had promoted them since that fell under Cabinet Office‟s purview
and not the director! According to the regulations for those positions, the
director could only recommend a course of action and it is up to Cabinet
Office to accept or reject it.
425

For details on this issue see an exposition by Krisdankorn Klinkesorn, Clientelism and Instability: The
Case of the Thai Highway Police, (University of Missouri-St Louis), Ph.D. Dissertation, December 2004.
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Table 4.6: Summary of the Survey Coverage
No. of
Respondents

% of Total
Respondents

69
12

85
15

Senior
Middle
Junior

14
25
42

17
31
52

Age Group (years)
20-29
30-39
40-49
>50
Years of Service in FD

14
39
19
10

17
48
23
12

<5
5-15
16-25
>25

30
31
9
11

37
38
11
14

27
b
70
5
2
4

33
75
6
2
7

26
19
9
2
3
2
5
7
4
7

32
23
11
2
4
2
6
9
5
9

Gender
Male
Female
Management level

Current Location (FD Section)
Forest Management
Forest Extension
Forest Research
Forest Products Research
Other

a

a

Field of Specialization
Forest Management
Forest Extension
Forestry Research
GIS & Remote Sensing
Natural Resource Management
Agroforestry
Apiculture
Agric. Extension
Human Resource Management
Don’t know
a

Some people did not answer this question, hence the number is less than total
respondents.
b
Includes 7 people who indicated Beekeeping, which is no longer a separate unit.
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Personal relationships (and mainly the lack of it) between the
Director and other managers has clouded the department‟s performance.
Often good ideas have not been used because the working environment
does not permit it.
On the other hand, those in good standing with the director are
favored in training, performance evaluations and other fringe benefits.
This oppression of talent is manifesting itself in poor performance, but
also challenges the status quo that actually the department does not lack
the capacity to deliver; capacity is available but subdued. According to
the respondents, it is unlikely that the department can improve its
performance in its present form. It needs a major surgery to energize into
action the under-utilized technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited
transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in
new people and fresh ideas that would ultimately invigorate everyone
again.426

Administrative Practices and Inter-Agency Relations
Finally, there are also issues relating to the internal administrative
dynamics within the bureau itself, starting with the organizational
structure and extending to personnel relations and their involvement in

426

The Forestry Commission was supposed to have come into being in 1999. But the Forestry Director has
not authorized it by failure to prepare a one page Statutory Instrument to activate the law that would bring
the FC into being.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 213

the routine operations of the department.427 Of course the multidimensional character of the Forest Department‟s mandate creates
conflicts with various stakeholders who also may have jurisdictional
powers over some portions of the forests. For instance, forests as
habitats for wildlife and by extension their role in supporting eco-tourism
have always sustained a „sweet-sour‟ relationship between FD and the
Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), formerly the Wildlife Department, in
the sense that although FD has the overall mandate over the forest
resources across the nation, foresters cannot exercise this mandate in
the National Parks and Game Management Areas (GMAs) except by
invitation by ZAWA. Where some portions of the National Parks and
GMAs overlap with the FD‟s estates, still the FD cannot exercise its
mandate in those forests; wildlife conservation takes priority.
This jurisdictional overlap and separation puts the FD in a very
awkward position because FD is supposed to oversee activities related to
forest resource extraction from all forests in the country be it in
protected or open forests. Yet its authority is not absolute: it is restricted
in some ways. And of course when other [primary] land users‟ demands
for agriculture, human settlements, industrial development, etc. and the
wider social issues come into play, e.g. population growth (which induces
demand for more land) this complicates the department‟s job even
further. This is because for the most part such demands are directed at
427

Andrew D. Szilagyi and Marc J. Wallace, Organizational Behavior and Performance, (Scott, Foresman
and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4th Edition. Part 3 and 5.
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the department‟s estates. Hence, FD has to deal with these challenges as
they arise both administratively and politically. And this requires good
managerial skills.

Forest Management and Jurisdictional Boundaries
Although FD‟s mandate extends to all indigenous forests (protected
or open forests),428 excluding private property, in reality its real authority
and accountability only applies to the protected forest areas (PFAs) where
the department does the actual forest management activities and is
therefore directly accountable for what happens to these forests.

Protected forest areas (PFAs) serve different roles: for production or
protection purposes or as wildlife habitats. Production forests serve as
reservoirs of forest biodiversity for the present and future generations
and as a source of government revenue. Protection forests provide
protective roles such as protection of water catchment areas, act as
reservoirs for endangered animal and plant species, buffers to soil
erosion, etc. No extraction activities are allowed in protective forests. On
the other hand, National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas
(GMAs) exist as for wildlife conservation, which is the nation‟s backbone
for eco-tourism. No logging operations are allowed in these areas either.

428

The Forest Act of 1973
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The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), a quasi-government body created
in 1997, oversees the management of NPs and GMAs.
The department‟s accountability for the open forests, national
parks and game reserves is indirect because those areas fall under other
jurisdictions, namely the Chiefs and the Zambia Wildlife Authority
(ZAWA), respectively. The only accountability FD has over those areas is
only to ensure that any forest products extracted for commercial use (i.e.
any forest produce intended for sale) is licensed regardless of the source,
except for game hunting which is ZAWA‟s responsibility. In other words,
nothing goes to the market place without a license.
As might be expected, these jurisdictional arrangements have
created some problems, one of them being inter-agency rivalry. For
instance, because wildlife conservation is under another agency, FD has
no powers over these forests except by invitation from ZAWA. And where
the boundaries overlap between FD‟s estates and ZAWA‟s national parks
(Figure 1.1), the Wildlife Act supersedes the Forest Act (forest
conservation). In other words, ZAWA takes an upper hand over FD.
Hence, instead of collaborative work between FD and ZAWA inter-agency
rivalry has been common. Worse still, these battles become even more
pronounced at budget time where ZAWA tends to be favored against FD,
but the FD has always insisted that the its mandate is more important
because wildlife conservation (i.e. ZAWA‟s existence) depends on its work.
Without healthy forests (as wildlife habitats) there would be no wildlife.
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Functionally, the superiority of the Wildlife Act over the Forest Act
is meant to protect foresters from being at risk working in National
Parks. Also because tourism brings in more money than does forestry
(whose data capture leaves much to be desired), that gives ZAWA a hedge
over FD. But from an operational stand point FD has a point but because
its argument is framed as a contest, it has not found many serious
supporters. As Deborah Stone (1997) advises political battles are fought
with and over words. People read different things in someone‟s words.
“People fight with ideas as well as about them. The different sides
in a conflict create different portrayals of the battle – who is
affected, how they are affected, and what is at stake. Political fights
are conducted with money, with rules, with votes and with favors,
….but they are conducted above all with words and ideas.”429

Because policy formulation involves multiple players, how an issue
is framed and portrayed430 can either make it shine or be shunned.
Deborah further highlights the fact that policy debates are a contest
when she says,
“Every idea about policy draws boundaries. It tells what or who is
included or excluded in a category. These boundaries are more
than intellectual – they define people in and out of a conflict or
place them on different sides. In politics, the representation of
issues is strategically designed to attract support to one‟s side, to

429
430

Stone, The Policy Paradox,1997:34
See for instance, Rochefort and Cobb (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition, 1994
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forge some alliances and break others. Ideas and alliances are
intimately connected.”431

Thus, creating allies not enemies in the policy arena is a skill every
bureaucrat, assuming the role of a policy entrepreneur, should learn and
employ. Sadly, the current management team in FD is oblivious to these
realities.
At times there have been suggestions for a merger between FD and
ZAWA but these efforts have always fallen apart. My speculation is that
because ZAWA has better conditions of service and is well funded, it
wants to keep its turf. On the other hand keeping the status quo also
helps the central government to keep its expenditure low; a merger would
mean “upgrading” the conditions for FD employees too! Besides, even the
politicians that oversee these entities also want to keep their jobs – a
merger would send one of them off the rail.
The point I‟m trying to make is that a merger between FD and
ZAWA would definitely be good: it would bring synergy and enhance
positive interdependence between the two agencies that are doing the
same business: biodiversity conservation. Since FD would benefit more
from this merger (by improved conditions of service and annual
allocations) the department should refrain from complaining and casting
its work as being superior over ZAWA to adopting a conciliatory position;
one that promotes cooperation rather that competition because the
431

Stone, 1997:34
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cooperation creates alliances and alliances are more enduring.432 And
this is important because how an issue is framed can either deepen or
solve a conflict.433 For this reason, it would be prudent for FD to reframe
its concerns as one in which FD is advocating for pulling the expertise
under one house. Otherwise, maintaining the current posture will only
deepen the social conflict between FD and ZAWA, although inter-agency
rivalry is still possible even under one roof. The only difference is it will
be easier to reach some common ground when operating under one
jurisdiction. As some scholars have pointed out, words and language do
matter and they matter most in the polis where different interpretations
get assigned to them.434
Because the Forestry Department is only directly responsible for its
estates

and

indirectly

for

all

other

areas,

this

raises

several

complications. One is that the department is not held accountable to
what happens in the open forests and GMAs where the Chiefs and ZAWA
have

jurisdictional

mandate,

respectively.

Yet,

because

forest

management is known to be a Forest Department‟s outfit, whenever any
forest is in bad shape, FD gets the blame not the other entities. And this
has contributed to the department‟s poor image where again the

432

Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (WW Norton & Company: New
York), 1997:26
433
David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, “ Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective”, in Rochefort
and Cobb (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition (University Press of Kansas), 1994:5
434
Rochefort and Cobb, 1994:5, 8-9; Stone, Policy Paradox, 1997
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department has not done a good job educating the public on the
limitations of its coverage and powers.
For example, under the Forest Act No. 39 of 1973, local
communities are exempted from paying for forest products harvested
from open forests that are intended for home use (subsistence
consumption). As can be expected, this is another area where the ground
is extremely slippery because the FD is basically at the mercy if its
clients: it relies on their integrity and sincerity.
These user rights bring various complications. First, it is not easy
to know if the product came from an open forest or a PFA. Second,
monitoring that forest products collected for home use are not used for
profit-making is a tall order; a challenge FD has faced over its lifetime.
People who know this legal provision have [ab]used it only to evade
paying but the product has in most cases ended up on the markets. As a
former employee of the FD under the Forest Extension Division, what
this researcher observed was that people would collect the product in
relatively small quantities that would pass for home consumption and
stockpile them until sufficient quantities have accumulated. Thereafter,
an individual would either go to FD offices to get a conveyor‟s license,
which permits them to sell the products or the product could be sold to a
middle person who has to get the license to resale the products. Either
way, there is loss of revenues at the first level.
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From a management point of view, the exemption for subsistence
consumption has been one of the largest loopholes on access to
indigenous forests. It is not easy to distinguish between what is being
collected for sale or for home use, other than relying on the individual‟s
integrity. In an era where everyone wants to maximize profits, any
loophole is exploited to its limits and this is one of them. For a
department so low on field staff, and whose operations are geared
towards policing its estates, it has increasingly become a tall order to
police and monitor resource users taking advantage of this legal
provision, in addition to any other activities. Tie this to high
unemployment rates, which have pushed more people to rely on the
forests, the result is that forests have become more or less a free
resource,

but

more

importantly

the

extraction

for

subsistence

consumption must have increased and therefore is a factor worth looking
at in relation to forest degradation.

International Treaties and Conventions – Multiple Players
So far this discussion has been confined to the local arena. But in
the larger scheme of things international treaties need a special mention
as they bring a different set of conditions and obligations. Although it is
not mandatory to sign onto these treaties countries get compelled to
belong to some groups because this makes it easier to be “heard” in the
international area. As a member to some of the treaties on forestry or
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biodiversity conservation in general, the Zambian government is under
obligation to uphold the prescriptions under those treaties.
Not only does membership to these conventions bring multiple
obligations but this also opens a country up to multiple players. Locally
this further complicates the multi-layered jurisdictional powers too. For
instance, although FD is the sole manager of Zambia‟s forest resources,
there are also various government institutions whose mandates impact
forest management.435 Each of these entities has its interests, and
jurisdictional boundaries to protect and, most importantly, an agenda to
pursue. To put it mildly, since FD‟s mandate overlaps over all the areas
that these other agencies deal with, it requires that the department
works collaboratively with these entities. But creating operational
harmony not only at home (national) but also at international levels
where each of these agencies have different conventions and treaties they
have signed on is not an easy endeavor. Sometimes inter-agency conflict
arises, as pointed out earlier.
In the same vein lack of specification of responsibility has
sometimes led to intra-agency rivalry. After the civil service reforms, a
new outfit has been the creation of planning departments in all
ministries to coordinate all planning activities and provide policy advice
435

These include the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) – a regulatory body on the environment; the
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) – in charge of wildlife conservation; and National Heritage
Conservation Commission (NHCC) – which is responsible for preservation of monuments and sites of
historical importance; and colleges that provide the necessary human resource e.g. the Zambia Forest
College (ZFC), and the Copperbelt University School of Natural Resources- both of which produce
graduates in forestry. In addition, various nongovernmental organizations are also involved. For further
information, refer to MENR, National Environmental Action Programme (NEAP), 1994.
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for informed decision-making. In the case of the Ministry of Environment
where the FD belongs the Planning and Information Department, under
the MTENR, has assumed this role as a policy coordinator. However,
because FD still wants to maintain some level of independence, tensions
between the two departments over who should do what are fairly
common. Sometimes these battles are over the boundaries of power while
others are on policy strategies to deal with certain problems. And this
takes us into statutory arena.

Multiple Regression Analysis
Up until now we have relied on observing the direction of change in
the forest estates and the two measures of institutional capacity (Figure
4.4), and based on these trends we have been able to make certain
inferences. However, as noted earlier, these trends cannot tell the actual
causal relationships or specific impacts arising from each of these
sources of capacity. Establishing the direction of change is a good thing
but getting to know the degree of influence that the independent
variables are exerting on the dependent variable is even better. Knowing
the degree of impact from each of these factors is very important because
that could be extremely useful in devising appropriate interventions to
solve the problem. Therefore, until we know the degree of impact arising
from each of these factors: that is, how they are contribution to the
current problem, it would be premature to draw any final conclusion(s)
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from these observations. To do this I now turn to the issue of causal
effect, namely, how are the two sources of capacity contributing to forest
degradation? And which one of these has a larger impact?
As discussed earlier (especially in Chapter 3), the department‟s
capacity is primarily being assessed in terms of its human capital and
financial outlays. Human capital has been broken down to three
categories (professional, technical and field staff) while the financial
status is divided into two - operational and capital outlays. Together this
gives us five independent variables for our model, which are then
subjected to a time series multiple regression analysis to further
understand their interactions.
The regression analysis reveals some interesting results; some
obvious others not quite so intuitive. Out of the five predictors, only two
are statistically significant – professional and technical staff – the two
groups where senior and middle managers are drawn from (Table 4.5).
This result runs counter to official statements that have culminated into
a long-held conviction that forest degradation is primarily a problem
caused by insufficient funding and inadequate field staff to work the
ground. Given the results just obtained, the question then is: why are
financial resources and field staff not as important as traditional wisdom
has portrayed them to be? How do we explain the fact that, in fact,
managerial capacity is actually the problem?
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According to this model, financial resources have no effect on the
dependent variable. Instead, managerial capacity turns out to be the
culprit. This is a very interesting revelation in the sense that for a long
time the department has argued and continues to point to poor funding
as insufficient field staff as its biggest obstacles hindering effective
execution of its programs and by extension contributes to forest loss and
degradation.

Table 4.7: Impact of IC predictors on Protected Forest Estates.
Protected Forest Areas
Predictors

Coefficient
[se]
(t-Score)
-.0001
[.0001]
(-1.01)
-.0000
[.0001]
(-0.27)
.0440
[.0111]
(3.97)*
-0043
[.0007]
(-6.07)*
.0002
[.0001]
(1.48)
6.19
[.4315]
(14.34)

Operational Outlays

Capital Outlays

Professional Staff

Technical Staff

Field Staff

Constant

2

R
Adj R-squared
Prob > F
No. of Observations

* Significant at 95% confidence interval

0.67
0.61
0.0000
36
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This study has generated some interesting findings that clearly
render FD‟s argument open for debate. But considering the modeling
limitations of this study, it is recommended that these findings be taken
as preliminary pointers to be verified through a more sophisticated
quantitative analysis.
The t-scores for the annual outlays and field staff are not
statistically significant and neither are their coefficients. In other words,
field staff and the level of funding to the department are not the biggest
problems causing forest degradation. Rather forest managers are,
represented by the professional and technical groups where senior and
middle managers are appointed from, respectively.
From an administrative and management point of view this should
not come as a surprise in the sense that managers set the tone and
expected standards on what is achievable. Since managers are in charge
of planning, organizing, directing and coordinating the functions of their
respective sections means that they have a huge influence on what can
and cannot be achieved. In this context, this finding simply validates the
theories on good management practices.436 Therefore, rather than
putting the blame on field staff we can agree that forest degradation
arises from ineffective managerial capacity. In particular, senior forest
managers have not provided the necessary guidance both to the middle

436

See for instance, Gortner, Administration in the Public Sector (1977); Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization, (1947); Herbert Simon, et. al., Public Administration, (1950); Herbert Simon,
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organizations, (1957b).
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managers and the field staff. As this study has also confirmed people in
the lower ranks are completely ignorant about what they are supposed to
do and teamwork is certainly lacking.
Managers at all levels responded that they do not participate in
any form of planning (51%), an activity that is supposed to bring them
together to chart the way forward at least annually. Also over half of the
managers acknowledged that they do not know if the department has
any strategic plans (58%) and goals (51%) to work towards. When asked
differently if at least they knew what their role was in working towards
those strategic goals, again the majority (46%) were only aware
sometimes, 22% had completely no idea and only 32% said they always
knew what their role was (Table 5.8).
This above revelation certainly does not reflect a good management
style, and neither does it convey a sense of managerial competence.
Leadership matters, but none of what is happening is anywhere near to
indicate this.437 Managers ought to translate their formal authority into
effective influence by providing the necessary guidance down the lower
ranks. The management style in use suggests this might no be possible
to do: there is hardly any planning is taking place, and when it is done
the majority of the managers are not involved in the planning process. As
a result they do not have even the most basic tool – a work plan – to
guide their annual activities.
437

Lawrence E. Lynn Jr., Public Management as Art, Science and Profession, (Chatham House Publishers,
Inc.: NJ), 1996:69-88
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Table 4.8: Management Practices – Responses from the Field.
Question

Does the Forestry Department have a strategic plan?
Does the FD set strategic goals?
Do you know the department‟s strategic goals?
Are you aware of your role in achieving the department‟s
strategic goals?

Does the department have Annual Work Plans?

Are you involved in developing FD‟s Work Plans?

Does the department evaluate its performance?

Are you involved in evaluating the department‟s
performance?

Response

% of
Total

Yes

42

No

58

Yes

62

No

36

Yes

44

No

56

Always

32

Sometimes

46

Never

22

Yes

51

No

6

Don’t know

43

Always

13

Sometimes

36

Never

51

Yes

43

No

26

Don’t know

31

Always

10

Sometimes

19

Never

72

For instance, almost half of the managers do not have work plans.
51% of them acknowledged that the department has work plans while
the other half (49%) do not know. If the majority of managers, who are
supposed to provide guidance on government policy implementation, do
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not know what they are supposed to work towards how can anyone
expect the junior staff to work out miracles in the field?
What can be expected is exactly what is taking place right now:
lawlessness and institutional breakdown. Therefore, it is not surprising
to see what is happening to the forests. In the absence of managerial
competence and guidance it is unrealistic to hold junior staff responsible
for the poor performance.
In this case, senior and middle managers are an important layer of
capacity and should therefore be strengthened. Their impact on the
forest estates has been found to be statistically significant. For instance,
an increase by one professional staffer would increase the forest estates
by 0.044 ha. Likewise a reduction in technical staff would result in losing
0.0043 ha. What this means is that although all the positions are filled,
as per current structure, these managers are not enough or are lacking
in managerial skills to effectively supervise the lower levels. As a result,
their presence and influence in the wider community is lacking. With
such a lean structure one way these managers could strengthen the
department‟s capacity is to establish partnerships with the local
communities to help with forest management, as was the arrangement
before. The absence of these partnerships might explain why forests have
become free for all.
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While this analysis has helped to isolate managerial capacity as a
problem, the model only explains 61.07% of variation, suggesting that
there are other factors at play that needs to be looked at. These internal
factors (human and financial resources) do not tell the whole story. For
this reason, the external environment, which may include but is not
limited to land tenure and ownership arrangements, political economy
dimensions, the legal environment, and of course the political aspects,
may provide an answer. I return to these issues later. For now let us look
at the problem of additive effects.
Considering that changes that occur in one year could potentially
have cumulative effects in another year or years after, an autocorrelation
test was performed to check for this problem. The results indicate no
sign of autocorrelation; there is no distinct pattern of either increase or
decrease (Figure 4.12).
Another test, a regression on error, also ruled out this problem.
The model confirmed that the relationship between error this year (e) and
error from last year (elag) is not significant. The p=0.078 is higher than
the 0.05 threshold and t =1.82 is also less than 2.
In terms of correlation between the independent variables and their
effect on the dependent variable, a multi-collinearity model also predicted
that there is no problem. All values turned out to be less than 4, the
threshold level (Table 5.9).

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 230

-1.5

-1

-.5

Residuals

0

.5

Figure 4.12: Annual Cumulative Effects.
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Table 4.9: Multi-Collinearity Test
Variable
Capital Funds1/
Field Officers
Annual Operational Outlays
Professional Staff
Technical Staff
Mean VIF
1/

VIF
1.41
1.41
1.40
1.25
1.17
1.33

1/VIF
0.707109
0.710547
0.712492
0.799798
0.852542

May or may not be released annually.

These are all very interesting results because intuitively one would
expect to find the presence of autocorrelation among independent
variables, which in this case are assumed to depend on each other to
achieve a common goal. But these results indicate the opposite. In a way
this confirms earlier observations from the regression analysis that each
of these variables has the potential to contribute to forest degradation
with or without any interference from other factors. From a policy
interventionist point of view, this is good because it makes it possible
and easier to deal with one aspect at a time and see if that intervention
yields the desired goals.
Although these results flout the entrenched beliefs in FD that hold
field staff as a group directly responsible for program implementation, or
at least have a stronger influence on what happens in the field than their
superiors, it is reasonable to appreciate this line of reasoning because
strictly speaking these are the officers who do the actual policy
implementation, which by implication also means their degree of
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involvement dictates program success or failure. In this context, their
failure to prevent any activities that lead to forest degradation, (even as
unexpected outcome), naturally speaks to their inability to do their job –
whether this is due to inadequate numbers or a question of technical and
other skills.
However, what this traditional reasoning overlooks is the fact that
field officers are as [in]effective as their superiors are. Their performance
depends on and reflects the managerial guidance (instructions and other
forms of support) they receive from their supervisors. And this is where
blame shifts from them to their superiors. It is the managers who develop
the plans of action, source funding and other resources, including
appointment of staff for various activities. In other words, managers
dictate what is to be done, when, why and by whom.
Therefore, it makes sense that forest degradation is a problem tied
to senior and middle managers because in reality this is the first layer of
human capacity. Not only do these managers interpret and break down
government policy into achievable objectives (or at least are supposed
to!), they actually set the [strategic] agenda and are responsible for how
other resources are organized and utilized to achieve those policy goals.
Therefore, when managerial capacity is weak or lacking, as this case
study seems to suggest, it is not unusual to experience performance
problems, the kind this analysis has just identified. In terms of policy
intervention, what this means is that increasing the number of field staff
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and the level of funding will not necessarily solve the problems FD is
facing until the managerial problem is addressed.
These results raise a very interesting observation and an important
lesson, one that the international development community may wish to
pay close attention to. In general, when the development community
talks about capacity building in most cases that means having to provide
some form of training to improve the technical skills of the target group.
To many people, capacity building has become synonymous to technical
training. Yet, as this case study has demonstrated, technical skills may
not always be the problem. For instance, all the forest officers in
managerial positions have more than the minimum professional
qualifications needed to be appointed to those positions, an indication
that in this case technical knowledge on forest management is not the
problem. What is lacking are managerial skills, which are quite different
from the technical knowledge in forestry.
As a lesson, what this means is that increasing the number of field
staff (i.e. taking FD‟s argument at its face value) or for that matter
sending these forestry managers for further training to increase their
technical skills in forestry would be a waste of such resources. Such
interventions would not solve the problem at hand as it would be
addressing the wrong place altogether. As this study has shown start
with assessment of existing capacities to find out where the problem
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resides before any intervention on capacity building is recommended and
implemented.
The other weakness FD suffers from is lack of visionary leadership
and a head of department that is simply politically disconnected. As a
management team, senior forest managers have lamentably failed to
keep reinventing and reinvigorating the department so it can respond to
the changing circumstances and capture the opportunities that have
come with such changes. This is an area previous managers were really
good at. Not only did they connect the department to the President‟s
office, but they also were highly creative in designing programs that
appealed to the public at different levels which encouraged their
participation in forestry activities. These included but not limited to
educational, civic and social clubs, radio and TV programs, corporate
promotional programs, etc. The most famous were the radio, TV and
corporate promotional programs438 where people were enticed to
participate because there was always something to be won. But also
some of these programs conveyed the information about forestry in a
comical way. So they offered a lot of fun.
The other issue relates to the global dimensions about forest
conservation. The fact that Zambia is a signatory to so many
international

438

conventions

and

treaties

dealing

with

biodiversity

One such popular programs was the Forestry “Kambeba” Radio program that aired every Saturday
morning, strategically placed at a time slot when most people were not in hurry compared to the typical
Monday through Friday routines.
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conservation, a genuine response to global interest and demands for
forest conservation and environmental management, gives FD unlimited
opportunities to still craft and maintain a reasonable, if not, respectable
prominence

in

the

national

policy

arena.

The

growth

of

the

environmental movement, starting with the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on Human Environment to the Earth Summit through to the present UN
millennium goals targets are all open avenues through which FD can and
should

use

to

market

itself

to

attract

government

attention.

Government‟s commitment to embrace international obligations on
themes such as sustainable development, forest conservation, integrated
natural resource management, biodiversity conservation or climate
change, areas where FD has no major rival, are open doors that FD can
and should exploit. Yet, all these openings or opportunities remain
untapped.
The point being made here is that organizations are like living
organisms, they perform well when they are kept dynamic e.g. by change
of mission, or constant injection of new ideas and doing things
differently.439 Although their (Donald Kettle and others, 1996) focus is
the American Federal government, their menu for building “a government
that works” is quite applicable to other organizations too.440 The Director
of Forestry has yet to learn how to play this game and win. Being
439

See, Donald Kettle, Patricia Ingraham, et.al., Civil Service Reform: Making Government that Works
(Brookings Institution Press), 1996; Patricia Ingraham, Government Performance: Why Management
Matters (Johns Hopkins Press), 2003:15
440
Kettl, et. al., 1996:4
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politically savvy will definitely be a required virtue. Fortunately, one can
easily learn from what previous heads of the department did to keep he
department securely connected to the political power house, right in the
President‟s office.441 Not only did FD manage to have the Republican
President officiate at most of these annual events, as in 1988 when the
President Kaunda was again the Guest of Honor for the National Tree
Planting Day (December 15th),442 but they were also able to tap into the
authority of his office to involve the general public as well as the
corporate community. To illustrate this point I‟m tempted to lift a lengthy
text.
“In response to the concern by H.E. the President at the rate of
deforestation, the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister issued instructions to
ZIMCO and two other Ministries to carry out the following:
a) ZIMCO to plant the same number as there were people in
Zambia. During the year alone ZIMCO was expected to plant 2.4
million trees.
b) Ministries of Higher Education and General Education and
Culture, to ensure that in future each child planted a tree.
Within the same year, H.E. the President issued another directive
that the Copperbelt Province should plant at least two million trees
during the year.”443

441

Check out FD Annual Reports for 1965 to 1988. In particular, refer to FD Annual Report for 1988 to
see how close the President‟s Office was to FD.
442
FD, Annual Report for 1988, p.1
443
FD Annual Report for 1988, p.22
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Because of the enormous amount of work and cost involved in
raising such a large quantity of seedlings the department used the
political machinery to involve all sections of society. In addition, the
program was adjusted as follows:

a) “Each Primary and Secondary School to plant at least one
hundred trees each
b) Each institution of Higher Learning to plant at least five
hundred trees each.
c) ZIMCO to provide K50,000 for fuelwood plantation at Kamaila
and a further K50,000 for distribution of seedlings to planting
sites throughout the country.”444

Clearly, these efforts demonstrate not only the creativity but more
importantly how politically savvy previous forest managers were. Against
the backdrop of a modest budget, the department was able to tap into
the parastatal coffers to implement programs it would have not been able
to execute. Working around government‟s rigid rules, these managers
were able to create their own “flexibility” in doing government work. They
valued

“performance”

over

“compliance”.445

444
445

FD Annual Report for 1988, p.23
Kettl e.t.al. Civil Service Reform, 1996:23

“protection”

and

“adaptation”

over
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Conclusion
Throughout this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that while
FD‟s long held belief that insufficient field staff and poor funding have
been two of its biggest obstacles to effective forest management may have
some threads of truth, the real problem lies with managerial capacity
and not the general work force. I have demonstrated that the department
operated quite effectively on a lean structure and modest budget mainly
because its managers recognized the strength of the social capital that
existed outside the FD. For as long as the department was collaborating
with the larger society, especially the Chiefs and politicians, its strength
was secured. When these relations were broken so did the department‟s
strength, it simply evaporated. What lessons does this bring to the table?
First is that, no organization operates in a vacuum. The strength of
any organization also lies in the network of its collaborators, clients, etc.
Second, when assessing an organization‟s performance be weary to run
to conclusions before doing an in depth assessment of its institutional
capacity. It is quite possible to arrive at wrong conclusions as FD
managers did in this case study. Trends (as in the direction of change of
some parameters) may not tell the whole story. It is important to
establish the degree of impact each variable has on the dependent
variable. This would help in targeting the intervention appropriately.
Third, considering that FD does not own the land set aside as PFAs but
only assumes a “care taker‟s” role, alienating the Chiefs (and their
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subjects) from being part of the management team, and acting as if the
department the absolute owner is among some of the worst blunders
forest managers committed over the years. The department needs the
blessings of the property owner to succeed in whatever it intends to do. It
is ironic to see the state (represented by FD) wanting to assume and
maintain absolute in an era when all roads are headed towards
democratization – the idea of decentralization and the devolution of
power to the people. While government is usually in a privileged position
to exercise its authority and power over its territory, it is unrealistic to
ignore the fact that government legitimacy and good governance are only
possible when people are involved and feel part of a system.
And finally, the disconnection from the political power house
cannot be over-emphasized. Administration and governance, defined here
as the “general exercise of authority,”446 go hand in hand. And because
politics shapes public policy, maintaining close relations to the policy
makers and, in this case, recognizing the local Chiefs‟ role in all this
should come as a natural response to forest managers. In the larger
context, there are also “global and local arrangements, formal structures,
informal norms and practices and spontaneous and intentional systems
of control” that impact public administration and need to be equally
recognized.447 Thus, when these political dimensions are overlooked,

446

Patricia Ingraham and Laurence E. Lynn (eds.), The Art of Governance: Analyzing Management and
Administration (Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C.), 2004:4
447
Ingraham and Lynn (eds.), The Art of Governance, 2004:4
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“ownership” by citizens and “control” by government bureaucrats will
always become sources of controversy. The solution to all is obvious – let
the people in.
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Chapter 5
Forest Management Issues in Zambia

External Factors
Up

until

this

point

our

discussion

has

concentrated

on

understanding the internal aspects of institutional capacity and how
these have contributed to forest degradation. In this chapter it is
appropriate that we turn our attention to the larger environment to see
how external factors may have contributed to forest degradation i.e. their
possible corresponding impact on forest degradation in conjunction with
or independent of the internal capacity dimensions.
Recall that the regression analysis explained only 67% of the
variation, suggesting that there are other factors contributing to forest
loss. These factors have been identified as relating to the political
economy,

population

growth,

policy

reforms,

land

tenure

and

jurisdictional boundaries, and political expedience. These issues were
indirectly referred to (and sometimes briefly discussed) in the foregoing
chapters. However, for purposes of clarity, they deserve further treatment
and this is what this Chapter tries to do.
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Political Economy dynamics
Zambia‟s over-dependence on copper as its main export commodity
has been its largest weakness, but in forestry terms this can be
construed as having been FD‟s biggest strength in the sense that forestry
gained its prominence on the national agenda mostly because of its
connection to the copper mines as a source of wood for energy and
construction works. Because of this marriage between the copper
economy and forestry it was impossible to ignore forestry. Thus, forestry
was perceived as a twin pillar in the national economy.
Copper

dependence

(which

accounts

for

90%

of

national

earnings)448 is a weakness because any price change in copper or the
production quotas has always sent Zambia‟s economy crawling on its
knees, with unprecedented ripple effects in all other sectors that depend
on copper revenues for their existence. Copper being the largest national
income source, it is not an overstatement to say that support to forestry
programs suffered partly due to a decline in revenues from copper and
partly because of Zambia‟s involvement in the political liberation
movement in the region, a political campaign that deviated local
resources to regional obligations. These developments, which by the way
coincided with (or some would say), accelerated Zambia‟s entry into a
structural adjustment program, became a source of weakness locally by

448

CSO, Zambia in Figures, 2000; Living Conditions, 2004
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reducing financial support to the national programs vis-à-vis, forestry.
How did this play out?
When copper prices plunged on the world market in early to mid
1970s, which incidentally coincided with the oil crisis, government
revenues followed in tandem. This meant a reduced national income
(revenues) to be shared among the different agencies. With a country in a
state of emergency (politically and militarily), naturally priority was given
to national security; the idea that the government should be ready and
able to contain any attack from the neighboring regimes that were in a
state of conflict with respective liberation movements that were
demanding and fighting for political freedom for their people. Because
Zambia hosted some of these freedom fighters, there was no room for
pretense that the country could not be attacked. As matter of fact
Zambia was hit several times by South Africa and Zimbabwe to force it to
withdraw its support to the freedom fighters from these nations. But
Zambia never did. Instead, the government even decided to introduce a
20 months mandatory military training for Grade 12 school leavers,
called the National Service Military and Agricultural Training program.
Trainees from National Service were anticipated to act as a buffer to the
regular army. While the program was meant to enhance national
security, it certainly drew some resources away from other sectors such
as forestry.
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In response to the dwindling copper revenues, government was
forced to look at alternative means to cushion the short fall, that is, the
development of forestry, agriculture and tourism industries as part of a
broad policy on “product diversification” away from copper dependence
and “export oriented growth.”449 Important as this policy was, and even
though the Zambian government went almost immediately into full gear
to promote this alternative policy, I would say this realization came
rather a little too late. At this time government revenues to support this
policy initiative were clearly lacking. As a result, this policy did not fully
take off. What one sees are bandage interventions that only deepened
dependence on donor funds.
As one retired forestry official explained, government support to
forestry started to decline from early 1980s.

But by the end of that

decade the situation had become so bad the department was basically
sustained by donor funds. Donor support accounted for almost 50% of
the budget.450 These budgetary constrained also compelled government to
cancel employing part-time and seasonal forestry workers. And since
most of these workers were employed from the local communities, this
development blew off the only jobs available to these people. Add this to
the idea that over the years FD had systematically moved from
community involvement to forest policing, mostly relying on the part-time
449

GRZ, New Economic Recovery Programme – Fourth National Development Plan1989-1993. Vol. I and
II, Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP), 1989:9-10; Economic Report – 1977 to 2000, Lusaka
450
Aaron Sugar Banda, Retired Deputy CCF (former Chief Forest Extension Officer), personal
communication, 2007. See also Appendix 4 and 5.
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local employees, the abolition of such positions created a huge vacuum.
Worse still there was a deep sense of resentment in those communities
who felt let down by their government. And this crack has never been
mended to date.
And of course the department has not been insulated from political
decisions that government made at national level. As is evident that
politicians, in any government, play a significant role in charting the
direction of the nation whether this is in advanced democracies
(capitalists like the USA, UK Japan or Germany and others) or emerging
ones. Zambia‟s participation in the liberation struggle in the southern
African region definitely came with a human, infrastructure and financial
cost. Of particular concern here is the financial drain. Funding that was
meant for domestic use was used to counter unfriendly regimes and
support the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa and Zimbabwe. Like many other national programs at that
moment, most forestry activities suffered too. In addition to this, the
adherence to the IMF conditions that Zambia should pay 5% of its GDP
for external debt meant that little money was left for internal programs.
Although the department was highly successful with other
programs

(e.g.

in

research,

forest

extension

and

the

industrial

plantations project) the „divorce‟ between forestry and copper mining
brought new challenges on board. When forestry lost its privileged
position on the national political grid, this meant less political attention
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than was accorded earlier when the agency (or the sector as a whole) was
perceived as holding the national economy. Following the decline in
revenues and coupled with increased demand on its estates due to
population growth, suddenly the department could not cope with the new
reality. I return to the population issue later. For now let‟s look at the
policy choices and their effects.

Policy Reforms
In my introductory remarks to this Chapter, I alluded to the fact
forestry was once a high profile sector because the forest managers at the
time were politically savvy. Not only did they develop and maintain close
ties with the upper echelon of the political power house, but they were
also able to convince the policy makers on the importance of forestry in
the national economy, in particular its relationship with the copper
industry as a source of wood energy. In addition, forestry was also
portrayed

as

a

very

important

partner

in

the

manufacturing,

construction, communication, and transportation industries, and of
course not forgetting its strategic position as a common man‟s safety net
from the cradle to the grave! In short, forest managers of the day
marketed forestry to the politicians in such a way that whichever angle of
the economy those policy makers looked at, they saw forestry as a twin
pillar in the industrial development process of the nation. This made the
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politicians to appreciate the department‟s role and supported its
programs accordingly.
I have also alluded to some of the policy choices that the Zambian
government embraced over different time slots, two of which have special
relevance to this study are Zambia‟s involvement (as a frontline state) in
the liberation movements of the Southern African region. The other and
most dominant economic policy choice, which has ran its course for over
three decades since 1980s has been the structural adjustment program
(SAP). As mentioned earlier, for all the good intentions that SAP
envisioned to deliver, the program delivered none. Instead, the program
created mayhem, directly but mostly indirectly for the forestry sector.
The first and possibly the biggest blow to FD came when the
copper mines switched from wood energy to electricity451 and coal. When
this happened, somehow forestry lost its economic recognition and
became just another sector. However, despite this change timber is still
widely used for support work in all the mines.452 Therefore, forestry is
just as important as it has always been. In fact, its role in the other
sectors has remained the same. Unfortunately, subsequent heads of the
department have not been able continue highlighting these connections
and to restore the department‟s image and prominence to earlier times.

451

They switched to electricity because it was cheaper and more reliable. At that time Zambia had surplus
electric power. The scenario has changed now. Since the Fall of 2007, Zambia is experiencing a short of
electric power such that load shading has become a common practice. Priority is given to the industries,
copper mines being among the privileged group.
452
Dennis Musaba, Geologist for Kalulushi & Chibuluma Copper Mines, personal communication 2007
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The question is why? Various challenges have played a role but most, if
not all, of them loop back to lack of managerial capacity and creativity.
First, the policy reforms induced by the structural adjustment
program (SAP) had a disastrous impact on the forest resources in the
sense that SAP introduced and accelerated a reduction in government
structure and its changes spending behavior. These reductions in the
department‟s labor force and financial support ultimately affected its
operational capacity too. I discuss these issues in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the decay in the cordial relationships
that previously existed between FD and the Chiefs (and by extension
their subjects) ultimate eroded FD‟s strength in regard to forest
management. Unfortunately, FD has done little to rectify the situation.
Since mid-1990s FD has seriously contemplated the introduction of
community-based joint forest management (JFM),453 a concept that
encourages local community involvement in forest management, as part
of a larger strategy aimed at devolution of power to the local
communities.

However,

because

government

had

systematically

dismantled and destroyed the local structures through which these
communities organized themselves to manage their forests, the JFM
concept has not generated much enthusiasm. The proposal to implement
JFM has been on paper since 2000 and the department has not prepared
a Statutory Instrument to give the JFM concept a legal backing.

453

See: National Forestry Policy of 1998:15
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As Lynch and Alcorn (1994) point out, this Zambian scenario
clearly confirms their argument that historically states have been known
to alienate local communities from the decision making table. States
ignore customary property rights and “assume the rights over the forests,
particularly for revenue generation,” including the right to decide who
can and when to harvest the resource, payment of loyalties, and rights to
all non-timber products.454 These tendencies do not help in building
healthy relations between government agencies and the communities. As
a result, communities may take the law in their own hands, as the
Zambian case illustrates on forest encroachment.
While the motive for JFM looks genuine on the surface the
problems underneath are quite mammoth. First, JFM suffers from lack of
a legal backing and therefore it is hard to envision how it is going to
operate, let alone motivate the public to embrace it. Second, this strategy
resembles a cut and run initiative as government only intends to give
technical support and leave the communities to do the rest. There is a
feeling that it is unrealistic to expect the communities to manage their
forests without giving them a „proper‟ head start.
These concerns are real and cut across nations and continents.
Community-based forest resource management has been tried in various

454
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countries with varying degrees of success and failure.455 This is because
“public land or other public resources belong to no one in particular but
to everyone in general.” And this “ambiguous official status acts as a
magnet that pulls” various resource users – charcoal burners, loggers,
landless farmers, etc. – on-to public forest lands.456 Hence, to participate
in community-based conservation initiatives, communities want to be
assured of security of tenure, access, and ownership rights; benefit
sharing; and the existence of legal recourse mechanisms.457 None of these
conditions have been provided yet in the Zambian case.
The proposed JFM is unlikely to be a solution in and by itself.
Much more needs to be done before FD can wash its hands on forest
management. Without a legal backing JFM is non-functional.458 Possibly
when the long-awaited Forestry Commission is formed it may push for
revision of forest law and policy.
One strategy (within the SAP ambit) that deserves special mention
here is the product diversification policy I mentioned earlier which
encouraged more private investors to enter into forestry. Under this
policy forestry equipment, which qualified under the agricultural
grouping, was exempt from import tax and customs duty. This
exemption, coupled with the increase in demand for indigenous timber in

455
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South Africa and some Asian countries, attracted more companies to
engage in forest business. Thus, natural forests became a center of
activity. But instead of being a positive development, unfortunately this
turned on its heels, and became a run away train. Due to inadequate
capacity of the FD to monitor that influx of saw-millers, the forests
simply became a target of over-exploitation, requiring more and better
management strategies and skills. In the absence of forestry personnel to
monitor all these activities, FD has continued to rely on the integrity of
its clients.
As

with

the

abolition

of

part-time

and

seasonal

workers

employment, again local communities found themselves on losing side.
Due to absence of supporting infrastructure (electric power, good roads,
and communication facilities) near the forests, commercial saw millers
set up their plants in urban areas and subcontracted their operations to
several pit sawyers who produced timber cants, which were later
reprocessed at mills in town. For those engaged in processing indigenous
timber, 63.7% are pit-sawyers and only 36% are commercial sawmills.459
Pit-sawyers typically belong to the cottage industry, and employ no more
than five people. The point I‟m trying to make is that these arrangements
in which commercial millers are in town and pit-sawyers are in the rural
areas completely defeats government‟s intentions of wanting to create
jobs in the rural areas because bigger plants employ more people. Also
459

Makano Rosemary, The Effect of Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia,
(MA. Thesis, University of Missouri-St. Louis), 2001:31
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one can‟t even start to compare job conditions and benefits between the
two! Commercial sawmills will certainly offer more decent conditions.
Notice here that nowhere in its official statements / complaints has FD
ever raised the absence of infrastructure to support commercial activities
in rural areas as a constraint to the development of forest industries. Yet,
this is an issue that urgently requires government‟s attention if the
sector is to become a viable source of employment in the rural areas and
possibly beyond. If this is not a sign of managerial incompetence, then
what else can it be?
Other weaknesses relate to the conditions governing timber
concession licenses. The forest regulation stipulates the minimum
volume or number of trees that a concessionaire (or pit-sawyer) should
extract per year (supposed to be monitored monthly) instead of the
maximum. This prescription not only gave an opportunity but clearly
encouraged the licensee to over-exploit the forests. In other words, FD
put up a perfect recipe for deforestation.

Since FD doesn‟t have a

corresponding capacity to monitor these operations, the forests have
been open for abuse.

Therefore, rather than placing a blame card on

central government for its market liberalization policy, espoused under
the SAP, forestry managers should shallow their share of the blame by
being so naïve and generous in their concession licenses. They literally
opened up these forests for over-exploitation.
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Forest Fees versus Free Access
Loosely connected to user rights is the moral issue of government‟s
responsibility and obligation to do what is right in the public interest.
The forest fees exemption for subsistence use was conceived from this
moral standing, including the low pricing of forest products. The FD has
raised its concerns over the fee exemption citing the complications it
brings in their line of duty: that it is very difficult, in most cases, to
distinguish between those accessing the forest resources for home
consumption and for commercial use. FD‟s argument on how government
loses revenues in this manner has not convinced lawmakers to strike out
the provision. Instead, lawmakers have always voted against it arguing
that forests are nature‟s provision that has generously been handed over
from generation to generation, and therefore people should have free
access to the resources their ancestors have tirelessly worked to
preserve. Since the local people have preserved these forests from time
immemorial, lawmakers find it reasonable to allow free access for
subsistence consumption as a pay back for the local people‟s labor.
Obviously,

for

anyone

who

follows

political

debates

these

arguments should ring a familiar cord. All politics being local (and in
most cases also personal), the last thing any elected official would do is
to go against representing the interests of their constituents, even though
such a move might be in the national interest. Because politics is all
about pleasing your local constituent first, which protects one‟s votes
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and guarantees re-election, so far no members of parliament have been
bold enough to support burning their fingers on an issue such as this
one. Protecting their votes is a game politicians know best, and this
loophole gives them a great platform to show that they have kept their
word to keep the interests of their constituents guaranteed. In any case
such loopholes not only benefit the common person but more so these
same people who make the laws.
Because of the central position forests occupy in supplying the
essentials for a regular person‟s daily survival, especially in rural areas,
and coupled with the entrenched perceptions of forests being a free gift
from nature it is most likely that eliminating free access for home use
will remain an uphill battle in Parliament.
While both the free access and low prices are good for the
consumer, what this has done is to encourage over-exploitation of the
forest resources. And the fact that these forests are considered as
common property, where in this case the invisible hand of the manager is
not even present, the tragedy of the commons has taken over. Hence, in
the absence of meaningful oversight from the department, this had
resulted in forest over-exploitation, which had now led to forest
degradation.
On the commercial side, particularly with regard to timber
extraction, there is also another bad loophole in the forest regulations.
The license specifies the minimum quantity a licensee should process per
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year and not the maximum. Yet even though the department has
absolute powers and is entirely at liberty to make changes to its
regulations any time it sees fit, this provision is still on the books to date.
Therefore, when the department complains about over-exploitation, one
wonders who should be blamed for that: is it the resource user or the
department itself which has not changed its regulations? People (as
individuals or groups) always look for avenues to maximize their profits
and utility motives. The current arrangement of free access for
subsistence consumption provides a perfect situation to achieve all that!

Land Tenure and Jurisdiction
At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited two types of land
tenure systems based on the English Law. One system was that of formal
title registration, administered under the Crown Land, which later
became State Land. The other was the customary law that applied to the
Native Reserves, Native Trust Land and Barotseland (now called Western
Province). In terms of land distribution, Trust Land covers the largest
portion. Out of Zambia‟s total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust
Land, 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve land, and 6% (4.5 million ha) is
State land, 460 which is mainly found along the line of rail (Figure 5.1).

460

M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in
Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third
Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45
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Land tenure defines ownership and access rights, including a
system of management. In Zambia, land ownership is segmented
between central and local government, who together own 6%, and the
traditional rulers who control 94% of the land (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Distribution of Land by Land Tenure System, Zambia.

Source: D.J. Siddle, “Colonial Land Rights” in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, 1971:49

Generally speaking the Zambian way of life is pretty much a
communal affair,461 and nowhere is this more pronounced than in land

461

Scott D. Taylor, Cultures and Customs of Zambia, 2006
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tenure arrangements. The Chiefs own the bulk of the land which they
distribute to their subjects depending on need. Families “own” the land
in perpetuity, provided they do not leave such lands unutilized for a long
time, at which time the Chief resumes ownership rights, or other
members of that community may go to the Chief to request such land to
be assigned to them.
Thus, in the Chiefs‟ areas, land ownership is not a complicated
process. A person simply goes to the local Chief to get a piece of land
and that becomes family property that would be passed on from one
generation to another as long as one maintains presence in that area. In
communities that rear livestock such as in Central, Eastern, Southern
and Western Provinces, it is not uncommon for the Chiefs to set aside
communal grazing lands. Yet, despite this communal ownership
arrangement, land has generally been well managed and hardly suffered
from the so called „tragedy of the commons’. This is because land has
always been considered a community heritage to be worked in such a
way that it provides for both the present and future generations. Also the
political

philosophy

of

humanism,462

espoused

by

the

Kaunda

administration, further entrenched these values.

462

In all its stripes and shapes, humanism was a disguised form of socialism; very much geared towards to
common property ownership and creating a classless society. Whether this is good or bad is another
question beyond the scope of this study. For details, refer to Kenneth Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and Its
Implementation, Part I (Lusaka, 1967); Humanism in Zambia: A Guide to its Implementation, Part II
(Lusaka, 1974).
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The issue of who has jurisdiction over what land has briefly been
dealt with. In this section I want to highlight how land tenure and
ownership rights (rather than administrative or stewardship powers per
se) influence the “assigned” powers of a manager such as those of the
FD. By land tenure I mean the formal and informal laws/rules that
assign access rights to land – for use and or ownership. It includes not
only the relationships between people and land but also the social
relationships between people. Why should land tenure be part of this
discussion? What relevance does it have here?
As I pointed out earlier, this issue is important even in a study
such as this one which is dealing with institutional capacity because
those with tenure rights will usually have more power over the property
in question and this gives them a certain social status in comparison
with those without those rights. What this means is that “tenure
determines who can (and can‟t) do what with the property in question
and under which circumstances they can (and can‟t) do it.” 463 Therefore,
knowing who has control over what land, how the FD gets the land for
reservations, and the different policies that deal with land issues, etc.
makes it easier to appreciate the challenges as well as the opportunities
available to Forestry Department. This is especially important in view of
the fact that FD does not own any land (as in buying it), but gets if free
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Owen J. Lynch and Janis B. Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-Based Conservation,” in: David
Western, et. al., (eds.) Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation, (Island Press:
Washington D.C.), 1994:373
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from respective landowners (e.g. the traditional Chiefs or central
government) on the understanding that such lands are going to be
managed on behalf of the people for a specific purpose, e.g. protection of
a water catchment area. In other words, the land is on “loan” to the FD.
These institutionalized land ownership arrangements cannot be ignored
and will not go away anytime soon, especially that they are protected
under the law.464 In fact, this is part of the reason why local communities
are able to assert themselves as they do because that land essentially
belongs to them and all they are doing is to exercise their rights hoping
to get back their land. Land tenure, ownership and access rights are
issues where various policy battles have been waged. A brief history will
be appropriate here.
Crown land (apparently the most fertile land) was reserved for
white settlers who were also permitted to hold freehold or leasehold title,
while native land was for the native Africans.465 To protect the natives
from losing their land, the British colonial government did not allow nonnatives or charitable organizations to own land in Native and Trust lands
for more than 5 years and 33 years, respectively. Since the natives did
not go into commercial farming at the rate and scale the white settlers
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M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980;
M.P. Mvunga, Land Law and Policy in Zambia, (Mambo Press: Institute for African Studies, Zambian
Papers No.17), 1982; M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in
Zambia", in Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in
the Third Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45
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D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, University of London
Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49; M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System,
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did, this somehow explains why more land are found in trust lands, and
by

extension

forest

estates

too.

However,

since

independence,

government has made several modifications to the statutes governing
land ownership, both during the First (1964-73) and Second (1973-1991)
Republics under the UNIP government, led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda as
well as under President Frederick Chiluba‟s government.
Since title to land was not permitted in customary lands and
neither could that land be sold, this essentially meant land in these
areas were valueless. The natives wanted this and other sections of the
law that were perceived to hinder development in their areas changed.
The first of these „solutions‟ came out of a 1967 Land Commission,
which among other things, recommended that land had value and,
therefore, can be bought or rented regardless of where it is located to
secure one‟s right to use it.466 Title to land should also be given to those
people on customary land so they too could have secure rights to land.
Finally, the Commission vested all land in the Republican President, to
be held in trust for the Zambian people.467
Sadly, the 1967 Land Commission Report was not made available
to the public so the Commission‟s recommendations were not formally
accepted or rejected. Instead, government conveniently only popularized
the clause that vested all land in the President. Other recommendations
such as the one that gave value to land were tactfully ignored until 1991
466
467

GRZ, Report of the Land Commission, Lusaka, August 1967:165
GRZ, Report of the Land Commission, 1967:112, 161
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when the MMD government inscribed it into law. Thus, concerns on land
laws continued, especially the need to redistribute to Zambians land held
by absentee landlords on State land.
Later, after the 1969 referendum, The Lands Acquisition Act of
1970 was passed and authorized land redistribution. Government could
buy such lands in cash or in kind by giving the affected landlord an
alternative piece of land.468 This Act gave the President so much power he
could “compulsorily acquire any property of any description.”469
In pursuit of his humanist philosophy, a disguised form of
socialism, President Kaunda argued against sale of land pointing out
that since land is never bought under the African tradition, it must
remain the property of the state.470 And this stance was further
consolidated under the UNIP administration where all existing free hold
titles were converted to leasehold titles of up to 99 years and that
government would monitor and facilitate land acquisition only in the
“national interest.” To that effect all land was vested in the President, to
be held in trust on behalf of the Zambian people.471 In a way, it is
possible to speculate that this is what led government to conserve as
much land in customary lands areas as possible, as exemplified in the
number of forest estates found in these areas.472
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GRZ, Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970:6-7
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After toying with several options between permitting titles to land
in Chiefs‟ areas (customary lands) and getting some portions of State
Land to redistribute to the people in areas where land shortage became a
problem (e.g. in Southern Province), these initiatives were allowed after
many years of negotiations.473 But the proposal to introduce a land tax
payable by all land users including peasants was rejected by the UNIP
government.474
Of all the changes that have occurred over the years, the most
monumental came in 1991 when finally land had value; land could now
be sold whether or not there was permanent infrastructures on it.475 In
particular, the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in
the Third Republic of Zambia also recommended that land be re-classified
into two categories: State land and Customary land rather than the
previous four; and that landowners on State land would have a 99 years
lease with automatic renewal, while those in Customary land would be
granted specific durations based on the purpose for which the land is
needed.476

473
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While the afore mentioned land reforms opened up customary
lands to attract investment, the restriction to 99 years lease title fails to
take into consideration the long maturity period of forestry crops. In this
respect, land laws in Zambia do not encourage private forest ownership
because renewal of title to land is not guaranteed after the 99 years
lease. Consequently, the country attracts forest extraction instead of
long-term investment; whereby investors would be keen to establish or
manage their own forest estates as is the case, for instance, in
Scandinavian and other western countries.
A few things deserve special mention. First, the Chiefs have more
land than central government, and these lands are communally owned
and still administered under customary laws of inheritance. The Chiefs
decide who can or cannot be given land, and what may or may not be
done in their areas. And this has been their power base. But this tenure
system also raises several concerns: how secure are communal property
rights? Do (or what type of) tenure incentives exist to promote
sustainable management of the land resources? How equitable are the
redistribution arrangements? When a person or group of people occupy a
piece of land without the Chief‟s permission are they squatters or do
their tenure rights come into play since they belong to that community?
At what point does free access become a problem for another person in a
communally owned land? As Lynch and Alcorn have argued with respect
to community-based conservation efforts, these questions can be
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addressed by assessing the state‟s performance (in this case represented
by

FD)

and

the existing

relationships

between

the Chiefs

and

government.477
As

Powell

and

DiMaggio

(1991)

explain,

institutionalized

arrangements tend to have long staying power, are easily reproduced and
people often do not even look at other alternatives because they regard
the prevailing arrangements as sufficiently appropriate.478 This is so true
in the Zambian situation where communal land ownership and tenure
arrangements have remained unchanged for so many years despite the
bashings from pro-capitalist and free market lovers who advocate
otherwise.
However, given what is happening now, it should not come as a
surprise to conceptualize the problem of forest degradation as a product
of the tragedy of the commons precisely because that is what it looks like
now, though not in the sense of the people maximizing utility from the
same piece of land but in the sense of individuals (or a group of families)
competing to [illegally] allocate themselves a piece of land that they
aspire to own before others get it. Somehow it resembles what happened
during the scramble for Africa, except this time the “sharing” is at local
level, with central government being perceived as an intruder, a common
enemy.
477

The

phenomenon

is

more

pronounced

for

forests

near

Lynch and Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-based Conservation,” in: David Western, et al.,
(eds.), Natural Connections, 1994:378-381
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Water Powell and Paul DiMaggio, the New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (University of
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metropolitan areas than it is in the rural areas, which again underscores
the fact that people still have more respect for the Chiefs‟ authority than
they do for central government. In other words, traditional “state” has
more staying power than the contemporary state, rather than vice versa.
Part of these reactions arise from an underlying frustration due
government‟s failure to deliver on its promises of creating jobs through
forestry, and partly because of the collapse of the economy that sent
thousands of unemployed people on the streets. Consequently, people
have invaded the forests as the only way they can claim them back. But
speaking from experience, I strongly believe that it is unlikely that these
lands will be in bad shape once they become private property.
For the unemployed masses, forests provided the easiest avenue
where one could extract some form of livelihood without having to worry
about any financial investment. For instance, all one needs is an axe and
the energy to stroll into the nearest forest to get some wood (or make
charcoal) for sale. And sometimes, no equipment is needed – just a
basket would do, and someone would come back with a host of products
to sell – mushrooms, fruits, vegetables, etc. Those who are skilled enough
can also trap unsuspecting wildlife using ropes crafted from tree barks!
Getting back to the tragedy of the commons, I envision this to be a
temporary phenomenon, meant only to force government to give up those
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forests as has happened before.479 Of course the people who are illegally
taking over some or parts of the forests are motivated by utility and
opportunity cost motives to the extent that this would lead to eventual
land ownership. Everyone is trying to maximize his or her utility from
forests, which ultimately is leading to forest over-exploitation. The fact
that the forest manager, FD, is perpetually absent made these communal
lands vulnerable. In the absence of a manager to provide some
leadership and control over these estates due to labor and financial
constraints (as the department claims), this opened up the forests to
unrestricted accesses.
Since people did not see anyone to be directly responsible for these
forests, and armed with the knowledge that these forests have been
common property from time immemorial, the natural tendency is for
anyone to claim ownership. Hence, these forests became open to
unrestricted access. Consequently, there is no control over what should
be extracted, when or how much. At first people went in only to help
themselves to the forest products, exercising their access and usufruct
rights. Later they realized they can actually establish their ownership
rights too, the best way they know how: to settle there. Bear in mind that
even when land is communal the owner/manager (the Chief) regulates
access and ownership. With FD having abrogated its responsibilities as a
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manager of PFAs, the local Chiefs could do nothing as they were tied up
in the contractual arrangement that released such lands to FD. As a
result, this created a managerial vacuum, one which the people have
exploited to their advantage. Ironically, the Chiefs never blame
government as having failed them. Instead, they always point to
population growth as the reason why their subjects have been invading
the forests.
The other dimension relates to the changes in the land laws. Up
until 1991 land in Zambia had no value: it could not be sold on its own
regardless of whether it was in State land or customary lands. Even on
State Land where land ownership through title deeds was permitted land
could not be sold on its own unless there was some form of permanent
infrastructure480 (e.g. buildings) on it. And because formal title to land
was not allowed in customary lands (Trust Land and Reserve Land) that
fell under the Chiefs‟ jurisdictions this not only reinforced the idea that
land was valueless and therefore useless but also promoted land
ownership insecurity.
Of course the whole idea was to keep land as a communal
property, to be accessed through the Chiefs‟ permission, and it worked
fairly well. As a result, there was no motivation to own land individually.
But all this changed in 1991 when land gained value under the new law.
480

Permanent infrastructures are defined as those whose main structure are built from bricks, stone or any
materials deemed to have an enduring life span. Buildings comprising timber as the main structural
components are deemed to be temporary structures and would therefore disqualify any such land from
being sold.
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People can now have title to land in customary lands (up to 99 years
renewable leases), although such land can only be accessed through the
Chiefs‟ approval.
These developments have ignited a huge surge for individual
property ownership. Thus, forest encroachment can be explained in
terms of individuals wanting to be early birds to catch the best worms.
Because land can now be sold in its own right, provided one has title to it
(which is also now allowed in Chiefs areas provided the Chief consents to
that), this has spurred a new wave of entrepreneurship geared towards
accumulating land as an asset that can be sold later. Ironically, as far as
forest encroachment is concerned, this is only happening in the PFAs,
the land perceived as belonging to government, and not in open forests
still under the Chiefs‟ jurisdiction.
What does this tell us? Simply that people still have respect for the
Chiefs‟ authority and appreciate that such lands are for their future
inheritance. On the other hand, because FD has become an „absentee
landlord‟ its estates have rendered themselves fallible to occupation by
anyone. And all this speaks to the idea of lack of managerial skills. At its
current level of capacity, it is unlikely that FD would be able to provide
the kind of penetration required to instill that sense of its presence. It is
this weak penetration that has, for the most part, led to the current
problems. And penetration here does not in any suggest unilateralism
but the adoption of arrangements that promote and rely on inclusion of
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other key players to get things done. At the end of the day the big
question is always, how useful was that government intervention for the
intended target group?
A good yardstick is to assess government interventions against
their benefits to society. In other words, how far has the state penetrated
society to solve the problems it was supposed to address? But if the state
fails or unevenly penetrates society, “local enclaves” may arise to provide
expression of “private” identities.481 The public has taken over the forest
estates precisely because its government has failed them. For instance,
there are no jobs created in the rural areas where the resource is
situated. Instead, even the few job opportunities that have been created
by the timber companies are located in urban areas where these
companies have set up camp.
What can be learned from all this? First, the department lost touch
with

real

world.

Whereas

the

previous

arrangement

permitted

involvement of the Chiefs and their subjects in forest management,
which included the recognition of group rights and access to these
resources, FD management decided to take a unilateral approach in
which it exerted itself as the only authority, ignoring the fact that Chiefs
still remained the real authority since land never really changes hands to
become the department‟s property. Forest department cannot sell the
land is manages. Therefore, what the forestry managers ought to do is to
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tap into the Chiefs‟ authority by re-activating previous relations it had
with these Chiefs. This is a model that has worked on wildlife
management.482 It is hard to find any reason why it would not work in a
related field like forestry.
The issue at stake here is how can FD remobilize this social
capital? And what expectations do these communities have about their
government? Although people are known to be driven by short-term selfinterests, given the right incentives and conditions, collective interests
and action is likely to replace individual self-interests.483 After all
communities are always sustained through collective action.
As observed earlier, it is clear from available evidence that FD‟s
capacity on forest management has not resided in the number of its staff,
their technical know-how nor the amount of funds at its disposal –
though this is genuinely helpful. Rather its biggest asset has always been
the unfettered cooperation that the department received from the Chiefs
and their subjects. The moment the local communities withdrew from
that partnership, all hell broke loose, and the effect of this withdrawal is
evident everywhere. What lessons does this case study provide?
First, under a communal land tenure/ownership arrangement
such as the one in Zambia, the bureaucracy clearly has no total control
over the land resources. The Chiefs, as custodians of their community‟s
property, have an upper hand. Therefore, community cooperation is
482
483
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needed [again] if any meaningful improvement on forest management is
to be achieved. Reintroducing and strengthening these ties is the best
way forward.
Thus, government‟s proposal to introduce joint forest management
(JFM)484 that would include the local people in forest management, and
currently being tried through some community-based natural resource
management programs (CBNRMP), is certainly a welcome gesture.
However, this too is not likely to yield any positive outcomes if
government is seen as trying to wash its hands by passing on the forest
management responsibility to the local communities after the forests
have been destroyed. What the people need is genuine leadership and
government commitment to show that this will be a cooperative
undertaking between government and the people. And of course local
communities are interested in seeing tangible benefits accrue to them.
Communities want and must regain security of tenure and access for
them to feel comfortable to participate in such programs.
JFM is being viewed in certain circles as government‟s acceptance
of failure to manage the forest resources. Thus, if not handled properly,
government‟s withdrawal via CBNRMP as part of a power devolution
strategy may create a leadership vacuum, which may hurt rather than
benefit the very people it wants to empower. Devolution of power through

484

JFM has been in existence but informally. The new proposal wants to legalize these partnerships so that
the public has legal protection especially as it relates to sharing revenues and other benefits. See the FD,
National Forest Policy, 1999.

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 272

CBNRMP should be done gradually to prevent the rich and powerful from
taking advantage of the situation.

At a time when poverty and health are of primary concern to a
common person, it will be folly for government to institute measures that
overlook these important obligations. This includes signing up blindly up
for some international treaties that have minimal impact on the local
communities just some organizations are willing to finance some so
called capacity building / community empowerment initiatives. Unless
such commitments translate into some tangible benefits to the local
communities it will be a long shot to win the cooperation of the local
people.
Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that Chiefs have more
control over how land is utilized than the contemporary state, a feature
that arises from the formation of the classic versus the modern state. In
our case study, the modern state draws its power and legitimacy from
the classical state (spread across the different Chiefdoms) which is quite
strong. It would not be surprising if a similar situation obtains in other
African states whose formation shares similar characteristics with the
contemporary state called Zambia. The issue that arises here is that this
power layering of “states” within a state can become a source of
weakness or conflict. May be this could explain why modern African
states continue on the path of underdevelopment because strictly
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speaking the contemporary state does not seem to have total control over
its land. This is another area development practitioners should pay
attention to, the first being why it is important to assess IC before
implementing any interventions.

Population Growth
Zambia‟s population has changed substantially from 3.4 million
(1964)485 to 11.7 million (2007),486 and with it has come corresponding
challenges and opportunities. For instance, population growth has meant
increased demand for agricultural land and human settlements. Also the
need for wood energy, timber and other land use activities has moved in
the same direction. These pressures have challenged FD‟s capacity to
deal with them trying to keep its forest estates intact. But with a
department that has been acting as an absentee landlord, the pressure
for its forests has exceeded its capacity. As a result most of its forests
have been compromised.
The conflict between having land for human settlements and
keeping it for biodiversity conservation is one that the department has
not handled very well in recent years mainly because FD has estranged
the local people from being partners in forest conservation. But as Anna
Lawrence has pointed out, foresters should adapt to changing social
expectations by adopting new ways of managing: sharing knowledge and
485
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responsibilities on forest management, not only among themselves but
more importantly with resource users. In other words, forest managers
should re-adopt approaches in which they see resource users as partners
rather than as a problem, or a group whose only responsibility is to
extract the forest resources.
I say re-adopt because these partnerships were previously in
existence, not only in forestry but also for fisheries and water
management.

Chiefs

had

their

own

systems

and

gave

specific

responsibilities to their subjects e.g. on forestry, fisheries, and water
management. And nowhere was this as elaborate as in Barotseland
(Western Province), among the Lozi. But the system broke down (or at
least was weakened) when FD took over the forests. A similar situation
also occurred in Luapula Province over the fishery resources.487
In business circles, population growth is always looked at as a
positive development – that is to say a potential market worth nurturing.
So why is it a problem to FD? Isn‟t this a potential market for forest
products too? It defeats my reasoning why FD does not look at
population growth in this context. In any case the wealth of any nation
starts with its people, the human capital! What makes a difference for
population being a problem or an asset is how it is harnessed. And China
487

For details refer to the Fisheries Act, Cap 200 of 1994 and Statutory Instrument No. 198 of 1986. These
statutes introduced a Fish Ban from December 1 st to February 28th each year as if the local communities
were not observing these restrictions already. The result was resentment from Luapula fishermen because
other areas e.g. Western Province were not covered under this law. Yet Western Province has fishing areas
too. But instead, government allowed the Litunga, the local Chief, to continue using his traditional
authority to enforce the Fishing Ban in his area.
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offers an excellent example in this respect! Strictly speaking, as a sector
supposed to create job opportunities, population growth should be
treated as an asset, both as a source of labor and as a market. FD is
supposed to device strategies that harness the opportunity that comes
with this growth rather than seeing it as a problem. Until foresters come
to this realization, people will forever be a problem rather than an asset.
In fact, even though population is orchestrated as problematic,
strictly speaking this is happening on a localized scale, with forests near
urban areas being at greater risk.488 It is a problem that local politicians
tend to exploit for political expedience – to convey to central government
the idea that due to population increase more land is needed both for
human settlements and agricultural purposes. Yet underlying this
supposedly noble purpose is their agenda of political appeasement to
their constituents. With a population density at 13 people per square
kilometer (with Lusaka, the capital city, and the most densely populated
town standing at 64 people per square kilometer),489 Zambia is still
nowhere near to having a problem of land shortage. I come back to these
dimension when I discuss political expedience.

Political Expedience
Land in Zambia conveys both a sense of identity and of power.
Land is distributed according to ethno-linguistic lines, and ownership
488
489

Felix Njovu, 2004
CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:1
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fallows this pattern. By virtue of belonging to a particular ethnolinguistic group (identify), one can own land through natural inheritance.
As a nation that is predominantly agrarian (over 80% of the population in
Zambia depend on subsistence farming for their livelihoods), land has
been and continues to be a wealth generating avenue. As a result, it
remains the “most valued form of property” to a common person.490 It is a
resource that has permanence many other resources don‟t have, at least
one can own it in perpetuity as long as one maintain ties to a particular
ethno-linguistic group.
Land is also a symbol of power in that those closer to the Chiefs
(and in the case of State Land those with the power of the pen) have more
influence over who owns the land and for what purposes. For a long time
land has also provided political power too. Local politicians, usually
claiming to speak on behalf of the people, tend to derive and drive their
personal agendas based on how they are going to deal with land issues in
their constituencies – either in terms of creating jobs or as advocates for
getting back the protected forest areas from central government to cater
for the local needs. In most cases the latter has resonated with the
people and subsequently has secured votes for such politicians.
Consequently, when they take office, such politicians have not been
helpful in forest management.
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Bina Agarwal, Are We Not Peasants? (Population Council Inc.: NY), 2002:2
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In order to preserve their legislative status, mainly for political
expedience, some local politicians have encouraged their constituencies
to illegally access the forest resources or simply settle in the protected
forests. Either way, this has led to forest degradation. Secondly,
politicians have offered little support for forest reforms in the country, a
position I construe as being content with the status quo. These
politicians prefer maintaining the current loopholes in the law because
they benefit from that. Initially people had respect for the law. But since
embracing democratic politics, some Members of Parliament have
encouraged people in their constituents to access the forest resources
freely, defending the practice as one of the benefits of freedom. In their
view, the classification of forests as government property means that this
was public property, which meant that people could do as they pleased
anytime. Obviously, the idea of having a manager in charge of that
resource is completely ignored.
Thus, what we see here is identity politics at play, which is also
confirming the idea that institutions matter.491 They matter because
institutions (as organizations or rules) both provide an avenue for
expressing one‟s concerns, which in this case are manifested in tactics of
fighting to retrieve what these communities rightfully perceive as their
property.

But the means adopted are counter-productive both for the

respective communities or the nation.

491

Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America, 2005:5-8
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On another level, it can also be argued that because the Zambian
societies are so communally oriented an individual hardly exists. Local
communities (including their elected officials) do not see themselves in
individual terms but always as part of a community, although I should
add that this is slowly changing in urban areas where ethno-linguistic
lines have become blurred.
However, from the stand point of identity politics, members of
parliament (as policy makers) are unlikely to stand alongside with the
Forestry Department on public policy unless they are convinced that the
department‟s interventions are going to bring benefits to their community
not only to a selected few, as most public interventions tend to be based
on a trickle down effects. What this means is that both the public and
their members of parliament (MPs) are unlikely to debate issues from an
objective position other than from a regional or communal, and usually,
a normative position. Such orientations leave the FD in the cold because
MPs will always lean towards protecting their constituent interests.
Therefore, it may be an uphill climb to reach common ground. And this
is where forest managers need to exercise their political skills by finding
allies in the political arena long before the department submits any
policy reforms. Support from the respective local communities and their
elected officials, is what will ensure sound forest management. It is the
single most capacity FD can count on if it has to succeed in its mission.
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As Ingraham, et. al. (2003) point out public managers have
multiple roles and operate at different levels, two main ones being the
bureaucratic and the political levels. Achieving a balance between the
two is a skill every public manager looking for success of their
organization has to learn.492 Sadly, the department is critically handcapped in this area. Compared to the previous administrators, the
current Director of Forestry does not even have anything resembling a
strategy. During and before B.O.M. Chiyabwe‟s time as head of the
department (i.e. 1986 and earlier), the department had a lot of extension
programs designed to draw the attention of policy makers and the public
at large to forestry. Currently, despite the department‟s focus having
shifted towards provision of extension services, there‟s hardly any
extension program in place! How ironic! Given that the department has
not developed any strategy to achieve its primary mandate, what does
that tell us about its managers?

If this is not a managerial problem,

what is it?
For example, the department doesn‟t have to finance all its
programs. With a bit of creativity the department could solve some, if not
all, of the so-called problems being faced. Some extension services (e.g.
radio and TV programs) can be self-financing if these managers could tap
into the corporate world who can underwrite these extension programs
for the benefit of both parties. No one in the department even thinks on
492

Patricia Ingraham, et. al., Government Performance: Why Management Matters, (The Johns Hopkins
University Press), 2003.
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these lines! It was apparent during the personal interviews with some of
the senior and middle managers that they all think within the box:
government is supposed to finance all their programs. But in light of
limited resources, creating public-private partnerships is not an option
but the only way the department should go.
Another aspect worth mentioning here, which also drew away the
national resources to other activities relates to Zambia‟s involvement in
the liberation movements in the region. Whether this was a good thing to
do or not is beside the point. The fact is that Zambia‟s involvement in
regional politics, especially to the degree this was pursued, undeniably
deviated a good portion of the national resources that could have gone
into building capacity in respective agencies. In hindsight, though the
sacrifice was too costly to the Zambian people, the country did the right
thing to host and create the necessary leadership that brought political
harmony to the region. Except for the Angolan case and recent political
instability in Zimbabwe, for the most part Southern Africa has been
relatively peaceful and stable – certainly a plus for the Kaunda
administration that pursued that unpopular policy at the time.
But how do these relate to the problem of deforestation? The
diversion of resources to fund liberation movements deprived the local
agencies of needed funds for development. However, despite these
difficult times those managers were so creative they developed bilateral
relationships and accessed grants that were used for research, training,
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and development of other forestry and forest-based activities. In addition
to the industrial plantation project, the department established some of
the best research plots and genetic materials for indigenous and
plantation forests.
Several things come into play here: there is visionary leadership
from head of department and unwavering creativity among managers
who were also able to communicate effectively to the lower ranks on what
needed to be done. They developed a strong team spirit that kept
everyone well informed. Also there is the issue of incentives offered
primarily through staff development but also other benefits such as
personal to holder vehicles,493 free accommodation and water494 that were
part of the conditions of service. All these things point to management
style and managerial skills. Certainly, there is a lack of vision and
leadership qualities at Director‟s level. The head of the department is not
providing the necessary leadership that would set the department in the
right direction. For instance, communication is so bad for the most part
the staff do not know what they are supposed to be doing. Organizational
goals are not clearly spelled out and neither are staff roles properly
explained to help them know how they fit into the larger picture.

493

This applied only to senior managers but middle and junior managers who were in charge of a forest
station or section also informally enjoyed similar privileges.
494
Government provided free institutional housing to all forestry personnel. Except those who lived in
town (under local municipal jurisdiction) government also absorbed the bill for water, telephone and
transportation for the personnel who lived in forest stations.
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For instance, 62% of the managers surveyed in this study think
that FD has strategic goals. But 58% don‟t know what those strategic
goals are! This is amazing! How can the department achieve anything if
its managers don‟t know what they are supposed to work towards? When
it comes to developing the annual work plans, again a gloomy picture
emerges. Over half (51%) of the managers said they are not involved in
developing the department‟s work plans, 42% don‟t know if FD has any
work plans, and 40% don‟t even know who develops these work plans, if
there are any at all!
In terms of program implementation i.e. knowing what role these
managers are supposed to play in pursuing the department‟s mission or
goals, only 32% of the forest managers (all levels) knew their role, while
22% hardly knew anything at all. The majority (46%) only knew
sometimes, and it is hard to tell how often they knew. Overall, 89%
confirmed that FD has problems implementing its plans because these
managers have no idea what they are supposed to do.
This is clearly a serious problem. If the managers who are
supposed to guide others are as ignorant regarding the department‟s
goals and their role in pursing the same as this study just revealed, how
will the rest of the staff know? Because of this information black out
there is a deep sense of frustration across the ranks to an extent where
most forest managers are just waiting for the creation of the Forestry
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Commission so they could get their separation benefits and take early
retirement.

Refugees, Forests and National Security
Zambia has been one of the most stable and peaceful nation in the
southern African region a feature that has made the country a safe
haven for people displayed from political conflicts in neighboring
countries, including those from Central and East Africa. It is therefore
befitting to highlight the important role the Zambian government has
played in accommodating refugees, and the impact this has had on
forests as well as the national budget which has to be shared to cater for
refugee too.
The influx of refugees into Zambia has been a constant occurrence
dating back to early 1960s when the first freedom fighter groups engaged
their governments into political and military campaigns. Since that time,
even as a young nation, Zambia has continued to host refugees not only
from its neighbors495 but even from countries further north in East and
Central Africa.496 For instance, in 2005 Zambia hosted over 260,000
refugees, the highest number in the whole world. By 2007 this figure had
dropped to 197,539, which excludes “42,250 Congolese refugees (and
unspecified number from Angola) who were offered voluntary repatriation

495

For instance, refugees came from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
This includes refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Congo, Congo DR (formerly Zaire), Sudan, Rwanda,
Burundi and Uganda.
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in November 2006”.497 If previous experience is anything to go by, most of
these people are likely to return possibly in the next two years. The
current refugee population of 197,539 includes: 90,000 from unspecified
neighboring countries (2006); 42,565 (Angola), 60,874 (Congo DR), and
4,100 (Rwanda) (2007).498 But what relevance do refugees have to the
subject at hand? Two dimensions they bring to the table: their impact on
forests and issues related to national security.
As a land locked country surrounded by eight neighbors, securing
its borders, most of which have corridors of forests is an issue not only
left to the national security wings, but one in which foresters also play an
active role. The latter are usually the ones who notice whether there are
movements of people from other countries, who then alert the security
wings to take appropriate action. Therefore, when there is a lack of
presence in monitoring these forests (whether by the foresters or local
communities), this compromises national security.
Second, the influx of refugees into means that government has to
find places where to settle these people to give them a decent shot at life,
even though it may not be the same level where they came from. In most
cases this means getting some pieces of land where to build refugee
camps. As can be expected the natural choice is to get from government
lands, although there are cases where Chiefs have been asked to donate
part of their land. Also these camps provide basic infrastructure such
497
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html. Accessed: June 10, 2008.
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that the facilities do not include the luxuries of modern life style.
Refugees are predominantly forest-dependent for their energy needs.
Therefore, depending on how long these would stay in an area, extensive
damage often occurs to the nearby forests. In this respect, refugees do
contribute to deforestation.

The Value of the Forests in Poverty Alleviation
It would be unreasonable if this discussion only shows what is
causing forest degradation without putting a human face to the topic. By
this I mean, so what if the forests are dwindling? Why should people care
if forests are declining? What are wider implications? There are various
reasons, and here is why.
First, if well managed, forests contain the natural “capital” that
can contribute magnificently to Zambia‟s economic development. This
has been proved by the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and
Sweden) who, by the way, have been the major financiers of forestry
programs in Zambia. In Finland, forestry alone contributed 5.6% to
Finland‟s national GDP in 2006.499 Between 1982 and 2005 Scandinavian
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For details visit:
http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/B870982E61D16328C22573D30026D674/$file/G028_
eng_08.pdf . And for more documents and statistics refer to this website:
http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/438DBC6361C9EB75C2256F34004154D8?Opendocu
ment#Graphics%3A . Accessed: May 28, 2008.
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countries have given Zambia over US$331.7 million in bilateral grants for
forestry programs.500
As mentioned earlier, over 80% of the Zambian population is
dependent on indigenous forests for agriculture, food, building materials,
wood energy, and other forest products for sale, all of which cushion
their subsistence living. And this situation applies to other countries too,
especially in the Third World.501 As a bank of mostly renewable resources
its potential to supply these could stay on in perpetuity. Thus, even as
the world has set for itself the millennium goals, forests can certainly
play an important role, especially in reducing poverty.
Yet, even with such an indisputable reality, the link between
forests and their role in poverty alleviation is clearly missing; at least the
Zambian foresters have not highlighted this in a way that makes sense to
policy makers. This is partly because of an over-stretched emphasis on
timber, which leaves out a host of other useful products, and partly
because a lot of the activity happens in the informal sector.
The first problem relates to how forests are valued. Foresters only
see timber in their forests; hardly pay any attention to other equally
important products such fruits, herbal medicines, etc. It is inconceivable
at this time in the history of forestry in Zambia that there are no
monetary statistics (not even speculations) on the value of forests. Yet,
500

The actual figure is US$331,719,309.00, based on information in Appendix 4. See Appendix 4 for
specific projects that have been financed by these three Scandinavian countries.
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Edward B. Barbier, Natural Resources and Economic Development (Cambridge University Press: NY),
2005.
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forests serve as the only secure bank, especially for the rural areas.
Forests make it possible for these folks at least to get some level of
decent subsistence survival, stopping them from falling into abject
poverty.
Foresters must learn to quantify in monetary terms not only timber
but also the other forest products, and show how these products could
(and do) help alleviate poverty. For instance, indigenous forests are a
great source of food and medicines, which by the way, are classified as
minor forests products and there are statistics on them whether in value
or quantity extracted. Yet, food is the most sought after commodity. And
forests provide this all year ranging from mushrooms and vegetables to
fruits and game meat (animals and birds). The way forests are valued in
Zambia leaves much to be desired. These professionals count what does
not count, at least to the common person, which includes this author.
The wealth and value of these goes far beyond timber and it time this is
reflected.
The current boom in honey production that has clearly been
enhanced by the beekeeping project under the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Fisheries (MAFF) is a good testimony on how forests can
alleviate poverty at household level without having to use “trickle down”
calculations, as most foreign-propelled programs tend to emphasize. In
fact, the ZMK12 billion loan (equiv. US$2.99 million) from the African
Development Bank (AfDB) for beekeeping activities in North-Western and

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L P a g e | 288

Central Province underscores the importance of forests in alleviating
poverty at household level.502 At least government is waking up to this
realization that organic honey is a product that would be well received on
the international market. If well coordinated this is an industry that can
pull a lot of subsistent farmers out of poverty. And of course there are
numerous other resources from the natural forests such as mushrooms
and fruits, obtained free, but whose value runs in millions, or possibly
billions, of dollars.
One classical example is Amanita Zambia, a company that
amassed its wealth exporting Amanita zambiana, an organic mushroom
from Zambia‟s indigenous forests. The Masuku wine from the fruits of
Uapaca tree species (Masuku) that was produced by Tip-top Company503
in Kitwe, is another. The other example is the Sclerocarrya birrea
(Marula)504 fruits that are used in the production of the Amarula cream
(Figure 5.2). The Amarula cream, produced in South Africa, is exported
worldwide but these fruits also come from Zambia‟s natural forests, the
Marula trees.
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For details on this see the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, web article of May 22, 2007 at -----.
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Sadly, Tip-Top Company was closed in 1992 in exchange for a franchise from the Coca-cola Company.
As can be expected the company‟s closure had a terrible effect on the peasants who used to supply the
masuku fruits to Tip-Top Company.
504
As of now the Marula has defied domestication, it grows only in the wild and has been found useful for
man and wildlife. For more information about the marula tree (Sclerocarrya birrea) see,
http://www.amarula.co.za/za/learn/amarula_roots/ .
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Figure 5.2: The Marula Fruits and the Amarula Cream (Liqueur).
a) The Marula tree

b) Marula Fruits

c) Amarula Cream

d) Amarula Cream on rocks
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Therefore, as we have seen before the inadequacy in capacity goes
beyond numbers. The problem is lack of managerial skills; the leadership
acumen, propelled by being visionary and pro-active rather than reactive,
are important ingredients for effective management.505 The department
lacks leadership that is supposed to shepherd the organization in a
productive direction, one where its staff understand the department‟s
goals and their role in achieving the same. It also lacks a shared vision. If
any vision exists only the Director of Forestry knows it.
For instance, according to the survey findings 88% of forestry
managers surveyed think FD has a mission statement, but 38% of them
do not even know what the department‟s mission statement is. With
respect to planning, 62% think the department has a strategic plan, yet
58% have no idea what the department‟s strategic goals are. And finally,
51% said they are not involved in any form of planning, if any planning is
done at all.
From a management point of view, this is a perfect recipe for
disaster because these are the managers who are supposed to lead
others in their respective provinces and or sections, and yet have no idea
about what they are supposed to do. Without any information to pass on
to their junior staff, a lack of shared vision has permeated throughout
the department creating a terrible sense of disillusionment and staff
morale has dipped rock bottom. This tendency or preference for a top
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down centralized decision-making style has unfortunately strangled the
department. It will certainly require a visionary leader and a manager to
bring the forestry staff back on board. For now we can only hope that
this will not take forever before that change happens.

Conclusion
Picking up our discussion from Chapter 5 and continuing the argument
in this Chapter, I have tried to further demonstrate that forest
degradation is directly linked to FD‟s weak institutional capacity that has
stronger roots in the internal than the external factors. Although some
external factors are at play, they are the kind that can be contained if FD
had good leadership.

As Chapter 5 has demonstrated the major

weakness is not necessarily the inadequacy of field staff (as in quantity or
the number), the problem lies in lack of managerial capacity – the
inability to plan, organize, direct, supervise, coordinate, inspire and
simply manage the personnel and other resources.506 Senior managers
lack the managerial skills even to link the department to the larger world
where it can tap into other people‟s capacities. Unlike previous managers
who valued and tapped into the social capital that exists outside the FD
(e.g. the Chiefs, in other government agencies, the corporate world and
even the international community) sadly, the current management team
is oblivious to this reality. Right now the department needs to implement
506

See for instance, Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration,
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a series of reforms to bring the department back on course: one of this is
that the department should renew its relations with the local Chiefs. This
is where the department‟s strength resides. And then it should work on
bringing in new partners such as the corporate world. The department‟s
success lies in working collaboratively with the larger community rather
continuing to pursue a unilateralism type of management.
External factors have had their own share of contribution too. But
as our analysis shows this is a smaller portion (33%) compared to 67%
that internal factors accounted for. Therefore, it is quite possible that if
the internal problems are resolved, some of the external factors would be
taken care of too. For instance, issues related to political expedience and
population pressure can be easily handled if FD‟s capacity is improved.
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Chapter 6
Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities
Throughout this discussion it has become more and more clear
that contrary to FD‟s official position (which now qualifies as a
popularized myth) that inadequate field staff and financial resources are
largely responsible for the poor state of forests in Zambia, the results
from this study show that this is not entirely true. Rather the problem
lies with a different set of factors: the managers themselves. There is very
little connection, if any, to the other two factors (financial and field staff)
that the department has always orchestrated. The biggest handicap FD
suffers from is managerial incompetence. The department lacks visionary
leadership, one that would provide guidance to the lower ranks to steer
them towards a common purpose. Indeed, this might come as a surprise
to most forest officers and others who have come to the same conclusion
as FD has done all these years. This is because their analyses have relied
on simply observing the direction of change (the trends) without
subjecting such observations to further statistical scrutiny, as this study
did, to at least establish the degree of impact from various factors at
play.
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As this study had made it abundantly clear, organizations are
created for a particular purpose. They have a life of their own as reflected
in their mission, vision, objectives, strategies and goals.507 Yet as we have
also seen, these are later shaped or modified by the preferences of the
staff that get hired as well as the people outside who interact with that
organization. And the strongest impact comes from an organization‟s
managers who set the agenda on what should and will not be done.
As various management and organizational theorists have argued,
managerial capability is an essential input if an organization is to be
effective in its mission.508 Availability of the factors of production is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for good performance. An
organization may have all the factors of production but the lack of
managerial skills to utilize these resources can render them meaningless.
Yet even with meager resources good managers are able to explore other
means and propel an organization to greater heights. And this is exactly
what has transpired in FD over the years. With meager resources, but
under good leadership, the department excelled so well it was a “star
agency”. But under poor leadership, despite some improvements in the
number and quality of personnel, the department recessed into a nonperformer and ceased to be a star kid on the block.
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See for instance, Herbert Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” American Political Science Review,
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unless the FD gets its act together in managerial leadership, no
improvements can be expected elsewhere anytime soon.
The challenge at hand is how can this capacity be developed? What
level should be dealt with first? A repeat of the PSRP should be avoided.
To this effect, the recommendations offered by David Frederickson and
James Perry (1998), which addresses how to implement change,509 seems
appropriate in this situation.
The first step they recommend is “unfreezing,” which entails
loosening long held “attitudes and self-perception of organizational
actors.”510 In their view, one should avoid structural adjustments, as the
major strategies for change, because these do not usually “engage the
deeply ingrained images and perceptions” of the organization‟s culture.511
Instead, Frederickson and Perry argue that the best tactics to institute
organizational change are those that will ameliorate the “natural human
desire to hold on to existing attitudes, perspectives and activities,” whose
natural response is usually anxiety, feelings of loss of something familiar
and predictable, uncertainty, and loss of identity.512 To institute and
nurture organizational change for improved performance, Frederickson
and Perry offer a series of recommendations, which can summarized as
follows:
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David Frederickson and James Perry, “Overcoming Employee Resistance to Change,” in: Patricia W.
Ingraham, et. al., Transforming Government, (Jossey-Bass Publishers), 1998:125-146
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The first step is to reduce the resistance by teaching employees to
let go. For instance, given the level of their technical and professional
qualifications, forestry staff would rightfully claim that they are well
trained and know their business. For this reason, it may not be easy for
them to accept that they are incompetent – that they lack managerial
skills. Therefore, the first challenge is insure that all employees are well
informed so they understand how the proposed change would improve
the status quo.
The second strategy is to cultivate and get the support of career
civil servants (and I add the politicians too). Political and administrative
actors are both important ingredients. Both groups bring a different kind
of durability to the reform effort which neither career bureaucrats nor
elected officials can provide alone.
Third, diffuse the concerns of those who would resist. Do not
bypass resisters as this may just mobilize them into a stronger force.
Ignoring resistance is not a good strategy; it may just delay or obstruct
looking at other alterative options that resisters may offer.513
In terms of nurturing change, again Frederickson and Perry
recommend several strategies, one of which to involve all employees to
participate and own the change process.514 Sometimes good ideas are fail
to be adopted simply because the people supposed to be affected are not
involved to own the process. This is where the SAP and PSRP both failed.
513
514

Frederickson and Perry, 1998:130-134
More strategies are offered from 134

M a k a n o , R o s e m a r y , 2 0 0 8 , U M S L , P a g e | 297

And the current management style utilizes a similar approach whereby
the Director of Forestry does not share information with the other
managers such that one third of the forest managers have no clue
regarding their role in working towards the department‟s strategic goals.
Besides the above internal constraints, the external environment
has also generated its own set of challenges and opportunities, most of
which could be minimized or completely eliminated if the managerial
capacity existed. Thus, the real challenge here is how to improve FD‟s
managerial capacity, and I dare say, this should be the focus for anyone
interested in improving the department‟s performance.
Because capacity development is both an objective and an
approach,515 linking capacities to performance outcomes is the best way
to know if, in fact, those are the key capacities needed to create positive
change. Therefore, whether capacity building is taken as an objective or
an approach is immaterial. The real issue lies in determining what
capacities are required to improve performance.
The easiest and fasted way to improve FD‟s performance would be
to overhaul the top so that a new leader can take over and must be given
specific targets to achieve. Until FD managers learn to re-invent the way
they do business by adjusting to changing circumstances, i.e. doing
business differently and embracing new ways of doing things, the current
situation will continue.
515

Khalid Malik, “Capacity for Development,” in: Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development:
New Solutions to Old Problems, 2002:27.
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CHALLENGES
A closer look at the obstacles facing the Forestry Department
indicates that the origins of the current challenges are self-inflicted,
rooted in lack of administrative and managerial skills. The main
challenges FD needs to pay attention to are captured below.

Managerial Leadership
As the findings elucidate, and without running the risk of being
repetitive, the lack of managerial leadership to provide strategic direction
to the workforce has led to various problems. The department has
cultivated an ideal ground for a frustrated, disoriented and de-motivated
labor force. Teamwork is clearly absent, and the management team has
failed to harnesses the technical skills in its staff, which clearly is a
waste

of

investment

from

previous

years

in

human

resource

development.
Poor planning, and mostly the lack of it, has led to the absence of
forest

management

plans

which

are

essential

operational

tools.

Consequently this has hampered the work of the department. There is no
guide as to what forestry personnel are supposed to work towards both
in

the

short

and

long

term.

Although

Nutt

(1971)

and

other

organizational theorists argue in favor of availability and adequacy of
tangible productive resources (human, capital, technology and an
enabling environment) as being necessary for the effective functioning of
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an organization I would add that this equation is incomplete in the
absence of managerial qualities. As we have discovered throughout this
study, managerial capacity matters; it serves as the fuel and glue that
drives and binds other factors of production to work in unison.
Indeed, the effectiveness of an organization is measured by the
quantity and quality of its output. Conversely, the caliber of the input
determines the output, or to put it more plainly „the means justifies the
end‟. Since the department‟s mission is to manage the forest resource,
the quantity and the quality of the forest (as a final product) is a good
measure of its performance. And this is where its managers have failed
lamentably.

Quality of Staff and Their Placement
Closely related to the first challenge is the quality of staff. Numbers
alone don‟t count much, quality, and in particular, quality of skills
matters most. In terms of professional qualifications and experience
(defined as years worked in forest operations), the department has higher
qualified personnel compared to 1970s and earlier, a time when FD had
less qualified staff but ironically a time when performance was also at its
best.
Looking at the current staff appointments, it is evident that the
department has adequately trained staff to carry out its mandate.
Although there is no one with a doctorate degree in forestry in the
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department, those with master‟s degrees in their respective fields are
adequately equipped to provide the necessary professional guidance
needed. And the lower ranks are equally adequately qualified for their
level. In fact, the spread and emphasis of professional specialization
reflects the department‟s previous mandate, weighted heavily towards
forest management (Figure 6.1). I say previous because since 1997
restructuring the department‟s emphasis has shifted towards provision of
extension services.

Figure 6.1: Forest Managers‟ Field of Specialization.

Currently, for each manager‟s position, the incumbent has a
higher qualification than the minimum required. In other words, FD has
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personnel that is well schooled in their professional field but lack the
skills to lead. It is this lack of managerial acumen, not technical
competence, which is a problem. Consequently, the quality of output
from these technical staff does not reflect their professional competence.
A person who has mastered a set of skills or trade will have the
ability to solve the problems and can be trusted to provide the right
answer to those problems.516 In other words, a trained person can bring
an enormous difference to an organization because of their technical
knowledge on a matter. And of course what makes the different is how
and whether one puts those skills to work. Looking at the curriculum for
forestry training both local and abroad and for all levels of staff, the
department has skills to provide technical expertise in forestry planning,
management and research. What is needed is to harness these skills. In
this case, therefore, the challenge is to find that leadership. For this
reason, anybody wanting to improve FD‟s performance should not waste
resources on improving technical knowledge per se but should focus on
managerial and political skills, including the skills to analyze public
policy.

Misalignment of the Department’s Functions
A comparison of the organizational structure of the Forestry
Department before and after 1997 has helped us appreciate how the

516

Herbert Simon et, al., Public Administration, (Knopf: New York) 1950, Chapter 24: p546
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department operated then and now. All along the primary function of the
department has been forest protection and this mission and vision
permeated throughout the organization down to the district level. The
headquarters, home of the chief executive and departmental heads, took
its rightful position as a policy guidance conduit to Provincial Heads and
later to district offices. This arrangement was also duplicated in
specialized divisions such as Forest Research, Beekeeping and the
Industrial Plantations Divisions. Note that among these three specialized
divisions only Beekeeping had district offices dotted around the country,
the other two did not have much representation in the districts as the
structure was more centralized. Forest research depended on Provincial
and District Heads.
With a shift of emphasis from forest management to forest
extension so came another challenge. First, the majority of personnel
spread out in the provinces are trained in forest management not forest
extension. Second, because forest extension was a support field to other
sections of the department training emphasis was placed on the other
fields. Therefore, the biggest down side of this strategic realignment is
that it has literally translated into staff misplacement. People are holding
positions for which they are ill-trained.
Among the people surveyed, 47% had experience in forest
management while only 26% did some forest extension work. In terms of
training, 40% were trained in forest management, 20% in forest
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extension and 10% in forest research. Such an imbalance in technical
training and experience should not be ignored, people do well in what
they have been trained for. In short, this may explain, to some extent,
why the department is at a standstill.

Table 6.1: Field of Specialization and Experience.
Field of Specialization

Response Rate (%)

Forest Management

40

Forest Extension

20

Forest Research

10

Apiculture (Beekeeping)

6

Agricultural Extension

8

Agro-forestry

2

Natural Resource Management

3

Human Resource Management

5

Other

6

Field Experience
Forest Management

47

Forest Extension

26

Forest Research

4

Beekeeping

13

Other

10

Following the new National Forestry Policy of 2000, it is
understandable that the realignment of the department‟s mission is
geared towards embracing local communities through joint forest
management (JFM) approaches. However, the way JFM is portrayed is
not clear at all, even among forest managers themselves. For some it
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means cultivating public-private partnerships to manage these forest
resources. For others it means FD will be releasing its forest
management responsibilities to the resource users and simply become a
facilitator by providing extension services. This is already problematic. If
the managers do not know what they will be implementing it raises
concerns about its success. Probably the same dilemma exists on the
other side that will be courted to enter into this arrangement. FD needs
to spell out clearly what JFM will entail. As one scholar at the University
of Zambia put it,
“it‟s all well and good to advocate for and embrace joint forest
management. But don‟t you think government is passing the back
here? How can it surrender the forests to the local communities
after destroying the structures and mechanisms through which
these people managed those resources? ….The way I see it, it
would be honorable for government to simply say we have failed
please take over, rather than hide in fancy concepts like JFM.”517

To a certain extent this pretty much sums up the general feeling
even among forestry staff too who do not know what role they will play
under JFM arrangements. Will it be hands off and let the people decide
the fate of their forests? Or will FD still be in the driving seat but simply
ask the people to participate? Currently, the law does not specify how
this arrangement will work. It appears only time will tell.

517

Courtesy of an anonymous contributor, UNZA, personal communication, August 2005
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Management Style and Strategic Planning
Any organization, be it private, pubic or indeed not-for-profit needs
a leader and a plan to achieve its objectives. Strategic planning is a prerequisite to organizational performance. It is so critical to the
organization that its absence reflects the quality of management. Miller
(1998) insists that organizational leadership (the soft issues) is the
foundation on which successful institutions are built. He further argues
that most employees would significantly improve productivity if they were
better managed, and the result would not only be better financial
performance but also would meet most of the items on the score-card.518
Various management and organizational experts agree that a „high
performance organization‟ does not happen by chance, but something
that management makes a deliberate effort to design, one that will
motivate people to produce results that will sustain the organization. The
emphasis is on man-management or „intellectual capital‟. According to
them

characteristics

of

high

performing

organizations

include:

availability of strategic planning, vision, employee involvement in
decision making processes and good compensation. Peter Drucker (1998)
also agrees saying it is the responsibility of management to educate their
subordinates about the goals and directions of the organization.519 Only
then is it possible to cultivate team work and a sense of collective

518
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Alex Miller, Strategic Management (Irwin McGraw-Hill, New York; New York), 1998:23-24
Peter Drucker, Managing Challenges for the 21st Century (Harper Collins, New York), 1998:20.
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purpose. Given what is going in our case study this is clearly an area of
concern.
The problem starts at excluding some managers as part of the
management team. They are not involved in the core activities over which
they bear total responsibility in terms of policy/program implementation.
While one would expect that all the managers to be involved in planning
and all technical staff to know about existence of the department‟s
strategic plan since this is a document that they are supposed to
implement in their respective sections, sadly most of the managers had
no idea if such a document exists. For example, 58% of the managers
surveyed don‟t know if the department has any plans; 51% said they are
not involved in any form of planning, while 36% are involved sometimes.
When asked differently about who develops the work plans? An
interesting scenario unfolds: 5% think the Planning and Information
Department (PID), a sister department to FD within the same Ministry,
does this on behalf of FD, 10% thought the Director and the two Chiefs
at FD headquarters (Forest Extension and Forest Research) do this job,
36% think it is all the senior staff in the department (including personnel
from the provinces), while an overwhelming 49% said they do not know!
And as someone scribbled, “I don‟t know and I don‟t care”.520
When asked whether FD had any work plans that field staff could
use to guide their field operations, there was a 50-50 split between those

520

Forest Dept personnel, anonymous respondents, September 2005)
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who knew and those who did not. But they were also quick to point out
that these plans, if they exist, are not implemented at all due to various
problems ranging from lack of resources to facilitate action to total
ignorance among these forest managers. They have no idea about what
they are supposed to do annually or in the long term.
In forest management it is a standard practice to have a work plan.
This is a document that details what needs to be done in each forest
estate. The absence of work plans in FD is responsible for lack of
coordination and by extension low morale in the workforce, now resulting
in the unwillingness to enforce forestry code of conduct. Workers become
motivated to implement a plan they know something about, especially
one they have helped to develop. When staff participate in planning it
gives them a sense of ownership of the process and the ensuring plans.
Miller (1998) advices that lack of involvement by people close to the
problem areas increases friction between executives and the rest of the
people who are supposed to implement strategies to solve such
problems.521 It is evident from our case study that because some
managers in the FD are not involvement in planning, they lack the
knowledge and experience in this critical area of management. As a
result they don‟t understand the direction and aims of the department.
Since they don‟t know where they are going, any road is leading
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Miller, Strategic Management, 1998:318
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anywhere. This lack of strategic planning has provided a fertile ground
for crisis management in the FD.
With over 7.5 million hectares of PFAs522 to manage as FD claims,
and given the different types of forests to be managed,523 forest planning
is a tool that needs no further advocacy. Not only does alienating some
managers in the planning process (who by the way are the policy
implementers) demoralize them, it also creates a fertile ground for
belligerence. And this is where good leadership comes in. The department
needs

to

harness

the

technical

capacities

of

its

staff

through

participatory planning and through that provide visionary leadership.
Good management and visionary leadership are so critical to any
organization that if and when they are absent, one can expect organized
chaos! Conversely, sound management practices yield high performance
organizations.
For the most part, senior managers at FD headquarters have
tended to be reactive in dealing with challenges and opportunities that
have arisen. There is over-reliance on crisis management or damage
control type of management. This kind of management style has not only
robbed FD of its best chances to capture wide opportunities out here but
has clearly made the department more reactive instead of being pro-
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This is an old figure that has no resemblance to reality on the ground. The extent of PFAs is far less
than the official figures thrown around. See Appendix 5 to this dissertation.
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A.C.R. Edmonds, The Vegetation Map of Zambia (Forest Department: Ndola, Zambia), 1976.
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active. Management style, as a part of organizational culture, is critical to
the

success

of

the

organization.

Employing

best

practices

in

management, whether in business, public or non-profit, is critical to the
survival of an organization. Managers are supposed to develop key
performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the direction the organization
is going and to create and maintain management systems that will
enhance performance. Furthermore, self-assessment through quarterly
reviews and planning sessions, prompt and resolute decision-making,
and ensuring that employees are adequately motivated are three
important keys to management. It is unlikely that any leadership that
does not provide these platforms will succeed in managing a successful
organization.
The important distinction for successful organizations is not
sociological or economic in nature or context. Rather it is the leadership
style that provides direction, creates structure and distributes power.
Sadly, not a lot of organizations are blessed with this leadership acumen.
Most organizations are over-managed and under led, which underscores
the importance of good leadership. As noted earlier in Chapter 2,
organizational

performance

will

depend

on

the

blend

between

administration, management and leadership.
Arising from personal interviews, it appears the problem dates
back to late 1980s and that the situation completely deteriorated in the
1990s and beyond when there was a total collapse of participatory
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planning. The staff point out that in spite of forestry being an outdoor
activity, in comparison to previous administration, senior managers from
mid 1980s to date, have largely been office-bound, rarely visiting the field
offices to acquaint themselves with what was on the ground. Previous
heads of the department (the Chief Conservator of Forests) believed in
and cultivated teamwork across all sections of the department not only
through participatory planning but regularly visited the provinces and
specialized units to appreciate what they were doing and solve whatever
problems they were encountering. This motivated the staff on the
ground. But for the “new crop of administrators”, as they were referred
to, they are reactive to operational problems, and only conduct field visits
to „put out fires‟ or for personal financial gain – i.e. they undertake field
trips for purposes of getting subsistence allowances. This obviously is a
pathetic way of running the department and the staff in the field are
least amused by it.
To make matters worse, the Director has developed an affinity for
clientelism and cronyism. For instance, there is a tendency of assigning
junior officers (without their immediate supervisors‟ knowledge) the
responsibilities supposed to be undertaken by senior officers, supposedly
in exchange for some favors. Naturally, this has been causing friction
between junior officers and their supervisors who cannot wait to exercise
their powers over the former. And since junior officers cannot instruct
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their supervisors what to do, whatever they have been assigned hardly
gets done!
In conclusion, any credible manager interested in positive and
progressive results would agree that this is not the best management
style! The question is: how can FD expect its officers to function
effectively if: 1) they are not involved in the planning process? 2) They do
not know what programs they are supposed to implement, let alone why?
And 3) They do not receive feedback on their performance because even
during the evaluation process these people are not included? This a
challenge FD ought to address immediately.

Decision Making Process and Staff Motivation
The decision making process came out as being an exclusively
closed

door

affair.

According

to

the

survey

results,

although

„management meetings‟ are held occasionally, they are for window
dressing only. The Director of Forestry wields so much power there is no
collective decision making although collective responsibility is expected
from the management team. In most cases, the Director makes unilateral
decisions affecting the general workforce, usually outside the scope of the
existing regulations and, without any consideration to the repercussions.
This corruption of power (defined as the abuse of power for personal
gain), which is meant to intimidate forestry personnel into submission to
the Director‟s wishes, has set the department on a wrong part.
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For instance, in recent years, staff transfers are so frequent – some
people have moved twice in a year – there is hardly time to even start
developing their strategies. Worse still some people are transferred to
[better] places where they cannot function because their skills sets do
not match the functions of that office. Forest employees are so demotivated they have no reason to work except wait for their pay checks.
And yes, they can also see the benefits of favoritism and consequences of
decent objective views. As a result, this has enhanced „boot licking,‟ and
cronyism. Although not an accepted standard, this practice is well
documented as a vehicle through which some people push their way up
the professional career ladder. Because there is a perceived benefit
accruing to both the junior officers being favored and the senior officer
expecting

a

return

favor,

slowly

the

clientelism524

is

becoming

entrenched.
As a person in a position of power, the Director is known to apply
sanctions to those outside the circle and has withdrawn benefits from
people with dissenting views; instituted unnecessary transfers, and only
offers scholarships to cronies. Personal relationships or the lack of it
between the Director and other managers has clouded the performance
of the FD.

524
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People are fearful of offering any constructive criticism because as
long as the idea does not please the director it is construed as being
personally against the incumbent. Hence, good ideas are not offered or
have not been used for fear of retribution. In other words, the
department actually does not lack the capacity to deliver, the capacity is
available but it is latent. This oppression of talent has manifested itself in
poor performance. On the other hand, those in good relationship with the
Director have been favored for training, performance evaluation and
other fringe benefits. But because such relationships are typically for
manipulative reasons, the duration has normally been short term, which
adds to the frustration when one falls out of favor and suffers the
consequences. Unlike, in the case of the Thai Highway Police where the
patron-client relationship last for a life time, the FD version is a revolving
door system in which those fall from grace (with the Director) are almost
immediately replaced by others.
According to the respondents, the department cannot increase its
performance in its present form. It requires a major surgery to reenergize the motionless technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited
transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in
fresh blood and ideas that would invigorate the workforce once again! For
now, poor leadership and personnel morale are two challenges the
department must address.
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Communication and Transport
In addition to lack of planning, communication and transportation
infrastructure are a real challenge to the department. As an entity whose
offices are represented in over 54 districts across the country, and most
of them in very remote places the absence of communication facilities is
not a matter that can simply be glossed over. If the department is slow in
responding to certain issues, part of it is due to lack of communication
facilities, which impede real time responses. But, notwithstanding this
challenge, the executive has also created another layer of problem by not
preserving the chain of command, the span of control and the channel of
communication. As mentioned earlier because of patronage (favoritism
and victimization) certain information, even of an operational nature is
not shared with all the employees. It is not uncommon for the Director to
by-pass the head of a section to directly assign junior officers duties
typically supposed to be undertaken by their supervisors, thus
undermining the authority of the latter. As a result, this has been
creating friction between heads of sections or provinces and their juniors.
In certain cases promotions and demotions have been done
without following the right procedures. For instance, in some provinces
there were two people for the position of a Provincial Extension Officer
position instead of one that the organization structure allows. This arose
because the Director appointed new people to those positions without
Cabinet Office approval to do so. According to government regulations
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only Cabinet Office has the mandate to promote or demote someone at
that level. The Director can only recommend, which was not done.
As if the communication challenge is not enough, FD also suffers
from lack of transport. A quick survey revealed that on average there was
one working vehicle per province, typically stationed at the provincial
office.
As result, foresters are hardly in the field where their services are
required, and therefore over de-forestation, irregular reporting about the
activities in the forest under uncollected revenue. Although attributed to
SAP,

which

facilitated

reduction

of

government

funding

to

the

department, this problem is largely due to the lack of managerial
capacity to anticipate the impact of such policies and failure to formulate
mitigation strategies. How have other agencies excelled yet they also
operated under the same environment? It was difficult to get a sense of
why the department has not popularized motor cycles (and even bicycles)
to enable its staff get out more often in the field. This is an area that
requires further research.

Revenue Collection Mechanism
Seemingly as an offshoot of poor management, revenue collection
is still an area of concern. Due to lack of physical presence in the field
there been an increase in illegal logging, agricultural activities and
settlements in natural forests. These un-supervised operations have not
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only robbed the department of revenue, but also heightened corruption
in the issuance of licenses. For instance, it has been estimated that the
department is collecting no more than 20% of revenue, mainly because
the department is relying on self-reporting by resource users.
At a different level the problem also relates to the value attached to
the forest resources. In particular, logging companies have taken
advantage of poor management and pay a minimal fee to harvest timber
in perpetuity. Even for high value timber like Teak (Mukusi) which
fetches no less than $500 per cubic meter on the international market,
the loggers buy for as low as $75 per cubic meter, representing only 15%
of the value. As Fynn (2004)525 and others526 before then have
recommended, revamping the revenue system and valuing the forest
resources correctly is an issue that cannot be over-emphasized.

The Public Sector Reform Program
Organizations are created for a particular purpose: to produce and
deliver goods or services to meet the expectations of their clients. In order
to remain viable an organization needs to respond to the changing
business needs of the enterprise and the environment in which it
operates. Typically its structure would reflect areas of specialization and

525

Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems, 2004.
Fynn‟s work was financed from a grant proposal this author wrote which specifically recommended that
some systematic study be undertaken to find out the best ways to improve and strengthen the forest revenue
collection mechanisms.
526
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implicitly the services to be provided.527 Prior to 1997 restructuring, FD‟s
structure was built on this principle, and the inter-dependence of its
various units called for cooperation and helped in capacity being built
over time.
In particular, staff rotation afforded the opportunity to gain
experience and knowledge from other forest areas and operations of the
department that has since been lost through restructuring. As Chandler
explains, change needs to be well planned. “Strategic growth results from
the awareness of opportunities and needs...” because a new structure
“requires a new or at least a re-fashioned structure if the enlarged
enterprise is to be operated efficiently.”528 Unless strategy shapes the
structure inefficiency would be the end result. This is so true for FD‟s
new structure which was not influenced by opportunities or strategy but
by external forces that forced the government to adhere to SAP
prescriptions.
Government bureaus hardly had any control over the process of
the PSRP. As one senior official at Cabinet Office put it, “Government
restructuring is a process we had no control over because we had only
one option: to do it. ….We were just told [by the World Bank] to reduce
government size or face consequences of losing our privileges to access

527
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their loans. ….with our national budget deeply dependent on World Bank
loans, there was no other option but to abide.”529
This development has created a few complications for Forestry
Department. First, the department has suffered from an abrupt loss of
institutional memory. The process dissipated the department‟s highly
experienced and qualified staff who were given early retirement. Second,
because of the abrupt manner in which the PSRP was implemented the
inexperienced staff found themselves in a vacuum with no one to mentor
them, having just suddenly lost the professional memory of the
department.
Also the atmosphere during the re-structuring of the department
did not leave much time for operational transitioning. Animosity and
frustration characterized those that were leaving while excitement, hope
and fear engulfed those that remained. In the process, those retired had
no motivation to hand-over operational briefs. For new hires from outside
forestry circles, this was quite a daunting experience – they literally had
to start from nowhere.
As a first bureau to undergo this exercise, uncertainty and low
morale bred disillusion. It was sad to see that sometimes “change is
painful”530. There is a deep sense of frustration within the department
arising from the fact that the department lost its best employees just
because
529
530

they

had

no

political

connections.

Cabinet Official at MDD, personal communication, 2005.
Chandler, Strategy and Structure,1962:15

In

particular,

some
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respondents bemoaned the fact that the department was short-changed
at director level where there were more and better qualified personnel
than the incumbent.
The proposal to transform FD into a new entity, the Forest
Commission, has not only cast new strategic demands and operational
issues for the department to consider, but at individual level this has reactivated fears, anxiety and job insecurity. Again forestry employees have
to go through the process of adjustment and healing. Whether well
planned or not, organizational change gives rise to instability, upheaval
and uncertainty. It brings about new bosses, and increases different
stakes of office politics. “The redistribution of power shakes the informal
organization. Anxiety warps individual behavior.”531 And this is exactly
what is happening in FD. Although looking forward to the new
organization, there is general discontentment that it is taking too long.
Consequently,

that

is

affecting

their

morale

and

professional

development plans. Some think senior management is delaying the
process for fear of losing jobs, control and power. But others are
optimistic that the new organization will bring about professionalism,
generate and allocate more resources to forest management, increase
their capacity, improve communication, as well as reach out to other
stakeholders.

531

Nadler, Champions of Change, 1998:91
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In change management, cosmetic changes rarely bring a major
impact on an organization. For a full impact, it is necessary to address
multiple related components of the organization. In the case of FD,
changing the top management my not necessarily result in the „magic
bullet‟ if the conditions of service, work culture, or even staff attitudes
are not addressed.
What is required, therefore, is a major surgery, an overhaul of the
entire organization that will address the systems and work culture.
Although Miller (1998) suggests that when senior management is
dissatisfied with the present, they initiate change.532 In the case of FD,
the desire for institutional change is stronger in middle management and
lower

positions,

i.e.

staff

who

are

frustrated

with

the

current

management style and lack of resources to perform their duties. In terms
of company politics, if such a change were to be granted, there is fertile
ground for its success. Employees are ready for it, and may quite
possibly embrace.
The PSRP, the most recent organizational change experienced by
forestry staff, lacked support at the micro level because it was initiated
and implemented by the central government, not FD. As Miller (1998)
points out even though initiators of organizational change may remain
committed to it, the success of any change strategy remains with the
handlers of implementation (the people that are involved in the day-to-

532

Miller, Strategic

Management, 1998:317:322
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day operations of the company).533 In this case, neither the handlers nor
the politicians were committed to the new structure, and that is why that
change created a frustrated labor force, manifested in their inertia. And
due to lack of other resources, FD has office foresters instead of forest
officers (being office bound instead of being in the field to supervise forest
operations). Therefore, the challenge is: is FD ready for another make
over?

OPPORTUNITIES
Although there is so much damage to the forests, not all is
completely lost. There is a possibility to redeem this situation if the
department can take a major surgery of realigning its management style
rather than a band aid strategy. Power to administer the department
must be shared across the ranks. It ought to diffuse away from the
Director to give every employee a sense of belonging and responsibility
both over the failures and successes of the department. Although public
employees are rarely blamed and, or punished as individuals for failures
of their organizations there is room to implement this through annual
reviews that should monitor and identify each employee‟s contribution to
the department‟s goals, and tie this to whether that employee deserves to
receive the annual benefits. There are several opportunities for the
department to get back on track.

533

Miller, Strategic

Management, 1998:317:322
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1.0

Harness the existing but apparently inert technical capital in
the department and make it productive.

2.0

Develop private-public partnerships for forest management by
having the private sector to underwrite certain programs. This
has been done before and it worked fairly well.

3.0

Institute necessary legal provisions that will support a
pragmatic and vigorous implementation of JFM strategy.

4.0

Commercialization of the department (e.g. into a Forest
Commission) will provide accountability and increase
performance.

5.0

Tap into the international goodwill to help with other technical
challenges such as forest inventory where the department has
no financial capacity to undertake.

6.0

The global interest in environmental management and biodiversity conservation is an opportunity the department
should fully embrace and utilize.

International Conventions and Treaties
From a global perspective, the heightened interest and realization
of the dangers associated with environmental damage,534 also helped to
bring the importance of forests to the fore. The global debate initiated at

534

Refer to the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, June 20-26, 1972
that helped push environmental concerns to the world arena. An online Conference declaration can be
accessed from UNEP at:
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentID=97&ArticleID=1503
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the 1972 Stockholm Conference that urged governments to manage the
human environment in a manner that provides for the present without
compromising benefits for future generations made the Zambian
government pay special attention to not only forests but to natural
resource conservation in general. The development of a National
Conservation Strategy (NCS), which developed what is considered as the
first broad-based policy on the environment, is a case in point. Prior to
this

there

were

only

stand-alone

sector

policies.

But

the

NCS

promulgated a holistic view and in a way set the agenda for later
collaborative works among sectors that deal with natural resources.
However, this global commitment is one large opportunity that FD
has not fully exploited. There is a lot that can be achieved in FD
partnered with other local and international organizations committed to
environmental management.
International

obligations

found

under

various

Treaties

and

Conventions to which the government of Zambia is a Party have generally
helped in the country‟s conservation efforts. This is a positive
development, one that needs to be strengthened. With financial help
through some of these agreements (e.g. the Convention on Biodiversity
Conservation, Climate Change, etc.), FD can undertake some activities
that government may not have the capacity to finance. As the world has
come to appreciate, environmental problems have no respect for national
boundaries. Therefore, FD should live up to its mandate of managing its
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estates in a way that the present generation does not outstrip the
benefits for the next.

Laws and Regulations
All the issues discussed above can be summed up under one
heading: national statutes on forestry. One of the things the foregoing
discussion has done is to highlight the fact that while much of the
challenges the department faces are managerial in context, it also
underscores the idea that simply making some changes to the prevailing
statutes on forestry could help ameliorate most of the problems. But this
is only possible if the forest managers are able to identify where the
problems lie and to develop the strategies so that appropriate
interventions could be implemented. And since law making is a political
contest, these forest managers will require sound political skills and
tenacity to attract supporters and build alliances across a broad
spectrum of society. In its current disposition the department is far out
of range. Foresters need to get out of the forests and start talking to the
politicians.

THE WAY FORWARD
1.0

There is need to undertake a thorough human resource needs
and skills mix assessment. As this research has found out not
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every forester can be a good manager. A change at Director level
is certainly inevitable.
2.0

Developing short and long term strategies to chat a new course
of action for the department must be a mandatory output
requiring the participation of all managers, not just a select few.

3.0

Revisit the licensing mechanisms to ensure revenue is captured
in a transparency and accountable fashion.

4.0

Design a benefit-sharing model with District Councils and local
Chiefs so that these too share the benefit(s) of managing local
forests. At the moment all revenue goes to central government.

5.0

Harmonize the roles of other natural resources management
entities like ZAWA, Departments of Energy, Agriculture and
Lands to develop a comprehensive plan for the management of
bio-diversity.

6.0

Integrate forest-based industries in the national planning
portfolio as an alternative avenue for job creation and source of
livelihood.

7.0

Develop specific strategies to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). In other words, interpret and relate
the department‟s activities to the MDGs.
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Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion illustrates FD has indeed undergone
some major metamorphosis – both in its structure and emphasis in its
functions. The growth in its estates stands out as one area of success.
But their decline also speaks volumes in how the department‟s
leadership changed from professional excellence to mediocrity. Indeed,
external factors such as policy shifts and population growth placed a
different set of responsibility on the FD, both of which needed better
equipped and visionary staff to deal with these challenges and translate
them into opportunities. Sadly, the department is yet to find its feet and
be as effective again.
Forest [mis]management in Zambia is clearly having its toll on the
local communities who are heavily dependent on these resources.
Though no direct effects have been quantified, indirectly the connection
between environmental damage, poverty, and disease and the resultant
vicious circle of problems this yields and sustains is well understood.
Therefore, when people try to migrate from these vices of land
degradation, disease, and poverty, in search of better economic
opportunities, usually that movement tends to create conflict over access
rights in the new area(s).
For instance, one of the underlying causes to the conflict in Darfur,
Sudan is precisely land degradation, which made different ethnic groups
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to start fighting over land that could sustain their livelihood.535 Zambia
has a choice to avoid this from arising by taking care of its land now.
And

because

environmental

problems

extend

beyond

national

boundaries, any such problems could affect other people thousands of
miles away. For instance, when conflict and possibly wars break out, the
global community is drawn in and pays the price in one way or another.
Worse still most of these effects will only be known long after the forests
are gone. This is where our concern arises. What should be done to halt
forest degradation in Zambian? The short answer is that there is need to
build institutional capacity in FD, particularly managerial competence.
As this study has shown, managerial capacity matters. And it matters for
at least two reasons: first, it is what enforces the rules and second, it
affects and influences the outcomes!

535

For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Ghadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest
for Peace, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.), 2006.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Zambia National Forest Policy, 1965

Zambia National Forest Policy, 1965536
1. To carry out in each district forest surveys to determine the forest
resources for each district, the forest areas needed to be managed
for land protection and for local and industrial supplies of forest
produce, and the forest plantations which are needed, so that the
forest estate required can be put under Government control.
2. To carry out all necessary research work on the ecology, protection,
management, and restocking of indigenous forest areas; on the
establishment, protection and management of plantations and on
the protective role of forests.
3. To carry out all necessary research on the exploitation of indigenous
and plantation timbers, on the properties, seasoning, saw-milling,
preservation and working qualities of these timbers, and, in cooperation with other interested organisations, to carry out necessary
research and development work on timber engineering and on
supplies for wood-based industries.
4.

To

provide

tree

seed

for

the

Republic‟s

plantations

by

the

establishment of seed stands and seed orchards, and by collection
and purchase.
5. To place under government control sufficient forest areas in each
district to supply the forest produce required for people‟s homes,
farms

and

local

industries,

and

to

provide

for

the

proper

management of these forest areas.
536

This is an abbreviated version, and can be found in any Forestry Department Annual Report.
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6. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed
to provide forest produce for people‟s homes, farms and local
industries in districts where indigenous forest areas are unable to
meet local needs, and to establish and manage these plantations.
7. To place under government control and to manage those forest areas
needed to supply the Republic‟s industries with their requirements
of timber and, where possible, to supply timber for export.
8. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed
to supply the Republic‟s industries with their requirements of
timber, and to establish and manage these plantations.
9. To make arrangements for the cutting and marketing of indigenous
and plantation timber.
10. To supply indigenous and plantation timber for industrial and local
needs at an economic price.
11. To place under government control, and to manage forest areas
needed for protect the land against floods, erosion and desiccation
and to maintain the flow of rivers.
12. To integrate the Republic‟s forest areas and plantation in a wise
system of land use, and to co-operate with other organisations in the
development and protection of the Republic‟s natural resources.
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13. To provide an extension service in bee-keeping and in the production
of beeswax and honey based on research and development work on
bee-keeping under Zambian conditions.
14. To advise and encourage local authorities, interested organisations
and private persons in the practice of sound forestry.
15. To spread among the people of Zambia an understanding of forestry.
16. To provide opportunities for technical training for those engaged in
forest work.

United National Independence Party Forestry Policy, 1974-1984.537
In accordance with the policy of industrialization, the Party will work for
self-sufficiency in timber and forestry products. To this end, the Party
will:
1. Take more effective measures in forest and fauna conservation by the
reinforcement of the existing measures against indiscriminate
cutting of trees and burning of forests;
2. Take measures to control charcoal burning and the chitemene system;
3.

Encourage

the

replanting

of

new

forests

to

meet

Zambia‟s

requirements of timber and forestry products, using labour intensive
methods to the largest extent possible; and

537

These UNIP policy statements were included for the first time in the Forestry Department Annual
Report for 1976 as part of government policy on forestry (see FD, 1980:16).

3

Zambia National Forest Policy, 1965

Appendix 1

4. Establish local industries for the manufacture and processing of
timber and forestry products to increase employment for the local
populations.

Source: FD Annual Report, 1986
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APPENDIX 2

PERSONAL OPINION QUESTIONAIRE
Part I: Respondent’s Service History
1. How long have you worked for the Forestry Department?

2.

□ Less than 5 years

□ 16-25 years

□ 5-15years

□ Over 25 years

Which sections of the department have you worked in and for how long?
(Please check all that applies).











Forest Management

Period (in Years)



a) Forestry Dept. Headquarters

__________________



b) Provincial HQ

__________________



c) Districts

__________________

Forest Extension

__________________



a) Forestry Dept. Headquarters

__________________



b) Provincial HQ

__________________



c) Districts

__________________

Forest Research

__________________



a) Forest Research Headquarters

__________________



b) Silviculture and Tree Genetics

__________________



c) Seed Store

__________________

Forest Products Research


a) Major Forest Products

__________________



b) Minor Forest Products

__________________



c) Utilization

__________________

Beekeeping

__________________



a) Extension

__________________



b) Production

__________________



Zambia Forestry College



Other (Please Specify)

__________________
________________________

__________________
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What positions have you held since you joined the department?
______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

4. What is your current position?

_________________________________________

5. What are your current responsibilities?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
6. Which division of the department are you working in now?




Forest Management
Extension
Forest Research

□ Forest Products Research
□ Beekeeping
□ Other (please specify) _________________

7. How many people do you supervise; those that directly report to you?





1-5
6-15
16-30
Over 30 people

8. What educational training level have you attained? (Check only the highest attained).









Ph.D.
M.Phil.
Master‟s Degree
Graduate Certificate
Bachelor‟s Degree
Forestry Diploma
Forestry Certificate
Other (Please specify)

______________________________________________

9. What is your field of specialization? ______________________________________
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10. Gender of Respondent?

□ Male

□ Female

11. Your age group (Please select one that applies).






Less than 20 years
20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50 and above

Part II: The Structural Adjustment Program.
1. Do you know anything about the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)?



2.

Yes
No
When was the SAP introduced in Zambia?







1973
1983
1985
Sometime in the 1990s
I don‟t know

3. Why did the Zambian govt. decide to implement SAP? What was the program
supposed to achieve? (check only 3 that apply).


Deal with inflation problems.



Sell (privatize) parastatal companies.



Reduce size of government through employee lay offs.



Become more accountable on public finance management.



Develop other sectors in addition to copper mining.



Promote private investment in non-copper producing sectors.



Increase exports from agriculture, forestry, and tourism.



Liberalize the domestic market by removing govt. controls on trade and
commerce.



CP

Other (p/se specify) _________________________________________________
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What are the three sectors the Zambian government selected as primary targets to

implement the SAP?


Health



Education



Labor



Mining



Agriculture



Forestry



Tourism



Financial institutions (e.g. Bank of Zambia)



All of the above



Other (p/se specify)

5.

Was the Forestry Department supposed to implement the SAP?


Yes



No



Not sure



I don‟t know

6.

6.1

________________________________________________

In your opinion, has Forestry Department implemented the SAP?


Yes



No



I don‟t know

If yes, how has the department implemented the SAP?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

CP
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If “no”, why do you think so?

6.2

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

7.

Does the department have plans/strategies to implement the SAP?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
7.1

If yes, what goals / outcomes are these plans supposed to achieve? (list as many as
you know).

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
7.2

If no, why do you think so?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

8.
What is the status on the department‟s achievement of the SAP goals you just
mentioned in your previous response? (list all that you mentioned).
Goal

Status (please check one)

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented
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_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

_______________________________________________

□
□
□
□

fully achieved
partially achieved
not achieved
not implemented

When you compare the department‟s performance before and during the SAP,

9.1

how did the department perform before the structural adjustment period?





Better
Worse
No difference
I don‟t know

Why do you think so?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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9.2 How has the department performed during the structural adjustment period?





Better
Worse
No difference
I don‟t know

Why do you think so?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
10. Is there anything that should be done to improve the situation?




Yes
No
I don‟t know

11. What exactly should be done to improve the department‟s performance?
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
12.
How is the status of the forest resources now compared to the period before the
SAP?


Better



Worse (degraded and over-exploited)



About the same (no difference)



I don‟t know

(Please explain why you think so).
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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13.1 How were the working relationships between the department and forest resource
users before the SAP?


Better



Worse



No difference



I don‟t know

(Explain why you think so).
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

13.2 How are the working relationships now between the department and forest resource
users after the SAP?





Better
Worse
No difference
I don‟t know

(Explain why you think so).
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

14. Which groups are involved in developing the Forestry Policy in Zambia?










Timber producers
Local communities living around the forests
Traditional leaders (Chiefs)
Government bureaucrats
Politicians
NGOs dealing with environmental issues
Charcoal producers
Beekeepers
Other (p/se specify) _________________________________________________
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15. Starting with “1” as the most influential group, rank the groups you just identified in
the previous question to indicate their influence on forestry policy.










Timber producers
Local communities living around the forests
Traditional leaders (Chiefs)
Government bureaucrats
Politicians
NGOs dealing with environmental issues
Charcoal producers
Beekeepers
Other (p/se specify) ___________________________________________

16.1 How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers
before SAP?

□ Very Good
□ Fair
□ No difference
□ Poor
□ I don‟t know
Why you think so?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

16.2 How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers
after SAP?

□ Very Good
□ Fair
□ No difference
□ Poor
□ I don‟t know
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Why you think so?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

17. Comparing the time before and after SAP, would you say the department now has:

□
□
□
□

more resources
fewer resources
about the same
I don‟t know
_________________________________

(Please list the resources you have in
mind).
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________

_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________

18. Does the station where you are working now have enough of these resources?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
19.1 Which of these resources do you think the department needs more of in order to
improve its performance?
_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________
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19.2 Which resources do you think the department should reduce in order to improve its
performance?
_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

_________________________________

20. Do forestry staff carry out their field operations as scheduled all year round?

□ Yes
□ No
□ Not sure
□ I don‟t know
(Give reasons for your response).
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

21. In comparison with agriculture and tourism sectors, what would you say about the
support that Forestry Dept. receives from policy makers and politicians for having its
programs financed?





Always receives 1st priority).
Always receives lowest priority).
Falls somewhere in between.
I don‟t know

Part III:

Administrative Practices

1. Does the Forestry Department have a mission statement?


Yes

□ No

□ I don‟t know

(If you checked “No” or “I don‟t know,” skip the next question).
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What is the department‟s mission statement?

2.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
3.

Does the department set strategic goals?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
4. What are the department‟s current strategic goals? (List as many as you know).
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
5. Has the department developed the plans to achieve its strategic goals?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I don‟t know

6. How often does the department develop these plan(s)?







Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Every Six Months
Yearly
Other (Please specify). _______________________________________________

7. Does the department have such plan(s) now?

□ Yes

□ No

□ I don‟t know
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Which people are involved in developing the department‟s goals and plan(s) to

8.

achieve its strategic goals?
______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

Are you involved in the process of developing the department‟s plans and setting

9.

its goals?

□ Always
□ Sometimes
□ Never
How would you rate the process of developing the department‟s plans?

10.





Very useful
Useful
Somehow useful
Not useful (waste of time)

11. Do you know what the department‟s strategic goals are?

□ Yes
□ No
12. Are you aware of your role in achieving the department‟s strategic goals?
□ Always
□ Sometimes
□ Never
13. Has the department implemented its plans?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
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13.1 If yes, how?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

13.2 If not, please explain why.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
14.1

Does the department experience any problems implementing its plans?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
14.2

If yes, what are these problems? (list as many as you know).

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
15. How do these problems affect the department‟s performance?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

16.

Do you know of any other means that help the department to implement its plans

and achieve its goals?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know

14
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If yes, what are they?

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________

17.

APPENDIX 2

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________

Does the department measure / evaluate its performance?

□ Yes
□ No
□ I don‟t know
18.

Approximately how often does the department evaluate/measure its performance?







19.

Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Every Six Months
Yearly
Other (Please specify). _______________________________________________
How does the department evaluate its performance?

□ Employs consultants to do the work
□ Convenes meetings for Heads of Divisions
□ Planning Unit analyzes reports from the Divisions
□ I don‟t know

20.

Are you involved in the process of measuring/evaluating the department‟s

performance?

□ Always
□ Sometimes
□ Never
21.

Does this process need improvement or should it be left as it is?

□ Need improvement
□ Leave it as it is
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□ Scrap it off
22.

In your opinion, how can the evaluation process be improved?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
23. Please write any general comments you may have.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

The End.

Thank you for your time.
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Mr. Obote Shakachite

Chief Extension Officer
Forestry Department HQ
(now the Managing Director for ZAFFICO)

Dr. Kenneth Nkhowani

Director
Natural Resources Dept, MTENR

Mr. Davy Siame

Chief Planner
Natural Resources Dept, MTENR

Mr. Thomson Musonda

Principal Planner
Planning & Information Dept, MTENR

Ms. Chiseche M. Mutale

Chief Planner
Planning & Information Dept, MTENR

Mr. Lubinda Aongola

Director
Planning & Information Dept, MTENR

Mr. Jack Mukosha

GIS Specialist
Forestry Department, NW Province
(Temporarily working at FD HQ)

Ms. Elizabeth Ndhlovu

Forest Sector Advisor
The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka

Ms. Wilma

Senior Counsellor
The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka

Viljamaa

Mr. Moses Chakanga

Forest Management Specialist, Namibia
(on short-term consultancy with the Finnish
Embassy, Lusaka)

Mr. Jose S. Simuyi

Head of Budget Information Systems
Ministry of Finance & National Planning

Ms. Veronica Mwiiche

Director
MDD, Cabinet Office, Lusaka

Mr. Bernard J. Kampansa

Public Policy Specialist
PAC, Cabinet Office, Lusaka

Ms. Rilla Hansali

Assistant Director
Technical Services, Cabinet Office, Lusaka

Mr. Benjamin Bota

Acting Director
Recruitment & Placements, Cabinet Office

Ms. Zeles Zulu

Director
Dept. of Local Government Administration
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Mr. Maxwell Phiri

Coordinator, PFAP
Forestry Dept., Lusaka

Mr. Aaron Sugar Banda

Forestry Extension Specialist
[Retired] Chief Extension Officer, Ndola

Mr. D.M. Tombo

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Northern Province

Mr. Kenneth Kambeu

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Lusaka Province

Mr. B.M. Chomba

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Central Province

Mr. Charles Taulo

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Southern Province

Mr. John Mulombwa

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Copperbelt Province

Mr. Fanwell Sikasamba

Principal Extension Officer
FD, North-Western Province

Mr. M.S. Mutemwa

Principal Extension Officer
FD, Luapula Province

Mr. Besa Muwele

Senior Statistician, Agric. & Forestry
Central Statistical Office, Lusaka

Mr. Joseph Tembo

Senior Statistician, External Trade
Central Statistical Office, Lusaka

Dr. Patrick Phiri

Senior Lecturer, Biology Dept.
University of Zambia, Lusaka
(now at Copperbelt University, Kitwe)

Dr. Fred Mutesa

Lecturer, Development Studies
University of Zambia, Lusaka

Mr. Victor K. Kazembe

Country Representative
Plant Resources of Tropical Africa (PROTA)
(also Chairman, Commonwealth Forest Association
– Zambia Branch)

Dr. Erick Chisanga

General Manager, ZAFFICO
(on sabbatical from Copperbelt University)

Mr. Felix Njovu

Lecturer
Copperbelt University, Kitwe
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Externally-Funded Forest Sector Investments by Project.
A. Multilateral Projects
PROJECT
Industrial Forestry
Fuelwood Plantations
Food Assistance to Forestry
Forestry Training Programme
Wood Energy Consumption Resource Survey

FINANCIER
World Bank
IDRC
WFP
IDA
UNDP

Intra Regional Co-operation in Development of
Plantation Forest Industry
Action Programme to Combat Deforestation
Forestry Industry Investment Promotion

UNDP
UNDP
FAO

Forest Resource Conservation Study
Zambia Forestry Action Programme

EU
UNDP/Netherlands

Forest Support Programme (support to the
Establishment of ZFC)
Forest Resource Management Project
Forest Resource Management Project
Forest Resource Management Project

EU
DED (German
Development Services
IFAD
IRISH AID
Total

US$
34,600,000
156,000
1,830,000
1,500,000
392,000

YEAR
1969-1993
(1982- ?)
1984-1990
1985-1989
1985-1986

3,248,000
316,000
160,000

1988-1991
1989-1991
1994-1995

336,000 1994-1995
893,860 1995-1997
2002-2004
1,690,000 2002-2008
12,633,000 2002-2008
123,366 2002-2008
57,878,226

B. Bilateral Projects
PROJECT
Dry Forestry
Chinyunyu Forestry Project
Forestry Education and Training
Forestry Education and Training
Forest and Forest Products Research
Kafubu Sawmill I & II
Formulation of a Community Forestry Strategy
Soil Conservation and Agroforestry
Forestry and Sawmill
Improvement and Strengthening of Forestry
Colleges in the SADC Region
Kafubu Frame Sawmill
Forestry Department Training
Special Fund for Forestry Sector
Kafubu Sawmill: Reservation for Harvesting and
Transport Import
Production of Agroforestry Manuals (Eastern,
Southern & Northern Zambia)

FINANCIER

US$

CIDA
NORAD
FINNIDA
FINNIDA
FINNIDA
FINNIDA
SIDA
SIDA
NORAD

810,000
714,000
8,570,000
500,142
508,000
788,000

? (1980-81)
? 19821983-1992
1985-1990
1985-1989
1985-1992
1986-1989
? 19861988-1992

FINNIDA
FINNIDA
ODA
FINNIDA

23,051,000
5,692,000
675,000
5,716,000

1989-1992
1989-1993
1989-1995
1990-1994

FINNIDA

2,860,000

1990-1992

8,000

? (1991-92)

SIDA

130,000
48,000

YEAR

1
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Zambia Forestry College
Acacia Trials
Forest Resource Management Study
Forest Research Training
SADC Tree Seed Centre
Support to the Forestry Extension Services in
Solwezi
Chinyunyu Forestry Project, Chongwe.
Forest Extension in Northern Province.
Provincial Forestry Action Programme, Phase I
Forest Extension in Northern Province.
Zambia Teak Forests.
Beekeeping Training & Extension Services, NW
Province.
Conservation of the Zambia Teak Forests

APPENDIX 4
CIDA
CIDA
JICA
ODA
CIDA

127,000
80,000
4,098,119
149,000

GDS (German Devt Svc)
NORAD
NVS (Norway)
FINNIDA
NVS (Norway)
GTZ
GDS
GTZ

Finnish Grant to the Provincial Forestry Programme,
bridging phase.
FINNIDA
Provincial Forestry Action Programme, Phase II
FINNIDA (Euro 6,389,056)
Total

1993
1993
1993-1995
1993-1994
1993-1998

2,808
1994-1996
4,091,090
1995
16,000,000
1995
4,400,000 1995-2005
38,000,000
1996
49,000,000
1996
6,329,912
3,000,000

1997
1997-2003

230,520,000
8,303,167
405,690,071

1997-2005
2000-2005

C. Non-Governmental Funded Projects
PROJECT
Promotion of Beekeeping
Forestry Extension and Saw-milling
Promotion of Agroforestry
Support to Beekeepers Association North-Western
Province

FINANCIER
AFRICARE
Finnish Volunteer Services
AFRICARE
OXFAM

YEAR
1983
1987-1996
1988
1992-1996

Nursery Establishment and Tree Planting in Petauke Lutheran World Federation
Support to Crafts Association in North-Western
Province
OXFAM
Tree Planting in Petauke
Beekeeping Training & Extension Services, NW
Province.

US$
990,000
53,200
92,000

MS-ZAMBIA
ADP/IFAD
Total
Grand Total

1,158

1994-1996

23,000 ? 1996-(1999)
2,000

1996

29,176,691
30,338,049

1997

493,906,346

Notes:
? means not too sure about the dates.
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GRZ Funding to Forestry Capital Projects, 1994=100 (ZMK '000).
Year
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1993
1994-1997
1998-2001
2002-2005

National Level
984830769
1283492644
290819669
0
0
0

Provincial Level
2975438462
512536552
113464695
0
0
0

Total Allocation
3960269231
1796029195
404284365
0
0
0

Source: MENR, Zambia Forestry Action Programme, Vol. II
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Change in PFAs, Annual Allocations and Forestry Personnel, 1962-2005.
PFAs (million ha.)

Operational
Funds
(ZMK,
million)

Capital
Funds
(ZMK,
million)

Forestry Department Personnel

1

Revenue
(ZMK,
million)

Professional

Technical

Field
Staff

Admin

Total
Staff

499.3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1071.1

4278.3

622.5

"

"

"

"

"

1271.5

5.23

4919.9

1349.7

"

"

"

"

"

1395.0

5,236,267

5.24

5416.3

1720.5

"

"

"

"

"

1520.9

1966

5,346,067

5.35

5825.6

1967.5

"

"

"

"

"

1784.2

1967

5,590,192

5.59

7363.6

4502.1

"

"

"

"

"

1788.3

1968

5,618,342

5.62

24011.7

3983.8

"

"

"

"

"

2333.9

1969

5,710,484

5.71

34707.3

2446.9

"

"

"

"

"

3840.0

1970

5,805,609

5.81

3048.1

5474.7

33

66

350

145

594

1244.7

1971

6,889,000

6.89

5951.7

2722.9

36

179

287

109

522

2123.3

1972

6,419,100

6.42

3911.7

222.3

33

166

280

119

598

2364.6

1973

7,054,600

7.05

2393.5

813.2

33

103

284

132

552

2368.9

1974

7,130,600

7.13

3000.1

842.7

26

84

284

132

552

2789.7

1975

7.16

1080.0

893.9

36

53

214

145

448

4375.1
4112.3

1977

7,189,480
7,423,902
7,496,343

1978

Year

Currently
Reported

Projection

1962

5,000,000

5.00

4071.5

1963

5,041,525

5.04

1964

5,229,167

1965

1976

2

7.33

1000.0

706.7

28

82

267

145

522

7.42

1071.4

432.8

26

114

374

144

658

4285.1

7,496,343

7.50

1412.5

1249.9

37

118

367

135

657

3670.8

1979

7,841,425

7.67

1277.8

6797.9

37

150

326

142

655

3358.3

1980

7,601,400

7.60

830.0

764.0

41

190

222

132

585

3181.3

1981

7,635,000

7.64

863.6

1394.5

50

213

333

92

688

4192.7

1982

7,635,000

7.64

175.0

1253.3

47

244

353

161

805

4958.9

1983

7,605,500

7.61

453.3

2010.0

40

82

372

82

576

717.7
576.8

1984

7,462,149

7.46

105.6

480.6

40

81

365

80

566

1985

7,378,305

7.38

77.8

3.0

38

97

365

80

580

478.3

1986

7,405,500

7.41

295.2

794.0

35

113

3132

63

3343

587.5

1987

7,435,835

7.44

169.4

409.8

29

117

1410

58

1614

254.3

1988

7,425,454

7.43

272.3

0.0

21

108

1303

55

1487

561.2

1989

7,375,533

7.38

426.2

1404.3

21

128

1303

55

1507

492.9

1990

7,375,533

7.38

145.3

0.0

19

152

1288

55

1514

250.9

1991

7,375,533

7.38

83.6

351.4

23

142

1273

62

1500

364.6
97.4

1992

7,361,406

7.36

6.4

154.9

23

130

1249

62

1464

1993

7,233,884

7.23

6.0

0.1

28

130

1247

54

1459

93.3

1994

7,233,884

7.10

7.1

0.0

28

128

1188

50

1394

95.3

1995

7,233,884

6.49

5.7

0.0

17

112

1120

64

1313

436.1

1996

7,199,802

6.49

4.4

10.4

21

124

1064

63

1272

327.8
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Appendix 5 (cont’d)
PFAs (million ha.)
Year

Currently
Reported

Projection

2

Operational
Funds
(ZMK,
million)

Capital
Funds
(ZMK,
million)

Forestry Department Personnel
Professional

Technical

Field
Staff

1

Admin

Total
Staff

Revenue
(ZMK,
million)

1997

7,176,273

6.46

5.0

30.5

26

115

695

47

883

265.1

1998

7,107,256

6.43

4.0

0.0

26

115

695

47

883

284.4

1999

7,103,099

6.37

6.0

362.3

26

115

695

47

883

416.1
399.8

2000

7,103,099

6.36

4.4

57.0

41

539

478

60

883

2001

7,103,099

5.62

83.3

327.6

44

434

273

135

886

342.5

2002

7,103,099

5.16

231.4

305.6

22

439

384

82

927

202.3

2003

7,103,099

5.16

135.5

0.0

23

417

374

76

890

221.0

2004

7,103,099

5.16

1136.9

0.0

23

418

374

76

891

111.2

2005

7,103,099

5.16

950.5

0.0

23

418

374

76

891

102.0

1

No data available for 1962 to 1969.

2

Projected status, adjustment based on reports from the Provinces. This figure may be possibly lower.
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